The Renascence of South Africa

BY

ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN

Gold Medallist Royal Geographical Society;
Formerly Administrator of Mashonaland, South Africa, and
Special Correspondent of the "Times" in S. Africa and the Far East;
Author of
"China in Transformation," "The 'Overland' to China,"
"Russia against India," etc., etc.

IN ONE VOLUME
WITH MAP

LONDON
HURST AND BLACKETT, LIMITED
13, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET
1900

PRINTED BY KELLY'S DIRECTORIES LIMITED,
LONDON AND KINGSTON

PREFACE.

THE year 1900, which sees the Death of the Old South Africa, sees also its Renascence.

This book is an attempt to gather together and present in the simplest form the salient facts in the story of South Africa and the principal features in the problem of settlement with which, as a nation, we are face to face.

There is no attempt to deal with the war in any detail; its place in the scheme of affairs is shewn, but for a record of it the reader must turn elsewhere. It has revolutionized many things, but the Problem of South Africa is deeper and wider and cannot be settled by mere *force majeure.*

South Africa is the land of surprises—not always pleasant ones—and it is not unlikely that her prosperity in the future may largely depend on conditions now unappreciated. If we are to master the riches she has in store we must broaden our conception of her possibilities.

The writer has approached the vital problems of South Africa not without diffidence, but a knowledge of many parts of that continent and special experience there, as well as in Asia, in an administrative capacity have assisted him in forming judgment, and in every case he has tried to suggest the strictly practical and plain solution instead of the theoretical.

Several reforms are suggested in this book which are absolutely necessary for the future success of South Africa, but no attempt is made to elaborate details, for a certain elasticity is essential to the success of all policies, and, moreover, the final solution of most of the problems, and the complete working out of every policy, must come from South Africa itself, if they are ever to succeed.

Failure in South Africa in the past has been the result of colossal ignorance. Let every man resolve that no such excuse may avail him or his rulers in the future. Great Britain cannot afford to fail in South Africa. It is the duty of every man to get sound knowledge and form a thoughtful opinion on the vital problems with which we are grappling to-day.

If we do this, and approach those problems with the light of a clear and definite policy, then will the glorious record of our country have a fitting sequel, and among her offshoots—last but not least—will arise South Africa Renascent and United!

A. R. C.

NOTE.—The writer desires to acknowledge his indebtedness, amongst others, to the works of Theal, Noble, Lucas, Gresswell, and Bryce.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.—THE LAND.

CHAPTER II.—THE PEOPLE.

CHAPTER III.—HISTORY.

CHAPTER IV.—THE NEW LANDS OF PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT.

APPENDIX.

THE RENASCENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA.



CHAPTER I.

THE LAND.

CHAPTER I.

THE LAND.

PART I.

RIVERS, CLIMATE AND FORESTS.

IT is impossible to form an adequate or even a coherent idea of a people until a study has been made of the country in which they live. Still less is it possible to gauge the political possibilities of a country without some knowledge of its physical features. It is no new simile, but a very apposite one, to say that, just as a physician must have a complete knowledge of the human frame, its construction, arteries and nerve system, before he can diagnose a local trouble, so those who desire any understanding of the conditions and possibilities of a country, or who wish to penetrate the reasons of any peculiar situation in that country, must perforce be acquainted with its geography, its water system or arteries, its mountains or backbone, and its climate, which may be likened to its nerves.

The influence of different aspects of nature on the

people who dwell among them is an important feature in the moulding of character and must inevitably have its place in their history. This is recognised forcibly in Germany, where the study of geography is given a foremost place, and is no doubt a large factor in the remarkable progress of that empire. Nowhere is this influence so wonderfully illustrated as in South Africa, where the unusual geographical and physical conditions have produced, or rather moulded, a race absolutely unlike any other of European descent. Without the mountain fringe and interior plateau of South Africa, there would have been no Boers.

These weighty reasons must serve as an apology for a description, as brief as possible, of the physical characteristics of South Africa, and the reader is asked to wade patiently through much that may seem to him heavy or uninteresting in the hope that he will eventually see not only its relevancy but its usefulness.

There are three regions south of the Zambesi. First, the low coast land of the Indian Ocean from near Cape Town to the Zambesi, increasing in width as one proceeds northwards. Narrow in the south, it broadens after Durban, being some 15 to 20 miles wide at Delagoa Bay, about 70 miles at Beira, and wider still further north. The Portuguese territory is

mainly lowland, and is swampy, wet, reeking with malaria, fertile but most unhealthy. Second, the hill slopes generally rising gradually, till some 30 to 40 miles from the coast they reach an elevation of 3,000 to 4,000 feet, and at 60 miles inland 5,000 to 6,000. These hill slopes, with narrower and steeper valleys as one goes inland, belong to the Drakensberg range, which runs 1,600 miles from the Zambesi to the Cape. The heights vary between 3,000 to 7,000 feet in the neighbourhood of Cape Town, and highest in Basutoland, with snow for some months in the year, the only instance of the sort in South Africa. Third, a plateau region 3,000 to 5,000 feet high stretches out behind the Drakensberg range, the higher plateau of Central Africa, with its mountains and valleys, which occupies seven-eighths of the surface of the Continent south of the Zambesi, and stretches to close by that river on the north and to the Atlantic on the west.

Viewed from west to east there is, then, a vast plateau separated from the low lying coast by one range with its broken spurs. This plateau is, as has been remarked, South Africa, the margin along the sea board being a mere fringe; but its importance, owing to its dryness and sterility, does not correspond with its area.

The harbours of South Africa are few. Between Cape Town and the Zambesi there is, at Durban, merely sheltered deep water with a bar, while the other ports, Delagoa Bay and Beira, are both in Portuguese territory. On the west, on the Atlantic coast, there is one fairly good harbour, Saldanha Bay, twenty miles north of Cape Town, the only one for over a thousand miles.

From what has been said, it will be clear that there is a considerable variation of climate. The chief characteristic of the interior is extreme dryness. Mounting the plateau from the eastern coast, three climates are met. First, tropical, on the coast, moist and damp. Second, semi-continental on the hill slopes. Third, continental on the interior plateau and mountain districts. These are, of course, broad distinctions, with many local exceptions; for instance, there is a great difference between the Western coast of Namaqualand and Damaraland, where the rainfall is very slight, and the eastern littoral; and in Cape Colony itself, and in the districts of the east coast there are many differences due to local conditions. The second climate is good, deriving coolness from the ocean winds, but free from humidity and depression common on the littoral itself. With the exception of a certain small area near Cape Town there is neither

winter nor summer, but merely a wet and dry season lasting respectively four and eight months. There is no "rainy season" punctual in its appearance and ending, as in India, with the monsoons. The rainfall is intermittent and violent, usually in the shape of thunderstorms, which are of no service to the farmer. The torrents of rain falling in a short space of time upon the sun-baked surface of the earth disappear like magic in the deep river beds, and even when there is a comparatively heavy rainfall the soil soon becomes dried up. The suddenness with which the rain pours down transforms the country; each path becomes a rivulet; the sluit, or hollow, a rushing stream; the stream a wild torrent, rising in an incredibly short space of time twenty or thirty feet above its ordinary level. The third climate has an air so dry and bracing that the extremes of heat and cold—as much as 40 or 50 degrees between day and night—are not felt as they would be elsewhere. For those afflicted with diseases of the lungs this climate is perfect.

As a consequence of its physical features there are in South Africa for practical purposes no rivers, which are only to be found on maps. In the dry season a waterless but water-worn channel, concealed, except in times of floods and freshets, by stunted willows and

acacias, is all that can be seen of the so-called river. The coast streams are either torrents or feeble and sluggish. The chief rivers, like the Orange River and Limpopo, during three-fourths of the year are useless for navigation; not only this, they are of little use to the agriculturist, for from its deep bed the water cannot easily be drawn for irrigating purposes. The lowness of the beds, with the drifts or fords, makes the passage by Cape cart or ox waggon both difficult and dangerous. In the absence of waterways all locomotion has hitherto been necessarily by horse or wheeled conveyance. In proceeding northwards in the dry season, through the immense areas of the northern portion of Cape Colony and Bechuanaland, water is scarcely met with. During the rainy season, the few rivers encountered—the Orange River, the Limpopo and its tributaries—are frequently impassable for days, and unnavigable on account of the violence of the current.

South of the Zambesi, following the western coast from the Cunene river (the northern boundary of Damaraland) to the mouth of the Zambesi on the east, there are, broadly speaking, four chief river systems. The Orange River, rising in the Drakensberg and draining the country east to west into the Atlantic, across almost the whole breadth of the

continent. The rivers in the south, carrying off the sudden thunderstorms and periodical rains of the Great Karroo. The rivers of Kaffirland and Zululand as far north as Delagoa Bay; hill torrents rising in the Drakensberg range and falling into the Indian Ocean. The Limpopo, Sabi and Zambesi rivers, draining the country north of the Transvaal and the territory known as Southern Rhodesia (Matabililand and Mashonaland), Khama's country and the district of Bechuanaland bordering the Kalahari desert. The drainage in the neighbourhood of the Zambesi falls eastward, the Orange River the exact reverse. The Zambesi rises close to the Atlantic, yet falls into the Indian Ocean; the Orange river rises near the Indian Ocean and falls into the Atlantic.

The Zambesi deserves, as the greatest of South African rivers, more than a passing notice. It is mainly known so far by its chief feature, the Victoria Falls, the wonder and admiration of all who have seen them. Their grandeur probably receives additional emphasis from the character of the country through which they have been usually approached, the arid and waterless tracts, the almost desert country north of the Ngami river. After sweeping in a broad flood half a mile across, past countless islands and rocks, the Zambesi river falls sheer, and rushes through a

narrow chasm a mile long before resuming its usual breadth.

As there are no rivers in South Africa there are also no lakes. Lake Ngami and Andersson's Vlei in the Kalahari desert are lakes in name only and, unconnected with any river or regular lake system, can serve no useful purpose. In this respect South Africa is in striking contrast with Canada, or even with Equatorial Africa. The natural hollows which, filled with water in the rainy season, are called lakes, rapidly dry, leaving an incrustation of salt on the surface, and are thus called salt-pans.

In the matter of vegetation South Africa is a terribly bare country, especially inland. On the south coast of Cape Colony and Natal there are ancient forests, with areas preserved and cared for by Government, such as the Knysna forest, between the ports of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. The forest vegetation here has a semi-tropical luxuriance, but the trees are seldom more than fifty feet in height, the yellow-wood, the black iron-wood and the stink-wood or laurel-wood being the chief varieties. The undergrowth is dense, and elephants and buffaloes still roam wild. The forests that existed in earlier days have been destroyed by fire and waste; fires in South Africa after a season of prolonged drought working terrible havoc.

These fires are particularly frequent in Matabililand and Mashonaland, but luckily, owing to the shortness of the grass, not so destructive as they might be. The sight of these conflagrations at night time arrests the attention of the traveller on first entering the country. The result either of fires lit by the natives with a view of obtaining a fresh growth of grass, and thus attracting the game, or to burn out mice and other small animals, they have done an immense amount of mischief in the country. They exhaust the soil and stunt the trees, preventing the younger ones from developing properly.

Nearly all timber for building is imported from Sweden, Norway and America.

Comparatively little has been done under British rule to care for the forests, and, considering the circumstances, the Dutch in the early days were laudably active in this matter, introducing many trees and plants from India and Europe, especially the oak and two kinds of pine. The avenues of oak at Cape Town and Stellenbosch, and the fir groves on Table Mountain, are due to Dutch enterprise. Among imported trees the Australian eucalypti thrive well, especially in marshy districts, and improve the climate; the wattle, or Australian acacia, does well on light and sandy soil, such as the Cape flats. The

Eastern coast forests are of a scrub or "bush" character, from four to eight feet in height, making the country very difficult for military operations, as British forces have found by experience. Natal is deficient in forest, while in Zululand there is only thick "bush" in parts. Throughout the great interior plateau—in the upland territories of Namaqualand and Damaraland, the Kalahari desert, the Karroo, the northern part of Cape Colony to the Orange River, Western Bechuanaland, the Orange Free State and Transvaal—there are practically no forests worthy the name, nothing but small, thorny mimosa. Here and there on the mountain-sides a few other shrubs or small trees are met with. Portions of Bechuanaland are fairly wooded, and, in a lesser degree, certain sections of the Transvaal and Matabililand, but mostly with the thorny mimosa, the spaces between being covered with prickly bushes. In Mashonaland certain river valleys are, for South Africa, heavily timbered, and here, as well as in Matabililand, there are flowering trees with handsome blossoms, which add an attraction to the country. In Eastern Manicaland the trees are of greater height, but not of any considerable extent.

The absence of forests has had one curious effect. The want of good timber suitable for ship-building

—there being no good harbours and no navigable rivers—has helped to bring about a great transformation in the Dutch character, namely, the change from a maritime and fishing people to a pastoral, nomadic and continental people, knowing nothing of the sea. The ocean and its life are things unknown to the Boer of to-day.

The dearth of forests has had a marked effect upon the climate of South Africa; it has helped to reduce the rainfall and made the retention of the rain less possible, for when it comes it sweeps the surface of the ground. It is imperative that attention should be paid to 'forestry, especially planting foreign trees, such as the Australian Eucalypti, for South African trees grow slowly. Already the gum tree is to be found in many parts of South Africa, especially in the neighbourhood of Pretoria and Kimberley, while in Mashonaland and Matabililand it is to be found throughout the country, and thus the aspect of the land is being changed.

The question of health is one that need only be very briefly touched on here The elevation and extreme dryness of the interior render the great heat of the sun bearable, the cool nights reinvigorate the system, and it is here that the great majority of foreigners are settled. Sunstroke is unusual, and the

European head-gear is worn everywhere. In the coast lands, and at places like Delagoa, Beira, and even Durban, the nights are oppressive, and the mid-day sun more dangerous. Chills are frequent, owing mainly to the fall of temperature at sunset, and require to be guarded against; malarial fever is terribly prevalent on the eastern coasts, the Zambesi and Congo basins and lower valleys, and in Nyassaland. Even in Damaraland it is found. On the high veldt, however, the dryness produces an air like elixir, so fresh and keen that the greater part of South Africa—Cape Colony, the Orange Free State, the higher parts of the Transvaal, Bechuanaland, Mashonaland and Matabililand—are true White Man's countries, where he can settle and bring up strong and healthy children. Free from the severe Canadian winter, the great interior is higher than the Australian plains, and the air more bracing. Broadly speaking, at a height of about 3,000 feet above sea level fever is not virulent, and is not prevalent at 4,500 feet. Owing to unsatisfactory local conditions, some places in the high veldt are subject to fevers, but they are due to ill-drained, swampy ground in the neighbourhood. On the other hand, the interior, especially the higher sections, is admirably suited to those suffering from all forms of chest disease, and the veldt of South

Africa has saved the life of many a man, and given him health and vigour. The Afrikanders are a magnificent race, tall, lithe, sturdy, showing no signs of any decline, physical or mental, and can hold their own against all comers.

PART II.

SCENERY, FAUNA AND FLORA.

SOUTH Africa cannot be called a beautiful or picturesque country. Generally a bare land, waterless and poorly timbered, with low, stunted vegetation—bush and mimosa—with mountains and plains the same everlasting brown dust colour, except in the rains. Especially on the veldt is this the case. On the coast there are some beautiful views, and in the *bosch*, or forest, the *berg*, or mountain, there are places where one can escape from the monotonous sameness characteristic of the veldt scenery.

Cape Town, situated at the foot of a magnificent range, is one of the finest sights, with beautiful avenues and country houses in the neighbourhood. There is some splendid wood and water scenery on the south coast of Cape Colony, and at Durban much to charm the eye. Between the Zambesi and Cape Town the mountain scenery is worthy of notice in three places only. Of Basutoland, a highland country with peaks 11,000 feet high, something is said later on.

The scenery rising from Delagoa Bay is very picturesque. Manica, the mountainous region between Mashonaland and the Portuguese lowlands, contains some varied and striking scenery. Both in Basuto and Manica lands, but especially the latter, the mountains gain an added charm from their well-wooded valleys and herbage-covered slopes.

The *veldt* of South Africa, the most distinctive feature of the country, is the name given to a wide and rolling space, and therefore to the great interior plateau (the high Veldt). It is also applied to herbage—for instance, the sour veldt and sweet veldt, or to the bush country, called the bush veldt. The farmer drives his flocks and herds from the high to the bush veldt, or from the cold to the warm veldt. The general aspect of the veldt is the same, and if nature is not beautiful the dwellings of man do little to adorn it. Near the Cape, among wooded country and vineyards, the buildings are more picturesque. But as a rule, inland, the white-washed walls and corrugated iron roofs are more durable than artistic, and make unsightly blots on the brown landscape.

The mornings and evenings are very brilliant, and the impression made on anyone who has spent some time in these parts of South Africa is not to be

forgotten. South Africa possesses the charm of perspective in a marked degree, owing this largely to the length of vista obtainable, and the consequent atmospheric effects. In summer when the sun's strength is greatest, the midday sunshine is overpowering; but the lights of morning and evening bathing the mountain sides in colour are extremely beautiful. So clear is the atmosphere that mountains fifty or sixty miles away stand out with the utmost distinctness, and the fine gradation of tints in the vista has a wonderful effect. In summer the veldt is baked and barren looking, the brown parched surface cracked into fissures or "sluits," and the atmosphere produces a mirage which is very deceptive. The roads are mere tracks winding snakelike across the seemingly interminable space, crossing here and there the "drift" of some river. The nights of South Africa are unique, and a most grateful time in summer after the garish heat of the day. They close in at once as soon as the sun has set. "Suddenly, so it seems to the northerner, accustomed to long grey twilights, the night comes on and the stars rush out. Hard outlines of distant mountains are softened and chastened, the glaring irregularities and scarred features of the plain are covered up, and strange sounds and murmurs flood into being. Nature, which

had seemed wrapped in a sleepy midday swoon, revives again, the evening blossom, or "abend bloem," casts its fragrance around, and the veldt birds call to one another. So still is the air, that sounds travel immense distances." *

Solitude, the natural feature of a land so thinly populated, is the keynote of Nature's music in South Africa. The towns are comparatively few, though thickly populated, but when one leaves them behind and travels into the great interior, it is possible to journey for days and see no sign of human habitation. The natives may perhaps be hidden in some kraal or cave not far away, but their presence does not obtrude itself, and the impression given is of a vast, empty, silent land. The solitude at times becomes oppressive. It is not the silence of an English pastoral scene, broken with the musical twitter of birds, the whirr of the grasshopper, or perhaps the flood of a skylark's song, high in air. There are birds, indeed, of glowing plumage; the scarlet flamingo, crane and kingfisher, are found in swampy lagoons; pheasants, partridges, snipe, guinea fowl, namaqua and quail give good sport in the long grass of the dry water-courses and the rough scrub of mountain sides. But instead of the soaring lark

* Gresswell. Geography of Africa South of the Zambesi.

there is the ghoulish vulture, wheeling high in air, the lammer-fanger, or lamb-catcher, which swoops down upon the grazing herds, and instead of the musical brown birds—nightingales, wrens, starlings, sparrows and the like, who chirp and twitter on every tree and hedge in England—there are innumerable small creatures, of varied and gorgeous plumage—some like tiny jewels with long beaks—which flash and glitter in the sun, but are silent and songless, or at most utter a harsh, unpleasing note. Even the game birds have not the cries familiar to European sportsmen.

Originally South Africa was the happy hunting ground of all who loved sport on a big scale, with the piquancy of danger. Among the animals found in early days to the very coast of Cape Colony, were the elephant, buffalo, lion, leopard, quagga, numerous species of antelope, rhinoceros, hippopotamus, giraffe and zebra. Where the "Diamond City," Kimberley, now stands was once the hunting ground of such men as Gordon Cumming. Even ten years ago, Mashonaland and Matabililand were full of big game, all the species mentioned being found in such profusion that even the march of the Pioneers at first failed to dislodge them. The Dutch, when they first began to settle inland, waged incessant war

against these animals, and in the northerly treks suffered much from their attacks. The larger game is now found only on the low, unhealthy Portuguese territory between Delagoa Bay and the Zambesi; in the Zambesi basin, equally unhealthy; and in the country north of the Zambesi and the Kalahari desert. This rapid extermination has been due not so much to the ruthless destruction of the animals by the natives, nor the markmanship of the Boers, who shot more for self-protection and to provide food than for sport or fame, but to the exploitation of the country by European professional and amateur hunters, and to the lack of any provision for the protection of wild animals on the part of Government. There is still plenty of smaller game in Cape Colony, such as wild cats and lynxes, leopards and the smaller antelopes in the mountain regions, while a few lions and elephants remain in Rhodesia and the north of the Transvaal. The amphibious animals, with the exception of the crocodile, are also disappearing from the rivers and swamps. Snakes of a venomous nature are no longer numerous in the high and well-populated regions, though they are found in the swamps and long grasses.

Just as South Africa, no doubt on account of its varying climate and different geographical conditions,

possessed the largest number of animal species known to be collected on one continent, so it is rich in the quantity and variety of its flora. The bulk of this wealth is, however, confined to the moderate region neighbouring Cape Town, and here the heath is, perhaps, most characteristic. There are said to be more than a hundred species of this flower in this small area, and orchids of many kinds are also found. Spring, on the South African Veldt as in the plains of Central Asia, brings out a brilliant, if ephemeral carpet of flowers, which, for a short time, transfigures the bare brownness with patches of scarlet and pink gladioli and other blossoms, while the mountains of Rhodesia have an Alpine flora of their own. In the swampy districts the arum lily and ferns grow in profusion. Bechuanaland and the Transvaal are not rich in vegetation, and what they possess is similar in type to that of Southern Rhodesia, and inferior to that of the Cape. The difference of climate in the valleys and on the plateau or mountain tops induces, over all South Africa, a corresponding variation in the nature and variety of flowers and fruit. In the higher regions it is possible to rear those of English species, while the low-lying ground, especially the east coast, produces, both as regards fruit and flowers, many kinds of rich tropical vegetation.

PART III.

FARMING AND PHYSICAL FEATURES.

FARMING in South Africa, as in Canada or Australia, may be made profitable by those who are hard-working, intelligent, take the precaution of serving an apprenticeship in local Colonial methods, and learn the peculiarities of seasons, soil, pasture, management of stock and native labour. A knowledge of Cape Dutch in many parts is imperative. The new hand ignorant of these matters is as unlikely to succeed here as in any other new country. Steps have been taken in Cape Colony to stimulate the development of agricultural and pastoral capabilities through a Department of Agriculture and colleges at certain centres where a scientific as well as a practical training can be had. Veterinary surgeons, bacteriologists, viticultural and tobacco experts are engaged to develop the wine and tobacco industries. In matters relating to soil, pastures and insect plagues

useful information is given, seeds of cereals and plants are distributed and an Agricultural Journal is published in the Cape Colony in English and Dutch.

South Africa is not, and never can be, one of the grain-producing countries of the world. Corn hardly figures in the list of exports. Yet Cape Colony grows grains of all kinds, from wheat to maize and Kaffir corn, the latter mainly in those parts where the native population is considerable. Wine, introduced by the French Huguenots, is no longer the industry it once was, when Constantia fetched a long price in Europe, not because the grape is inferior, but on account of the indifferent manufacture. Fruit of all kinds grows well, varying with the level of the ground. In the south of the Colony tobacco is cultivated. Sheep farming is carried on on a large scale, especially on the plains of the Karroo, the sheep, except in periods of severe drought, thriving on the stunted bush covering these plains. Sheep are also reared on a considerable scale in the grass country east of the Karroo, as well as in the Transkei territories and the south-west of the Colony. The sheep are mainly of the merino breed, the bulk of the wool being exported from Port Elizabeth and East London. Mohair from the

Angora goat is produced in certain districts and forms an important article of export. Cattle are reared in many parts of Cape Colony as well as of Natal, especially in the coast lands, in the eastern and north-eastern grass districts, and north of the Orange River. With the introduction of railways and roads, the demand for cattle, formerly so much needed for transport purposes, becomes less and less. Neither the climate nor soil of South Africa are well suited for dairy farming. Ostrich farming, an important industry special to South Africa, is carried on in various districts of Cape Colony.

Of minerals within the Cape Colony, the Kimberley diamonds head the list; the copper from Namaqualand is an important industry; coal is found and mined at various points in the north-eastern districts. In one district, the Knysna, some gold is found, but it is trivial, the gold almost entirely coming from the Transvaal.

In Natal, on the lowlands next the coast, sub-tropical products thrive, and it is a great sugar-growing country, East Indian coolies being largely employed in cultivation. Coffee is little grown, but tea is planted on an increasing scale, and nearly all tropical products can be raised. Maize is universal throughout the Colony; while wheat, barley and

oats are grown on the higher levels. With its great range of climate and soil all varieties of fruits and vegetables are grown, tropical and sub-tropical, as well as those of the temperate zones. The pastoral industry is the most important, wool being still the largest article of export. There is a large and valuable coal-field in Natal, the chief mining centres being Dundee and Newcastle. Gold is found in small quantities in various districts. In the interior plateau maize is grown and cattle are reared, and there are vast stores of minerals in certain districts, of which something will be said elsewhere.

Before leaving the subject of the general physical features of the country, the chief points, in bare outline, may here be recapitulated. A low-lying coast land, varying in width; hill terraces, rising to the edge of the plateau; then the interior plateau or high veldt. The western side has not such high mountains and still fewer rivers, a lower average level, and a greater extent of barren desert, which renders it almost valueless. Cape Colony has a great extent of littoral and coast land, but rising to the plateau extends far inland, containing within its territory the main geographical conditions of South Africa as a whole. Natal is a country of coast land, with terraces rising to the plateau. Zululand is a coast land;

Basutoland an interior highland country, among the high mountains of the Drakensberg. The Orange State, the Transvaal, the Bechuanaland protectorate, Southern Rhodesia (Matabililand and Mashonaland) are in the main level tracts, on the great interior African plateau. German South-West Africa is a wilderness of high country with a narrow, sandy fringe next the coast. Portuguese South-East Africa is mainly a level territory stretching inland from the sea till it rises gradually in the neighbourhood of the plateau.

PART IV.

POLITICAL DIVISIONS.

To turn to a very brief consideration of each of the chief political divisions in the year 1900, so that the reader may gain some idea of their relative value.

Within the area south of the Zambesi, a territory one-third the size of Canada, and more than one-third the combined area of the Australian Colonies, are the following: Cape Colony, the mother-colony of South Africa, and Natal, both self-governing colonies; Basutoland and Zululand, both Crown Colonies; the Transvaal, the Orange State, British Bechuanaland, with Khama's country, Amatongaland, Swaziland; and finally the territory known as Southern Rhodesia, lying between the Limpopo and Zambesi, north and south, and between German and Portuguese South Africa, west and east.

CAPE COLONY.

Cape Colony, including British Bechuanaland (277,000 square miles), is a territory more than

twice as large as the United Kingdom, larger than Austria and Hungary, about the size of the South Atlantic States of America, but rather less than New South Wales in Australia. Comparatively little is available for tillage, and much is unsuited for cattle rearing. The population, very unequally distributed —in the north-western divisions it numbers only one to the square mile—is never more than seven to the square mile, or one-eightieth of the population of England. Some years ago, of the white population 230,000 were Boers of Dutch or Huguenot descent, and 150,000 British. The coast, especially the western side, is without natural harbours or mouths of navigable rivers. On the western and southern coasts there is a narrow strip of low ground, a mile or two wide, broadening out here and there into open tracts. From this strip there is a rise, either abruptly or in terraces, to the great interior plateau.

The harbours are indifferent. To start from the west, Walfish Bay, in German territory, over 700 miles from Cape Town, is of horse-shoe shape, and affords a safe and sheltered anchorage. As the sole harbour on a long stretch of coast, the bay has some value, but its hinterland is a desert, cattle being the sole wealth of the native tribes. Port Nolloth, the little port for the copper-bearing districts of Namaqua-

land, is some 300 miles distant from Cape Town. Saldanha Bay, 60 miles north of Table Bay, is the best natural harbour on the south-western coast, but its position is bad with regard to the chief centres of the colony, and the water supply is insufficient. No need here to say anything of Table Bay, except to remark that, although exposed to the north-western gales of the winter, and the winds which in summer blow with great violence through the gaps in the mountain range, the extensive breakwaters and harbour works have created a tolerably safe shelter. Simons Bay, the Imperial coaling station, is a better harbour than Table Bay. Mossel Bay, about 240 miles east of Cape Town, serves as an outlet for the central coast districts, but is exposed to gales from the south-east. The harbour at the mouth of the Knysna river, with a double bar, is safe and landlocked, but practicable only for the few small vessels engaged in the local timber trade. Port Elizabeth, the port and chief town of the eastern districts, standing on the south-western shores of Algoa Bay, about 450 miles from Cape Town, is now the great port of Cape Colony, and the chief entrance port of South Africa. Though exposed to the south-east winds the anchorage is good, and it is the terminus of a large railway communication with the interior, being nearer the Transvaal

gold-fields than Cape Town. East London, the third seaport of the colony, is 150 miles from Port Elizabeth and 260 miles from Durban. The natural disadvantages of this port have been partly overcome by artificial works, and with a railway to the Transvaal gold-fields shorter than from Port Elizabeth the trade is bound to increase. Such are the harbours of Cape Colony. The Natal littoral is similarly wanting in natural harbours. This deficiency on a stormy coast, and the absence of navigable rivers offering access to the interior, are responsible, as has been remarked, for the lateness of colonization and the slowness of expansion. For a century after the coast was known the interior remained a terra incognita, and South Africa was regarded as a mere place of call, to be touched at as seldom as possible.

The present practicable seaboard of South Africa, it will be seen, lies between Cape Town and Durban, with its centre at Algoa Bay, but the centre of gravity is shifting northwards, and with the coming opening of the great interior, the Transvaal and Rhodesia especially, the ports of Delagoa Bay and Beira must take the premier place. The magnificent position of Delagoa Bay, as regards access to the interior, is equalled by its natural advantages as a first-class harbour, the only one in South Africa, and for this

reason alone is of supreme value to the Power that is occupying South Africa by giant strides.

The character of the rivers has already been given; when constant they are rapid, while the streams of the plateau are dry for the greater portion of the year. For irrigation purposes, as already explained, most South African streams are useless, and not merely in Cape Colony, but throughout South Africa; and if one excepts the Pungwe river running through Portuguese territory—a stream of no value for any considerable transport—there is not one navigable river. The natural conditions which have made South Africa the most difficult of all countries for the progress of colonization can only be partially overcome by the introduction of railways. This means of communication may render the great interior easy of access, but no matter how elaborated, cannot altogether supply the deficiency of water and render the country *as a whole* habitable for white settlers.

In the discussion of the future of South Africa, the colonies of Canada and Australia are often referred to, but these territories in their more salient features are utterly dissimilar. Canada, for instance, has an admirable system of lakes and waterways which have acted as paths for the pioneers of all kinds, and have greatly facilitated the progress of coloniza-

tion; the entrance to the country is by the magnificent Gulf of St. Lawrence, the mouth of a river system which leads to the inmost interior. From the eastern coast-line on the Atlantic as far as the Rockies is an almost level stretch of country. In Australia, again, a country resembling South Africa in its geographical outline, we have a coast well furnished with natural harbours—some of the finest in the world — and an interior not shut off by mountains, but easy of access. These characteristic features of Australia and of Canada contrast strongly with the practically harbourless coasts, shut off interior, riverless tracts, and in many parts, rainless skies of South Africa.

The rainfall varies greatly in different parts of the country; broadly speaking the north-west districts are almost rainless, the fall not exceeding two or three inches and that uncertain. The most favoured districts are those from the Cape eastwards, the south-easterly winds carrying copious moisture from the Indian Ocean, which, on impact with the main mountain range, is discharged on the belt of country next the coast. In the Cape peninsula and western districts it is the westerly and north-westerly winds which, in the winter months, bring rain from the Atlantic. In the interior rains come

from east and west, and on the Karroo (literally a dry, or bare place) bordered both east and west by mountains which intercept these winds, the rainfall is very slight. In the different districts of Cape Colony there is a varying rainfall, the average at Cape Town being about eight inches, but this is by no means constant from year to year. On the Karroo the rainfall is from five to fifteen inches. More than one-half of this district, about three hundred miles in length, has hardly a running stream; the country has the character of a desert with little herbage and few trees; prickly shrubs and stunted bush are the only vegetation, and on these the sheep and goats have to feed. On the northern borders of this semi-desert stands Kimberley, well known as the centre of the diamond mining—the largest town from Cape Town to the Zambesi.

The country known as Bechuanaland, though of immense extent, has little practical value. It stands on the central plateau of South Africa at an elevation of from 3,000 to 4,000 feet above the sea. The climate is dry and bracing, the days in summer being intensely hot, while in winter the nights are proportionately cold. The rainfall itself is not particularly small, averaging 25 inches, but evaporation is so rapid that the resultant water supply is very scanty.

To the east the supply is better, though not on the surface, and can be obtained by sinking wells; while the western side, known as the Kalahari, is practically a huge desert.

Despite the drawbacks consequent on the lack of water, Bechuanaland, especially on the east, is by South Africans considered a fairly good pasture country in comparison with other districts, and cattle are grazed on the uplands, though the water is often brackish. Timber is said to have been plentiful here at one time, but the trees were cut down to be used for the building of Kimberley, and at present there is only a certain amount of poor and scrubby wood. The supreme value of Bechuanaland — a thinly pastoral country, with its few scattered farms and cattle runs and a more or less nomad native population—was that it preserved the open highway to better countries, Matabililand and Mashonaland, and formed part of the great trade route to the far interior.

NATAL.

The colony of Natal differs in many ways from the Cape. The country is fairly well watered, although the rivers are not fit for navigation. Grass is plentiful, timber grows near the coast, the climate is considerably warmer than in the more southern

colony, and in the low strip bordering the sea is almost tropical. Lower down it becomes at once exceedingly hot and moist. On the slopes of the Drakensberg the air is dry and bracing, the highest points being more lofty than any other South African mountains and reaching to close on 11,000 feet. The agriculture of Natal, mainly sugar growing, is largely carried on by coolies imported from the East Indies, whose numbers almost equal the Europeans, while the coloured population is in a majority of ten to one. The main element in the white population of the towns is British, the farmers of the interior being chiefly of Dutch extraction, with a few Germans.

ZULULAND.

Zululand, a Crown colony administered by the Governor of Natal, is situated north of that colony, between the Transvaal and the ocean, with Portuguese territory on the north. The coast line, low-lying and alluvial, is in great part so malarious as to be hardly habitable; the country rises as it spreads inland and is more healthy. There is no harbour, and no river whose mouth can be navigated, the coast being mainly composed of cliffs and sandhills. As an agricultural country Zululand has yet to be tested, but at present the crops are poor. Gold and

coal (the former of considerable promise) have, however, been discovered, and the opening of the country may cause a change in the primitive methods of the Zulu, who has more of a pastoral than an agricultural bent. The native population is about 200,000 and the European about 1,000. Until Zululand came under British rule it was the scene of constant internecine wars and massacres. Since its annexation it has enjoyed the blessings of peace, but little seems to have been done to open it up or exploit the natural advantages it may possess. To the north lies Amatongaland, a continuation of the low-lying, fever-stricken malarious swamp of the Zulu coast-land. It is both unfertile and unhealthy, but its inhabitants, though of inferior physique to the Zulus, are more intelligent, cultivate the ground and go in large numbers to work in Natal and at the Goldfields.

GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

The immense area on the west coast, lying between the Portuguese West African possessions and Cape Colony (the Orange river being the border), known as Damaraland and Great Namaqualand, having some 800 miles of sea-board and reaching inland on an average over 400 miles, is a terribly dry, barren, waterless country, practically a desert, and barely populated.

The resources are, so far as known, of no great value. Copper mines may be developed in time, other minerals are said to abound in the interior, but the cost of transport is prohibitive. A narrow tract of loose and difficult sand lies between the littoral and the high interior, which is so dry as to be unfit for cultivation of any kind. Cattle is the chief means of livelihood. Only in the northern districts, however, is the country much inhabited (by the Ovampos, who devote themselves to cattle-breeding). The country is unfit for purposes of immigration, and of a white population of less than 3,000, close on 800 are actually officials or soldiers. The only harbour, Walfish Bay, which belongs to Cape Colony, commands the road to the interior. Many German companies and one Anglo-German, the South-West Africa Company, have obtained concessions for the development of the country, especially the minerals, but these are believed to have accomplished very little. The character of the country precludes all hope of its being developed internally, or of becoming an important highway to the interior, as was once hoped, nevertheless Germany, for reasons of her own attaches considerable importance to this colony, as is shewn by the enormous annual Imperial subsidy she grants it—£360,000.

PORTUGUESE SOUTH-EAST AFRICA.

On the east coast, north and south of the Zambesi, covering a length of some 1,400 miles, is the extensive Portuguese territory. Portugal on the south touches Amatongaland, and in the section south of the Zambesi (the province of Lourenço Marques) is bordered by the Transvaal and parts of Southern Rhodesia. Of the total population of the Portuguese territory (about 1,500,000) only a few hundred are European subjects. The country south of the Zambesi, from the coast inland for a considerable distance, with an average of about a couple of hundred miles, is level, rising gradually on reaching the slopes of the plateau. The country next the littoral is generally sandy and poor, but inland is well watered and very fertile, though, owing to malaria, extremely unhealthy. The country is quite unsuited to European settlement, and the development must depend on native African, or rather on imported labour, East Indian or Chinese; for the native population, owing to the internecine wars that have devastated this region, is now scanty. Coal is found on the Zambesi, near Tete, and elsewhere, and in course of time may be developed. Large tracts of the country have been given over as concessions to companies (the Mozambique Company being the chief), which have,

however, done little but dispose of certain of their rights to sub-companies, chiefly English. Game is plentiful, and so is the pestilent tsetse fly, which works such havoc with cattle, making railway communication an absolute necessity. Beira is the chief port for Mashonaland and Matabililand, as Delagoa Bay (the finest in South Africa) is for the Transvaal.

THE ORANGE STATE.

The Orange State, about half the size of the Transvaal, like the greater portion of that country, is part of the great interior plateau, and stands between 4,000 and 5,000 feet above sea-level. Hills here and there reach a height of about 6,000 feet, and the climate is excellent. Barely wooded with scrub it has good pasturage, and the streams here do not altogether dry. With the exception of the south-eastern section, which is very fertile and well adapted for corn growing, the country is pasture land, and is divided into a number of grazing farms, capable at present of supporting only a scanty population. The white inhabitants, mainly Dutch, with a sprinkling of English and Scotch, number only some 80,000 to an area almost equal to that of England, and there are about 130,000 natives. Coal exists and is worked, and a valuable diamond mine (Jagersfontein) has a considerable output.

TRANSVAAL.

The country, in size about half the area of Cape Colony, is part of the plateau as already said, the hills on the east and north being higher than in the Orange State; on the former they are over 6,000 feet in height. The lower parts, the hills and valleys on the edges of the plateau known as the banken-veldt, or "terrace country" and the bush veldt, are unhealthy, but the rest of the country is on the whole healthy, thanks to the height, the eastern winds and summer rains. The country is divided into a number of farms (12,245, of which 3,636 belonged to the Boer Government), the white population numbering probably about 245,000, of whom two-thirds are concentrated in one spot, the Golden Randt. The native population is about 700,000. The country admits of cattle and sheep breeding, the cultivation of cereals or the growth of tropical and sub-tropical products. In the main, however, although a well-watered, grazing land, the pasturage is not to be compared with that of the Orange State, and there is a great deal of "sour veldt." Horse sickness is frequent in the north. There is little timber, usually stunted and of small value. The southern and eastern sections, known as the High Veldt, are at an elevation of 4,000 to 7,000 feet above sea-level. Tobacco,

a bastard plant brought from Sumatra, much prized throughout South Africa, especially on the high plateau, is largely exported to neighbouring territories. Those who have once taken to Boer tobacco can, on the veldt, tolerate no other. During the winters, which are inclement, the cattle are moved to the lower country, chiefly on the eastern side of the Drakensberg, in Natal and the borders of Swaziland, or to the sheltered bush veldt. The occupation of the land is almost entirely in the hands of the Boers. On the whole an unattractive country so far as the settler is concerned, but there is gold, and gold is *the* attraction of the Transvaal. The ever-persistent, consistent "banket" of the Randt has transformed the Transvaal, and conferred on it an importance which, however, cannot be permanent, its term of life being usually set down at a maximum of about half a century of years.

BASUTOLAND.

Basutoland is a small, remote, mountainous, inland territory, situated between the Orange State on the west and north, Natal on the north and east, and Cape Colony on the south and east. About two-thirds of the size of Switzerland, it is situated among the highest mountains of South Africa, the

Drakensberg, the summits next Natal, reaching to over 10,000 feet.

A broken, timberless, tableland, over 6,000 feet high, encased by ranges and their spurs, its valleys are fertile and well watered. From the mountains rise the Orange river and the Caledon. The climate is good, keen and bracing, with dry winters, the rains falling mostly in the summer time. The people are better agriculturists than other natives of South Africa. Of minerals, so far coal only has been found. The population is over 250,000, with some 600 Europeans, and already there are signs of over-population. In itself of little importance, except as a corn growing and horse and cattle breeding country, it is cut off from the highways and is almost an unknown land.

MATABILILAND AND MASHONALAND.

Two recent additions to British territory in South Africa are Matabililand and Mashonaland, known as Southern Rhodesia, situated between the Zambesi and the Transvaal, north and south, and Northern Bechuanaland and the Portuguese territory next the sea, west and east. The area of Southern Rhodesia is close on 200,000 square miles, rather less than that of its western desert-like neighbour,

the Bechuanaland protectorate, a country of less practical value now that communication with Rhodesia can be assured from the sea through Portuguese territory and the Transvaal. Before this end had been secured Bechuanaland was of extreme importance as affording the one access to the northern region under British control. The tiny country ruled by Khama, the ablest and best of African chiefs, with its population of some 25,000, is the only independent territory in this neighbourhood.

Matabililand and Mashonaland are part of the great plateau, a northern extension of the Transvaal tableland, with an average height of 3,500 to 4,000 feet. Altogether a different country, however, from Bechuanaland,— higher, more undulating, better wooded, better watered. A small range, the Matoppo hills, crosses the country diagonally, from south-west to north-east, and forms the water-shed, northwards to the Zambesi, and southwards to the Sabi and Limpopo rivers. The country rises gradually from south and west, with a rather steep decline towards the Zambesi, while on the east, in the Manica country, the mountains skirting the plateau rise to over 7,000 feet. Buluwayo, the capital of Matabililand, stands at an elevation of 3,500 feet, while Salisbury, the capital of Mashona-

land, is some 1,500 feet higher. Towards the Limpopo, the northern border of the Transvaal, the country is much lower.

This region generally is covered with granite boulders and kopjes; there are many rivers, some of considerable size, and in parts fine timber; the soil is fertile and the pasturage good. In all these respects Matabililand and Mashonaland present a marked contrast to the rest of the internal plateau of South Africa. The mineral wealth, of which some further account is given later on, is considerable. On the slope towards the Zambesi the soil is deeper and richer, but this section of the country falls within the Zambesi basin region and suffers from the pestilential climate common to the whole Zambesi Valley.

Although within the tropics, the climate of Mashonaland and Matabililand as a whole is suitable for Europeans, and, notwithstanding the heat and certain other disadvantages, may be pronounced a real "white man's country." It owes this distinction not only to its elevation above sea level, but to the breezes from the Indian Ocean which prevail all the year. Cool evenings and nights can be counted upon no matter how hot the day may be. The most unhealthy parts are along the river

valleys, especially those running from the Zambesi in the north and the Limpopo in the south, which lie low and are malarious. Of the two, Matabililand has the better reputation for healthy climate, the luxuriant vegetation in Mashonaland being conducive, at the end of the rainy season, to a certain amount of low fever.

A large section of this country is favourable for sheep farming, and were it not for diseases such as rinderpest, which have swept away whole herds, would also be suitable for cattle. Its possibilities, despite such drawbacks as rinderpest, the scourge of locusts, and occasional want of rain, have hardly been fully exploited. The water supply is good and affords facilities for irrigation, while the climate permits the white man to work hard without injury to his health—two advantages by no means common in South Africa.

The total European population—chiefly concerned in mining interests — was said to be about 6,000 before the war, a number which seems extremely small when it is remembered that Mashonaland was occupied in 1890 and Matabililand in 1893. The natives number several hundred thousand.

CHAPTER II.

THE PEOPLE.

CHAPTER II.

THE PEOPLE.

PART I.

BUSHMEN, HOTTENTOTS, KAFFIRS.

APART from all other considerations, the very numbers of the natives in South Africa constitute an element in the problem which must be taken into account. Already in excess of the whites, they are increasing at a rapid rate; hitherto, however, there has been ample room for the Europeans to come in and settle without crowding out the natives, except from the best lands. Since the advent of Europeans the coloured races have increased much more rapidly, for with their coming an end has been made to the waging of inter-tribal wars and the wholesale slaughter which was the rule, and new branches of employment have been opened to them. The native races are three in number and vary greatly in appearance, language, character and habits. These races are the Bushmen, Hottentots, and the Bantu tribes whom we call Kaffirs.

The Aborigines of South Africa were the Bushmen, savages of a very low type. Pygmies, yellowish brown in colour, hollow backed, they anointed their bodies with grease when obtainable, and then painted themselves with soot or coloured clay. These people, who seem to have been scattered all over South Africa, did not cultivate the soil nor own cattle, but lived by the chase, for which they employed poisoned arrows, or upon wild plants and fruits, honey, locusts, and even carrion. Though incapable of toil they had great talent in all matters connected with the trapping and tracking of game, having extraordinary keenness of vision, fleetness of foot and power of endurance. They had no domestic animal but the dog. They wandered about in small groups, and their idea of government was so limited, that even parental claims were not respected as soon as they were able to provide for themselves. Like the black men of Australia, incapable of becoming accustomed to civilised life, driven back by the white man who was often compelled to kill them in self defence, and elsewhere finding the means of support gone owing to the decrease of game, they are now almost extinct. The only trace left of them will shortly be found in the drawings of wild animals in red, yellow and black, often spirited and clever, which they made on cliffs

and rocks in various parts of the country, from the Zambesi southwards to the Cape.

The Hottentots, a people much more advanced towards civilisation, were found by the Portuguese explorers in the regions east and north of the Cape. Whence or how they came, no one yet has been able to tell. The theory that they came from the north and dispossessed the Bushmen, forcing these into the less fertile interior region, seems unsupported by evidence. Some have it that they sprang originally from Bushman stock, others that the Bushmen were simply Hottentots who had deteriorated owing to the loss of their domestic cattle. Neither of these theories seem altogether satisfactory. Their languages are of different construction, though both abound with clicks; the Bushman was a strict monogamist, while the Hottentot customs admitted of polygamy, and the construction of the skull differs widely in the two races. In the colour of the skin, and the short, woolly or rather wiry hair, growing in clumps, they are the same, and both have small hands and feet. But the Hottentots, though small men, were not Pygmies, and were superior to the Bushmen physically and intellectually. They were never numerous, and between them and the Bushmen there was a constant and deadly feud. They possessed sheep and cattle, de-

pended mainly upon milk and did not practise agriculture. Living in communities under chiefs who had very little authority, they were frequently at feud with one another, and nearly always with the Bushmen, who stole their cattle. These thoughtless and good-natured people, living in idleness and in indescribably filthy surroundings, were difficult to domesticate for purposes of service. They have, however, shown themselves capable of improvement, and many Hottentots have adopted European habits, while not one Bushman of pure blood has been known to do so. Smallpox and other epidemics reduced their numbers and they are now very few, though in the mixed population of Cape Town there are strong traces of Hottentot blood, as there are of Malay and of the descendants of Negro slaves from the West Coast.

The Bantus, called also Kaffirs, occupy the whole of South Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, and southwards from the Upper Nile. These tribes before the arrival of Europeans were pressing down by a variety of routes into South Africa, stalwart people with some knowledge of agriculture and metallurgy, with a Government and an elaborate system of law. Those south of the Zambesi are well made, about the average height of a European, varying con-

siderably in colour, some black and some brown. They are a healthy and vigorous stock, and the most prolific people in South Africa. In recent times amongst the Bantus the Zulus have been distinguished for their fighting organisation and courage, the Fingos for their commercial aptitude, the Basutos for steady industry. The only tribe in all South Africa which has preserved its independence is that under Khama, a Christian Bechuana chief, who by his ability and uprightness has preserved his people from demoralising influences, and by the exercise of singular diplomacy has avoided all collision with the white men.

In the early days of the Dutch little was known of the natives in the interior, except that there were a number of tribes frequently at war with one another. In different parts of the country there were tribes speaking the same dialect, with other tribes between, just as to a lesser extent there are to-day. They were roaming people, little attached to the soil. Internecine warfare was the rule throughout the whole of Africa from North to South, and the rise of some leaders with commanding qualities led to the ravaging of some neighbouring, or even far distant, territory which was conquered and a kingdom set up. This accounts for the curious fact already mentioned that people speaking the same dialect were found, and

still exist, in widely separated regions, for instance north of the Zambesi river and far south of it. The rise of the Zulu chief Chaka illustrates this fact. This extraordinary man, who was of the Napoleonic type, combined unusual ability with absolute despotism, raised the then small tribe of Zulus to the command of other neighbouring tribes, and created a military system which was destined first to carry devastation far and wide amongst the native states of South Africa, and later on even to seriously test the military strength of a great European Power. This military genius, for such he was, considering the material and resources he had to deal with, armed his men with the assegai, and produced within a short period a force admirably drilled in regiments, ready to act together and engage the enemy with such spirit that no native force could resist, and even European troops, with modern firearms, could hardly withstand the shock of their attack. Chaka's method of carrying war into the neighbouring regions was even more bloody than the ordinary native wars, where quarter is unknown. The indiscriminate slaughter and devastation which accompanied his raids were something indescribable. Whole country sides, as the writer has seen, were cleared of their population, leaving in after years hardly a trace of human habitation.

Eastern Mashonaland is an example of the effects of such devastating raids upon some of the native tribes. "Some fifty years ago," says Selous, "this fine country must have been thickly inhabited," as almost every valley has, at one time or another, been under cultivation. The sites of villages are also very numerous, though now only marked by a few deep pits from which the natives obtained the clay used by them for plastering their huts and making their cooking pots, and also the presence usually of a cluster of huge acacia trees, which grow to a far greater size on the sites of old villages than anywhere else. On the summit of every hill may be found the walls, in more or less perfect preservation, of what, I think, must have been cattle kraals. These walls are very neatly built of squared stones, nicely fitted together, but uncemented with any kind of mortar. The peaceful people inhabiting this part of Africa must then have been in the zenith of their prosperity. Herds of their small but beautiful cattle lowed in every valley, and their rich and fertile country doubtless afforded them an abundance of vegetable food. About 1840, however, the Matabili Zulus, under their warlike chief Umziligazi, settled in the country which they now inhabit, and very soon bands of these ferocious and bloodthirsty savages overran the peaceful vales of the

Mashona country in every direction. The poor Mashonas, unskilled in war, and living, moreover, in small communities scattered all over the country, without a central government, fell an easy prey before the fierce invaders, and very soon every stream in their country ran red with their blood, whilst vultures and hyenas feasted undisturbed amidst the ruins of their devastated homes. Their cattle, sheep and goats were driven off by their conquerors, and their children, when old enough to walk, and not above ten or twelve years of age, were taken for slaves; the little children too young to walk were of course killed, together with their mothers. In a very few years there were no more Mashonas left in the open country, the remnant that had escaped massacre having fled into the mountainous districts to the south and east of their former dwellings, where they still live. Thus, in a short time an immense extent of fertile country, that had, perhaps, for ages past, supported a large and thriving community, was again given back to nature; and so it remains to the present day—an utterly uninhabited country, roamed over at will by herds of elands and other antelopes.*

Thus the various sections of the Zulu race over-ran different parts of the country, extending even to the

* Written prior to the occupation of Mashonaland in 1890.

north of the Zambesi, the Matabili conquering what is known as Matabililand in 1838, and the Angoni in 1837 making their way to the neighbourhood of Nyassaland, where they are to this day. Some of the Kaffir tribes were driven by the Zulus to various parts, some to what is now Basutoland, others to Bechuanaland, some to the banks of the Zambesi. The Gaza Zulus devastated the country watered by the Lower Limpopo and Sabi rivers, now Portuguese territory. The Zulu power is now completely destroyed. The main branch under Cetewayo was broken up in 1879, the Matabili under Lobengula were conquered in 1893, and the last branch, the weakest and least warlike of the three, was overthrown by the Portuguese, their chief, Gungunhana, being seized and deported in 1896. Thus ended the last of the Zulus, a race that played such a great rôle in its time in South African history.

PART II.

A QUESTION OF COLOUR.

LITTLE as the subject is mentioned or taken into account, the question of the blacks in South Africa is one of supreme importance. There are some six to eight million blacks south of the Zambesi, while there are not more than three-quarters of a million whites. Broadly speaking, in Cape Colony and the Transvaal they are more than thrice as numerous, in Natal ten times, in the Orange State twice, while in the rest of the country occupied by Europeans, whether British, German or Portuguese, the proportion is probably over four million natives to 10,000 Europeans, or a proportion of 400 to 1.

This proportion, too, does not appear likely to be greatly diminished with the increase of emigration and natural growth of the white population, for the blacks are at present increasing more rapidly than the whites. The Kaffirs, the most prolific race in South Africa, are prospering and multiplying everywhere, both where untouched by the European and where

found under his rule. Land is plentiful, the climate generally suited to the black man, and the soil fertile. With the advent of the European has come the cessation of wars, and the internecine conflicts which kept down the population, also the wholesale slaughter carried on by native chiefs with the assistance of witch doctors. The problem in South Africa of the two races, black and white, living together, will have to be faced. Self-governing colonies in the temperate zone peopled by Europeans govern themselves; tropical colonies with a predominant coloured population are governed by the Colonial Office through local representatives. It is evident that what is suitable for one is not suitable for the other. Here in South Africa is the case of a country which has self-government, yet with two races, one, the majority, being, as in the Southern States of America, native. The difficulty has existed for many years in the Southern States, but under different conditions—the majority in America being white, while in Africa the continent is peopled by an immense reserve of coloured races. Even taking the southern slave States, the difference in proportion is startling, for there the blacks are only half as numerous as the whites, while in South Africa they are four times as many.

The African native races are far behind the negroes of the Southern States in civilization, the latter having had two centuries of training and education, and speaking the same language as their masters.

If under such conditions there exists in America a problem which has puzzled the wisest heads, how much more serious must be the state of affairs in a country where a handful of white men—themselves split into two camps—are face to face with a vast black population. At present the line of cleavage is very wide between whites and blacks in Africa, but the Kaffir, who is absolutely indispensable to the European at present, as he does all the rougher and harder work which the white man directs, is nevertheless capable of rising to a higher level. It is not likely that he can be pushed back, as has been suggested, to the unhealthy Zambesi basin and north of that river. The Kaffirs are more children of the soil than the Europeans, they are increasing rapidly, and gaining strength morally and physically from the discipline imposed on them.

At present they are universally regarded with contempt and aversion, not merely by the Dutch, though they perhaps have these feelings in an exaggerated form, but by all European settlers. They are too primitive in their development as yet to resent this

attitude, but a people with such native intelligence as must be possessed, for instance, by the Zulus, who organized a great military power, and enacted a strict code of law, cannot be depended on to remain always in a state of subjection.

The practical lesson to be drawn from even a cursory consideration of a question which may take years to come to a head, is the necessity for union among the white races which dominate South Africa.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY

PART I.

GENESIS OF CAPE COLONY.

HITHERTO South Africa has been a practical illustration of the irony of Fate. "He that soweth shall not reap," might well have been written of this land, and if it is true that all things acquire value in men's eyes in proportion to the trouble they must take to get them, then of all countries South Africa, *if it is ever fully developed*, will be the most precious.

To return to the first part of this statement. The Portuguese discovered South Africa in 1486, when they landed at Table Bay and used it as a watering place for their ships. They were, however, frightened away from their new discovery by the savagery of the natives and the rough nature of the coast—they christened the chief promontory the Cape of Storms. The Dutch thereupon took advantage of their too easily checked

enterprize, and used Table Bay for nearly a century for purposes of rest and refreshing on their way to the far off East Indies. The English made the same use of it, both races—English and Dutch—of the same stolid Teuton stock, finding no insurmountable difficulties in either coast or natives. The shipwreck of certain Dutch mariners on the shores of Table Bay in 1648—a century and a half after it was first discovered—was one of those accidents which do more to make history than the most carefully planned evolutions. They took reports of the fertility of the soil back to Holland, and the Dutch East India Company—then almost half a century old, and in great power—sent a hundred settlers to establish a fort, grow vegetables and collect provisions to supply passing Dutch ships. It was the trade with the East Indies that gave the Cape her first importance, and it was the cutting of the Suez Canal, more than 220 years later (in 1869) which, by destroying the value of the Cape route, till then the sole ocean highway to India, gave South Africa, thus thrown on her own resources, her greatest impetus in becoming an independent factor in world history.

The Dutch founded a settlement, but when it grew to be a colony, it was no longer Dutch—in all essentials it had lost touch and kinship with the mother country.

Nor was it even in name to be linked with the land which gave it birth. The English came and took from Holland even the semblance of suzerainty. The strange chicks—who were neither ducks nor fowls—were foster-mothered by a new hen, and some of them, desiring no mothering at all, but merely their freedom, developed wings and flew away. The foster mother clucked and fussed, but the chicks were gone, and after many vicissitudes they grew into fine strong birds, but never, never, "charm she never so wisely" would they come back peaceably under the pseudo-maternal wing.

Such in outline is the early history of South Africa. The Portuguese discovered, the Dutch settled, the English took possession, and out of the elements involved in this process—in which the Portuguese have little part—South Africa was evolved.

The Portuguese, when they deserted Table Bay, founded colonies at Sofala and along the malarious and enervating east coast, where they languished on, trading a little, making fruitless attempts to explore along the fever-stricken valleys of the Zambesi, and gradually almost disappearing, though they retained the country over which their flag still droops—*waves* is too energetic an expression.

The Dutch, who arrived at Table Bay in 1653, were

all servants of the Dutch East India Company, and regarded themselves as only temporarily banished to the distant unknown Cape of Good Hope, as it had been re-named. They confined themselves to the Cape peninsula, and as they were few—hardly any had brought wives or families—and the soil was fertile and repaid cultivation, the Company, in 1658, imported slave labour—negroes from West Africa—and shortly after Asiatic convicts, mostly from the East Indies, who intermarried with the Hottentot women and so formed another mixed race. No attempt was made by Holland to send out emigrants of her own blood to balance these inferior elements. The Dutch, as a matter of fact, were neither numerous nor poor enough to colonise. They had acquired, by dint of force of character, which compensated for the smallness of their numbers, an importance far greater than their absolute strength warranted. They had rich and important possessions in the East Indies which absorbed all their trading energies. At their best they were comfortable, prosperous, mercantile folk, who all had good homes in their mother country and did not want to settle elsewhere. They would trade and voyage and face the perils of the deep, but always with the goal in view—no dream of world empire but a comfortable seat on a sunny bench in a trim tulip garden, with a

clean substantial house at back, and a vista in front of low-lying flats, winding canals and rows of poplars fading into the cool grey distance. So the few who came to the Cape were not of the best class, and it was rather necessity than choice which drove them to accept service with the Company and settle, somewhat grudgingly, on the extremest point of South Africa. The distance and expense of a journey to Holland naturally were insuperable obstacles to settlers, and to them came a band of exiles who had even less choice in the matter of dwelling place than themselves.

In 1689 arrived at the Cape some 300 French Huguenots who, driven by the Edict of Nantes from their own land, and having taken refuge in Holland, were sent on to the new country where she had recently raised her flag. South Africa to them meant not a temporary exile, but the land where, willy nilly, they and their children must live and die, and they gave permanence to the South African sentiment, while they raised the whole tone of the society which they found there. They were of superior rank, culture and refinement to the original Dutch settlers, and were besides possessed of many arts—viticulture among others—which they introduced into the settlement. The strict intolerance of

the Dutch East India Company refused any separate rights as a civil or religious community to these French emigrants, and they became in the course of a century entirely merged in the Dutch population, though their names are still preserved in some of the oldest and best families both of the Cape Dutch and the Boers.

We have now two of the chief ingredients which went to the making of the Afrikander. The old Dutch stock, of the uncultured class, sturdy, physically sound, brave, independent, ignorant and simple, with a religion which lacked all theological subtleties and accepted the Bible verbally as its guide, but laid most stress on the "root and branch" passages of the Old Testament, just as in modern times we incline more favourably to the less uncompromising parts of the New. To them came a second element, weaker, but more subtle, varying from them in every point save in religion, so that from both sources the South African drew one common inspiration. The dominant feature in the creed for which the Huguenots sacrificed their homes and country was independence; the refusal to acknowledge established canons; the return, after centuries of sacerdotalism and polemical intricacy to a simple, fundamental, narrow belief. For this belief, right or wrong, they were willing to die rather than

recant, and so, to the natural obstinacy of the Teuton race which was strongly developed in the sturdy and strong-willed Dutch, they added the fanatical devotion of religious martyrs. Another element is worthy of notice. Oppression and persecution teach men to dissemble their true selves. Perhaps the Boer of to-day owes some part of his natural "slimness" to the lessons learnt by his Huguenot ancestors under Louis XIV.

Here then was the beginning of South African empire. A handful of Dutch servants of a Company, two or three handfuls of French fugitives and a motley collection of coloured people, negroes, Malays, Kaffirs and Hottentots. Very soon the settlement had spread out from its original limits. The area of land suitable for agriculture was limited, the demand for fresh meat by passing vessels encouraged cattle farming, and above all, from the first the tendency of the Afrikander (who was evolving out of the two European elements) was to isolate himself. He liked plenty of elbow room. This feature in his character was partly an outcome of his stern religion, which discouraged all the arts and amenities of social life, and taught him to find happiness in solemn communion with his soul in the solitudes where he could feel the overshadowing presence of his Creator. It is not a pure accident that European

South Africa has no indigenous art, no poetry, no music of her own. Her sons were trained in a stern school, and, besides, South Africa herself is no luxurious mother-land, where adopted children could settle and develop themselves in peace and comfort.

From the first the settlers had to contend with difficulties. Whenever they spread out a little further into the interior in search of fresh pasture for their animals, for the grass was thin—another reason to drive men apart—they had to contend with fierce savages. The powerful and even aggressive Kaffirs harried them, and the deadly little Bushmen lurked behind tree or kopje with poisoned arrows. Lions, wolves, jackals, the fierce strong buffalo, and many other predatory animals threatened their flocks, and the farmer lived with gun in hand and taught his sons to do the same as soon as they were strong enough to hold one.

Meanwhile the Dutch East India Company ruled at Cape Town, and as might be expected of a government whose head was in Holland—several months' journey away—corruption was the order of the day. While the settlers remained in the vicinity of the fort at Cape Town they could be ruled with some success, but when they moved away they became practically independent, for the Governor had no means of enforcing his

authority. At the end of the 17th century, when the inland movement had just begun, the Dutch authorities, in answer to an appeal from the Governor, sent out a ship-load of young women from the orphan schools, as wives for the settlers. This increased the links which were fast binding them to South Africa, and weakened still further their connection with the old country.

A picture of these early Boers (or farmers) in the middle of the 18th century, would contrast strangely with the condition of society in the western world which they left behind them, nearly a century before. In that century matters had developed fast in Europe, the great wave of upheaval and revolution which was shortly to break had slowly but surely gathered strength. The luxury and corruption of the aristocracy, the degradation of religion, whose ministers were too often the mere hangers on and protégés of great men, or else were themselves political schemers; the poverty and oppression of the lower classes—these were the salient features of society in Western Europe. In America the spirit of independence was maturing rapidly under the forcing glass of a home government which regarded colonies in the light of milch cows. How far from all this turmoil seems the little South African colony! Here, in the town at the

Cape, the old Dutch colonists had built their houses like those of the Fatherland, with broad open "stoep," low rooms, and general trimness of aspect. But a majority of the colonists had moved away, and although they built farms and nominally settled in particular districts, it was their custom, during a greater part of the year, to live in a tent-waggon, following their cattle from spot to spot in the wild unclaimed interior to find fresh pasture. Obviously in a country infested with so much danger the wife and children could not be left behind, so the whole family moved from place to place together, and the "trek boers," or wandering farmers, acquired yet another characteristic which became engrafted in them. There was, doubtless, much that was pleasant in this rough free life, with its independence of all conventions, its slow, sunny days. The waggon lumbering over the roadless veldt, the children running alongside; the halt by some stream, and the *al fresco* meal. Privations there were, and dangers from man and beast, so that the farmer's son grew up healthy and hardy, brave and cunning, for he learnt to ride all day without food, to shoot straight anywhere and anyhow, and to out-manœuvre the malicious Bushmen or the wild beast of the veldt. But there was another side. Education was impossible, the farmer knew little of

book-learning, his son knew nothing. The only book was the Bible, and this was read and interpreted with absolute literalness. The women too, who had no opportunity in the waggon life for exercising a housewife's pride, lost their neat and orderly ways; and above all, the employment of slaves, who were used for all menial purposes, and for what little agriculture the farmer practised in the neighbourhood of his farm, had a deleterious effect on the moral character of the Boers.

It has been noticed that the practice of slavery brings out inevitably some of the worst traits of a man's character. In the first place it teaches him to despise manual labour; in the second, by placing him in relations of such supreme control and superiority over his fellow-men; it induces a certain callousness, a disposition to regard them more as brutes than men. Many of the native Hottentots, as well as the imported negroes, became slaves to the Boers, and from the very first the latter regarded their dark-skinned dependants with absolute contempt. They were "the sons of Ham," cursed from their birth, hewers of wood and drawers of water to the more favoured races.

It is a curious trait of the
that he had none of the instinct which leads men

to organise themselves, to make laws for mutual protection and benefit and so to evolve a government. To begin with, the early settlers brought with them no traditions of elective government, and for many years they were still the bondmen of a Company. The rule of that Company was autocratic and cramping to the energies, and although certain of the citizens were, after a time, admitted to the council appointed to aid the Governor in his deliberations, little was done to promote trade, or encourage enterprize, while the monopolies enjoyed by the Company and the restriction on trading with the natives made it impossible for individual effort to recoup itself. All these circumstances confirmed the farmer in his determination to trek away from these tiresome regulations, and to live his own life without official interference. He did not see why, when by his own strength he was maintaining himself and family in a country where his quondam government had never penetrated, he should still pay taxes and acknowledge allegiance, and this simple and rude idea of a commonwealth of individual responsibilities took a strong hold on his imagination. The only organisation he attempted was to form war bands—commandos—for defence and offence against the Kaffirs and Bushmen. Thus began the rift, which, grow-

ing wider, separated Boer and Burgher, farmer and townsman, from each other in character and customs.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Colony of South Africa was divided into four districts, Cape Town, Swellendam, Stellenbosch and Graaf Reinet, nominally administered by Landdrosts and Heemraden, under the direction of the Governor, who in turn was responsible to the Directors of the Company in Holland.

The total European population at this period was about 10,000, of whom about one-sixth were servants of the Company. The remainder were mostly the farmers living in the outlying districts — the trek boers, and their children. The slave population was slightly in excess of the European, but the percentage of adult white males was higher. The limits of the Colony at the end of the eighteenth century were theoretically the Great Fish river on the east and the Orange river on the north, though a large portion of the country north of the Karroo which belongs to the great interior plateau was still a virgin country, being considered unsuitable even for pasturage on account of its lack of rivers and scanty rainfall.

The first Kaffir war, in 1780, which was precipitated by the incursions of that tribe across the Great Fish

river, gave the Boer commandos a chance of proving their mettle. The Kaffirs were driven back into their own territory.

Three years previous to this, the Declaration of Independence had awakened an echo in this far off Colony, the tangible proof of which lies in their appeal, in 1779, to the Government in Amsterdam for reform of the evils which they suffered at the hands of the East India Company. That Company was in difficulties on every side, but the Government of the Netherlands was hardly less awkwardly placed. As the revolutionary party and the supporters of the Stadtholder were disputing for supremacy, and the colonies in the east were threatened by Britain, under the circumstances it is little wonder that the matter of reform for South Africa was allowed to stand over for some ten years. Meanwhile, in 1780, Great Britain, on the discovery that Holland had been furnishing aid to the rebellious colonists of North America, declared war with her, and made an attempt to seize the Cape—an attempt frustrated by the prompt action of France, who came to the rescue and for some time after left a French regiment to help to garrison Cape Town. This effort of England to seize the Cape increased its importance in the eyes of the Netherlands Government, and efforts

were made to strengthen its defences, while its garrison was swelled by Swiss and German mercenaries. No really adequate reforms in the control of commerce or re-arrangement of the governmental methods of the East India Company were carried into effect, and while the foreigners increased the town population, and so made the life and trade of Cape Town more lively, no attention was paid to the pressing need of the farmers, who were once more attacked in force by the Kaffirs. They were willing to arm and protect their property themselves, but the Government, making the first of a series of blunders which have marked the dealings of Europeans with natives in South Africa, refused to allow the use of force, and endeavoured to buy off the Kaffirs. The following year the Dutch East India Company finally collapsed. All its work was at once abandoned at the Cape and elsewhere, the Governor withdrawn, and the Colony left practically headless, and in a state of administrative and financial confusion, to which was added the danger of invasion on the frontiers. In 1792 two commissioners were sent by the States General to reform matters, and they were engaged in this duty for more than a year, at the end of which time they departed, leaving a better balance sheet and a Governor, but an accompanying

load of taxation which the ill-disciplined colonists were loth to bear.

The farmers of two districts rose in revolt, and calling themselves "Nationals," in emulation of the French revolutionaries, founded miniature republics of their own. The spirit of Liberty and Equality—though hardly of Fraternity—had winged her way from troubled Europe to far off Africa.

The armies of France overran the Netherlands; the Republican party drove the Stadtholder over-sea to England, and the Republic of Batavia emerged from the wreck of the United Netherlands. Under such conditions little help could be given to the unfortunate Governor of the Cape.

At this juncture, when the Colony was in a state of chaos—internal dissensions, fear of foreign invasion, lack of funds, and general confusion—the third European Power who was to stamp her name on South Africa, arrived upon the scene. William of Orange, a fugitive in England, wrote a letter commanding the Governor of the Cape to admit British troops in order to protect the Colony against the French—a curious incident viewed in the light of later events, but not without its parallels in history. The Moors in Spain and the Manchus in China are two well-known instances of the guests who afterwards refused to leave when

they had settled the difficulties which had led to their invitation. As the French were in close alliance with the Batavian Government, it was rather a case of "six of one and half a dozen of the other," but the scruples of the Governor, who felt himself bound to uphold his countrymen rather than his fugitive sovereign, were forcibly overcome, and in September 1795, British forces first occupied Cape Town. They remained in occupation until 1803, for the first year merely as allies of the Stadtholder, and after that the Cape was declared a Crown Colony.

The Governors appointed by Great Britain encountered considerable difficulties. In the first place they had to deal with a people who had never yet known good and equable government, and who, never having been accustomed to the exercise of even electoral functions, were incapable of governing themselves. Notwithstanding this, a strong or even a consistent rule would have soon reconciled the South Africans to the dominion of a foreigner. Unfortunately this was apparently not forthcoming. In the seven and a half years of English occupation there were five administrations—two civilian governors, and two military, one of whom acted twice. The consequent changes of the policy and personnel of the Government were fatal, and notwithstanding un-

doubted reforms in the opening of trade and abolition of taxes, the colonists, especially the farmers who were not particularly benefited by these reforms, and who *did* feel the want of a strong hand to help them in their struggle with the natives, were far from satisfied under British rule. The farmers of Graaf Reinet, upon whom had fallen the heaviest burden in the Kaffir wars, and who were in revolt at the time of the English occupation, only gave a grudging submission after a whole year of independence, and in 1799 and 1801 again took up arms against the Government. While affairs were still in this unsettled condition, the peace of Amiens (March, 1802) readjusted the claims of England and Holland, and while assuring to the former the possession of Ceylon, restored the Cape to the latter, with free access to its ports for British vessels. The evacuation took place in 1803, but war broke out again almost immediately between England and the Netherlands, and the former did not delay in attacking the Cape, whose value and weakness she was well acquainted with. The last years of the Dutch in the Cape were their best, and the record of their last Governor, Janssens, shows what an immense difference one man—if he is the right man—can make in a situation like this. Much had been done to restore peace and prosperity to the Colony

when in 1806 the English fleet under Baird arrived at Table Bay, and after a futile resistance by the Governor, whose forces were outnumbered by three to one, the Colony capitulated, and was finally occupied by the English. This action on the part of Great Britain was one of a long chain of events made inevitable by the Napoleonic wars. The Netherlands, England's ancient ally, were under the thumb of France, and England and France were at death grips with each other. The Cape, too, had become of first importance to Great Britain as a half-way house to India, where she was so rapidly building up an empire. In 1814 England was legally established in the territory thus taken by force, when, in the general settling up of the nations, the Stadtholder, restored to his kingdom, formally ceded his rights in the Cape, and in some of the South American colonies, for the sum of six millions sterling.

Thus ended the dominion of the Dutch in the land they had taken for their own, and so entered the third element of which the Afrikander nation is compounded. It has been said that they "sold" the Cape, but it must be remembered that they were only making a virtue of necessity in so doing. Nevertheless, it was palpable that they were not in a position, nor was their genius adequate to the problem

of colonizing the country. For a century it had been little more than a place of call for them, and that it would still remain. The Dutch proved their strength by recognizing their own limitations.

The population in 1805 was 26,000, of whom the majority were of Dutch and French descent, with a smaller number of Germans. The slaves numbered some 30,000, and there were then about 17,000 Hottentots. The language spoken by all was the low Dutch into which the original tongue had been corrupted. The Colony was bounded on the south-east coast by the Great Fish river running up to the Sneeuwbergen on the north, and by the Buffalo river on the west coast, from which the line ran down to the Nieuwveldbergen. It was divided into five districts, of which the Cape, by far the most thickly populated, occupied the strip of land bounded by the Great Berg river and the Cape peninsula, practically the coast line from Cape St. Martin to the Cape of Good Hope. Outside this lay Stellenbosch, and, along the coast to the east, Swellendam; Uitenhage occupied the extreme south-east corner, and Graaf Reinet the north-east, just above, shut in by the mountains. The north-western province, which included a great portion of desert, and is a practically rainless, barren country, was known as Tulbagh. Each district, with

the exception of the Cape, had an officer known as Landdrost to administer affairs, judicial and financial; and a local board, called Heemraden, of which he was president, acted as a sort of check on him, and managed the business of the district. Each ward, or sub-division of the district, was in charge of a Feldcornet. With these and other local institutions the English at first made no attempt to interfere.

This was one of the most important epochs in South African history. Had England been able to cope with the situation how different might the course of events have been! There was nothing in the state of affairs which precluded the amicable settlement of Dutch and British side by side and the consequent fusion of the races. As has been pointed out, they came of the same stock, had the same religion, the same devotion to liberty. The Dutch had no particular tie of loyalty to their mother country; its dominion over them—or rather the dominion of the Dutch East India Company whom it supported—had been distasteful to them; they had never had any abstract passion for governing themselves. They seemed ready, therefore, for the appearance of the Strong Power, whose naval superiority counterbalanced her distance from them, and who was able not only to increase their trade but to protect them from all other Powers who, in case of

hostilities, must perforce attack them from the sea. Notwithstanding all this the fact remains that within a period of thirty years Britain succeeded so ill in the conciliation of her new subjects that large numbers of them left their homes and trekked into the wilderness rather than be subject to her.

To understand the reasons which brought about this unfortunate result we must go back to the farmers or Boers whose character in the middle of the 18th century has been sketched. They had not advanced one whit in civilization or refinement since then—rather had they retrogressed—but their characters had developed along the lines laid down; love of solitude and independence had become second nature to them, while their constant friction with the natives—Kaffirs, Hottentots and Bushmen—in which their government, far from aiding, had more than once put them in the wrong, had not decreased their animosity and contempt for their coloured neighbours. Slave labour, too, had taught them its lessons of arrogance and callousness, and altogether the Boer of this period was a less attractive personality than his forefather—sterner, more bigoted, more ignorant. He knew very little of governments, but that little was evil. Whether it were the Dutch or the English it seemed to him that government of any sort meant taxes, without any *quid pro*

quo in the shape of protection. Scattered over a wide district he had little time or opportunity to mix with the British, and his first experience of the policy of Great Britain in a question which to him was of vital importance—the frontier struggle with the Kaffirs—was, to say the least of it, unfortunate. In 1834 the farmers had suffered from an irruption of these savages, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban, calling together colonists of both races, had driven them back, fixed their frontiers, and converted the country between them and the farmers into a British province, in which the peaceful natives were to dwell under British tutelage. This settlement was, however, deemed unsatisfactory by the British Government at home, where the spirit of brotherhood—an easy thing to profess when one's troublesome brethren do not live next door—was stirring strongly in the hearts of men. Sir B. D'Urban was recalled, and the Kaffirs restored to their territory in close proximity to the Dutch and English farmers. It is difficult to estimate the bitter feeling this act, doubtless dictated by a sensitive desire to deal justly with the natives, aroused, especially in the Boers, and this was not their only ground of complaint.

Between 1825 and 1828 changes were made in the system of local government, and the English instead of

the Dutch language was appointed to be used in all official and legal proceedings. The stream of immigration which had gone on since the British annexation had filled the coast towns and the more settled districts with British subjects, and as they amalgamated with the burgher inhabitants the two languages became equally known. But in the wide interior country where the Boers had their stock farms, the English tongue was practically unknown, and in these immense districts the only British who were well known to the Boers were the missionaries.

The part played by missionaries in the history of South Africa is considerable, and although in summing it up we may feel that they have not always done well, we must remember that throughout they acted not for their own welfare or benefit, but in the cause which seemed to them that of humanity and justice. The great question on which the missionaries and colonists—and not the Dutch only, but the English colonists as well—split, was that of relations with the coloured races. It often happens that a good cause is half ruined by the injudicious manner in which it is espoused; no better cause theoretically than the protection of the weak against the strong can be found, but even in such a case as this it is possible in redressing one injustice to inflict another. From the

Boer point of view they possessed certain slaves, Hottentots and negroes, people who were only a shade removed from soulless brute beasts. They were not conscious of any wrong principle involved in owning these slaves, and although they treated them as of a lower organism than themselves, yet they did not, consistently, practise such cruelties as were perpetrated by slave owners in, for instance, the West Indies. In the first place they did not possess such enormous numbers of slaves, and therefore were more careful of the lives of their property. It seems a fair view of the state of affairs to say that, although the evils of slavery were apparent in South Africa, and the subject races suffered inevitably under the *régime*, yet their sufferings were the outcome of the system, and not of any particular malignancy or cruelty on the part of the Boers, as is often represented.

The missionaries reported every case of ill usage to the Government, and were therefore looked upon as spies by the farmers, while it is probable that their very strong bias made them unable to detect inaccuracies or exaggerations in the complaints which reached their ears. An unfortunate affair, in which a small rising, consequent on the attempt to arrest a farmer who had ill-used a native servant,

led to an act of stern reprisal as ill-timed as were the concessions, before mentioned, to the Kaffirs. Six of the ringleaders were hanged, and the bitter feeling against the English Government received a strong impetus. "The affair of Slaghter's Nek" is still told to inflame the anger of the Boer against the British. In 1828 equal voting rights were given to Hottentots and all free coloured people as well as Europeans, and although the number who could fulfil the property qualification was not large, the resentment of the Boers at seeing those whom they so despised placed on an equal footing with them was extreme.

In 1834 all the slaves in British colonies were emancipated, and a sum of twenty millions sterling voted as compensation to the slave owners. This was divided among the colonies according to the number of slaves—a mistaken calculation, since in South Africa they were individually far more valuable than in other parts, on account of the size of the country and scarceness of labour. The sum allotted to the Cape was very inadequate, and the claims were to be personally presented in London, which further discounted their value. Slave owners were forced to sell their claims to dealers, who bought up large numbers, since the time and

expense involved in the journey were absolutely prohibitive to the farmers.

It cannot be denied that in the thirty years of British rule the Dutch boers (this name is used in its real meaning of "farmer") had suffered more than one injustice. Had the path of subjection to foreign government been smoothed for them, their ancient prejudices respected, their rights and customs rigorously preserved; could they have been given, in increased prosperity, protection from savages, or facilities for communication, some *quid pro quo* for their enforced submission, then it is likely that English and Dutch would to-day be an united Afrikander nation, and the African programme would be too simple to require discussion. Nowhere is the difficulty so fully illustrated of founding a colonial empire under the vacillations of party government.

In 1836, influenced in the main by the motives before set out, the love of independence, and a sense of injustice, the Dutch farmers began their *Great Trek.* Like Israel of old, to whom they likened themselves, they, and their wives and their little ones, their cattle and household gods and all they possessed, left the land where they had conquered and been conquered, and set forth on a

long journey into the wilderness, to seek a country where they could lead the lives they loved among their herds, and—to use an expression forcible if not elegant—muddle along in their own way.

The burghers of the towns, many of whom had intermarried with the British, had besides no serious grievances against the Government, and very few joined in the Treks. They had felt the benefit of free trade, and the increased commercial prosperity which the resources of England were able to bring. They had not suffered from the predations of the Kaffirs and were therefore less imbued with a sense of injustice in the dealings of the Government; so, although they had a good deal of sympathy with their kinsmen, they did not feel called upon to leave the flesh pots of Egypt. Since that time, when the exclusively Dutch population to a large extent removed itself, the Afrikander has taken a new phase. The English colonists brought with them the knowledge of a wider sphere, more enterprise, energy and the faculty for organisation and self-government which had been lacking in the Dutch.

At this point we must leave the Cape, rapidly developing into an English colony with a Dutch substratum, and follow the "Trekkers" into the wilderness.

PART II.

EXODUS OF THE BOERS.

THE first party of Boers started from Albany led by Triechard, went north as far as Zoutpansberg, and then east to Delagoa Bay. They numbered ninety-eight when they started, but were thinned by the attacks of natives, and finally, with a few exceptions, perished of malaria on the swampy coast. The next party including several burgher families from Colesberg, was led by Potgieter, and, with a third party under Maritz, settled for a time at Thabanchu in what is now known as the Orange Free State. They waged a successful war against the Matabili, who under their redoubtable chief Moselekatze was at that time harrying the whole country. The Matabili were a warlike tribe of Zulus, and more formidable in fight than any natives yet encountered. They were eventually driven across the Limpopo river, and in 1837 Potgieter proclaimed the whole of the country

south of that river, which includes a greater part of the Transvaal, the Orange State and Southern Bechuanaland, to be forfeited to the emigrants. The right of conquest is one whose legality may be disputed, but it must be remembered that the Matabili were themselves invaders. Chaka, the chief of the Zulus, had almost depopulated and laid waste the central regions to the north-west of Cape Colony and the fertile district of Natal. The Matabili were a tribe who rose in rebellion against him, and in their turn raided and massacred the unfortunate native tribes, Basutos and Bechuanas, from whom the Boers obtained concessions in consideration of freeing them from the Matabili, so that their position at first was not actually that of aggression against peaceful natives.

Port Natal at this time was occupied by a few English traders, who had established friendly, if precarious, relations with the Zulus. They had several times demanded to be made an English colony, but the policy of non-expansion was on the ascendant in England, and in the words of the statesman who gave back to the Kaffirs the territory conquered by Sir Benjamin D'Urban "the great danger of South Africa lies in its size." So Natal was not acknowledged, and a party of Boers, under Retief, who found their way there, were welcomed by the

traders, and settled down with every intention of making the district their own. Unhappily the leader was cruelly murdered with many of his followers when on a mission to the kraal of the Zulu chief Dingaan. This act of treachery was avenged by the remaining Boers, reinforced by their kinsfolk from the Transvaal under Potgieter and Pretorius, who had just come victorious from their Matabili campaign. In a fierce and bloody battle they broke the power of Dingaan, and promoted his brother, Panda, who was friendly to them, to be chief in his stead. Having founded Pietermaritzburg and portioned out the land, they began to frame laws and organise themselves as the Republic of Natalia. Their leader and head was Pretorius, Potgieter and his friends having retired again to the Transvaal, on account of disagreements with the other chief.

The obvious disadvantage to Britain of allowing one of her very few ports to be annexed by her quondam and recalcitrant subjects, together with the disturbances caused by the Boers among the native tribes under British protection, rendered interference by the Government inevitable. A small force, sent against the Boers in 1842, was surrounded and besieged in Port Natal, but after twenty-six days received reinforcements and relief by sea, and dis-

persed the Boers. The annexation of Natalia by Britain was bitterly opposed by the colonists, but became an accomplished fact, and rather than settle down again under the rule they had come so far to avoid the majority of the Boers again trekked across the mountains and rejoined their kinsfolk in the Transvaal.

The Republic of Natalia only existed for six years, and during that time it certainly accomplished something in defeating the Zulus and rendering the country safe for white men. But the Boers, unaccustomed to the organisation of government, and deprived of their natural head, Retief, early in the day were split up by internal disagreements, and their little colony was by no means in a flourishing condition when annexed by Great Britain.

Unfortunately for the Boers, the Zulu campaign had cost them dearly in the loss not only of Retief but of Pieter Uys, and later of Maritz. Potgieter and Pretorius remained, but as has already been said, they could not work together, and the former retired again across the Drakensburg; and in the districts of Winburg and Potchefstroom, both north and south of the Vaal river, small communities were established, practically independent but linked together and to the Republic of Natal by a sort of representative

body, known as the Adjunct Raad. By no means all the Boers, however, gave their support to this primitive parliament. Nor was it invested with any real authority. Each farmer desired merely to do what was right in his own eyes, to take possession of as much land as possible for his herds to graze, and to control the natives to do all the agricultural work that was absolutely necessary. Unfortunately for these primitive aspirations there were other forces at work in South Africa, which were bound to compel the Boers, willy nilly, into the semblance of a nation if they wished to retain their precious independence.

The British Government some little time after the annexation of Natal pursued the course of non-conciliation towards the Boers which had proved fatal in Cape Colony. In 1847 Pretorius was sent by his countrymen who still remained in the country, to lay their grievance before the Governor at Cape Town, but he was not granted an interview and returned with much bitterness. The exodus therefore continued, large portions of the country were left vacant and had to be filled up with natives, and the great predominance of coloured people consequent on the exodus of so many Europeans still exists in this Colony, and is becoming a serious difficulty. Natal was at first regarded as part of Cape Colony, but became a

separate Crown Colony in 1853, and obtained self-government in 1893.

In order to limit the power of the Boers, and as a sort of compromise between declaring the whole country British and leaving it altogether alone, the plan was adopted of establishing a protectorate over various native states round and within the borders of the district the Boers had occupied. Compromises, although they may save present trouble, are seldom successful in the long run, and this proved no exception. Among these "buffer states" was Griqualand, inhabited by a half-caste Christianised race, and with these Griquas the Boers very shortly came into conflict. They were naturally aggrieved that a recognition should be made of the quasi-independence of this bastard race, while they themselves were constantly met with the assurances that the British Government regarded them merely as rebellious subjects. This was in 1846, two years after the Adjunct Raad of Winburg and Potchefstroom had issued a declaration of independence. The numbers of the Boers at this time was little more than 15,000, all told. They were scattered freely over an area 700 miles long and 300 miles wide, which stretched from the Limpopo on the north to near the Orange river on the south. The

most independent spirits had trekked to the north of the Transvaal, where they felt secure from interference, and were busy settling down. They impressed the natives very largely into their service, and although they had nominally abjured slavery the position held by their servants or "apprentices" was little else. The Boers themselves have never been able to see why the Kaffirs should not be made to work for them in return for the privilege of living undisturbed in their own country.

In 1848 Sir Harry Smith, who had just arrived as Governor of the Cape, visited Natal, where he tried in vain to turn the tide of Boer emigration, and even made overtures to Pretorius, whose worth he was able to appreciate. His next act was to declare the whole territory between the Orange and Vaal rivers to be under English rule, and a British Resident was sent to occupy Bloemfontein—then merely a farm. Pretorius thereupon called his countrymen together, and for a few months resisted the British mandate, but was finally defeated by Sir Harry Smith at Boomplatz, after an engagement—the first in which the Boers, as an independent people, met the "red-coats" of Britain—in which they surprised the veteran general of their opponents by their stubborn resistance. This engagement, which terminated in the flight

of most of the Boers across the Vaal river, was undoubtedly unfortunate. Sir Harry had begun a policy of conciliation which might have ended well, but his too hasty action in annexing the territory drove matters to a premature crisis, by which the Boers were for ever alienated.

The "Orange River Sovereignty" was constituted under British rule, many English settlers came in, and the country began to assume a flourishing aspect. But the "penny wise, pound foolish" system of the Home Government had ordained that the new colony must from the first be self-supporting and self-defending. The system of commandos remained in force, and not a little discontent was felt by the burghers when called upon to take part in the numerous squabbles which were always arising among the neighbouring Basuto tribes. It was, in their opinion, to the weakness of the Government, which supported these tribes, that they owed their continuance and their ability to trouble the peace. A skirmish with the Basutos, in which the European troops were defeated, culminated matters, and the open discontent of the farmers found an echo in the British Cabinet.

Pretorius, one of the most remarkable figures in South African history, who has not without cause been

called "The Boer Cromwell," remained on the south of the Transvaal, just across the river, a proscribed outlaw, and waited his opportunity to inflame both Boers and Basutos to revolt. His opportunity arrived with the check inflicted by the Basutos, for a fresh change was made in the policy of the Government, Sir Harry Smith was recalled, and the abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty was determined; for —said the Home Authorities—if the British Resident cannot keep order among disaffected Dutch and quarrelsome Basutos merely by his personal influence, then he had better give it up altogether; the Kaffir wars are trouble and expense enough, we cannot increase the responsibilities of Her Majesty any further.

Pretorius offered his services to mediate with the disaffected Dutch of the Orange river territory, and the Government were apparently glad to conciliate him. The sentence of outlawry on him was therefore reversed, he was recognised as the head of the Boers, and on January 16th, 1852, sixteen years after the exodus from Cape Colony, the Sand River Convention recognised the existence of a separate independent state beyond the Vaal. It was hoped that this, by satisfying the demands of the more turbulent spirits and pacifying Pretorius, would lead the

Orange river farmers to settle down peaceably, when the revolutionary influence of their kinsfolk was removed—another compromise, and another failure. The Basuto question remained untouched in this settlement, and was soon to the fore again. An unsuccessful campaign against them, conducted by General Cathcart at the head of 2,000 regular troops, finally disgusted the Government entirely with the whole situation. They were unwilling to prolong their occupation of a country surrounded by hostile tribes, and inhabited for the most part by disaffected Dutch. They were above all anxious to be rid of the responsibility, and in their frenzy of caution they forgot that obligations voluntarily assumed cannot be voluntarily abandoned. To go back at this point seemed a confession, not only of weakness, but of callousness as to the fate of the colony and her British inhabitants, but the protests of English settlers, of the Cape Colony and of others whose interests were bound up with the continuance of the Orange river territory as an English possession, were unheeded.

In February, 1854, the convention of Bloemfontein granted independence to what then became known as the Orange Free State, and repudiated alliances with all native tribes north of the Orange river, except the Griquas. This was the year of the Crimean War; Eng-

land had plenty on her hands in other quarters of the globe; but a policy which aims merely at the evasion of responsibility is not one that can be expected to succeed, especially when practised by a nation which, if it is to live, is bound to expand. Quiescence seems impossible to nations, they must progress or retrogress, and in shelving the problem of the Orange River territory, the politicians of 1854 were merely laying up in store a crop of difficulties, compared to which the situation then was almost simple. The acknowledgment of the Transvaal was a different matter, there the country was entirely settled by Boers, the English had no hold and no authority, but the Orange River territory was already half colonised by British who had, contrary to their custom in South Africa, actually settled on the land. The real difficulty, then as ever, lay in the native question; and the weak-kneed policy of the Home Government, far more cruel in the long run, led among other mistakes to the recall of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and produced its inevitable crop of petty wars and skirmishes, which were a constant worry and expense, and gave the Government an unfavourable opinion of the prospects of South Africa as a white man's country. The gist of the matter was that South Africa was governed from Downing Street, by men who knew little of the conditions of life of the country

whose fortunes they attempted to guide, and nothing of the idiosyncrasies of either natives or Dutch. Nor were they willing to listen to the man on the spot. His actions must be guided not by the exigencies of the situation in which he found himself, or by his knowledge of the peculiarities of the people with whom he was dealing, but by the lines laid down in party politics at home, by the prevailing sentiment which was for the moment swaying a fickle electorate. Was it the cry of pity and consideration for the poor native, as depicted by the missionaries? Then nothing must be done to control the marauding Kaffir. Was it a sudden burst of economy, and a nervous desire that the mother country should not be swamped by her possessions? Then the Governor of the Cape must see to it that horns were pulled in on every side, regardless of the interests those horns were intended to protect. This policy has not been confined to the earlier history of the British rule in South Africa.

It is little wonder that South Africa is known as the Grave of Reputations. 'Through the long list of Government officials from 1806 downwards few have escaped censure, and the ablest have been summarily recalled.

PART III.

PROGRESSION AND RETROGRESSION.

THE long-desired freedom did not bring peace to the emigrant farmers. They were already split up into factions, and Pretorius, who acted on behalf of all his countrymen in accepting the Bloemfontein Convention, was, in reality, merely the head of the party in the South of the Transvaal. His death, and that of Potgieter shortly after, left the Republic in a somewhat headless condition, though Pretorius' son to a certain extent took his place. Paul Kruger, who as a small boy had followed his father's waggon in the Great Trek, began at this period to make his personality felt in the world of politics.

The Adjunct Raad had ceased to exist, and there were four or five separate republics in different parts of the country. The Grondwet or Constitution, drawn up in 1857 by the farmers of Potchefstroom, was the first serious attempt at organised self-govern-

ment made by the emigrant farmers. It was extremely simple in substance, and only one or two points need be mentioned here. Slavery was abjured (this, indeed, had been one of the articles of the Sand River Convention), no equality between white and colored inhabitants was to be tolerated in Church or State, although the Gospel might be preached to the heathen. The territory was declared free and open to every stranger who submitted to the laws; every able-bodied male was to be subject to a commando, natives, if necessary, included. Suffrage was granted to every burgher at the age of twenty-one, but not to natives or bastards or members of any but the Dutch Reformed Church. The government was to be by a president elected for five years, an executive council consisting of the Commandant-General, two burghers and a secretary, and the Raad, a representative body of twelve members.

This constitution was not generally adopted until 1860, when the various rival factions were united and the "South African Republic" may be said to have been fairly launched. Pretorius—son of the old Pretorius—was the first president, and attempted, by securing his election as President of the Orange Free State as well, to unite the two Republics. He was, however, foiled in this, and in 1864 was re-elected as

President of the South African Republic, while Kruger became Commandant-General. It is needless here to give a detailed account of the tortuous paths of policy in the two States. Internal dissension was rife in the more northern one; native wars, expeditions and acts of violence on both sides disturbed the peace. The English missionaries who were at work among the Bechuanas strongly resented the conduct of the Boers towards their native converts. The intrepid and devoted Livingstone, in particular, strongly condemned them; to him their Christianity was incomprehensible, since their Church was the bulwark of slavery. In all utterances of missionaries at this time it is necessary to make allowances for a bitter prejudice, but at the same time there is no doubt that, whereas the Boers had frequently in their forays to avenge the murders of their kinsmen, yet they often made reprisal the excuse for aggression, and although nominally abjuring slavery carried off the children of their slaughtered foes to be apprentices to them on terms not very different from actual slavery.

Nor were the Boers content with the slice of country acknowledged to be theirs. They desired to find access to the sea, or if that were impossible, to block the road to Central Africa. They were,

however, handicapped by severe internal difficulties. A people who for twenty years had lived without rule, without organisation, by the strength of their right arm alone, were not easily converted into law abiding, tax paying citizens; even their religion was not under the guidance of established canons. The stricter and more Puritanical founded a sect known as the Doppers, or Roundheads, who cherished the most ancient traditions of the race and held by the literal verbal inspiration of the Bible. Religious differences, among such a devout people, led more than once to serious internal dissensions. The question of revenue for the Republic was also an extremely difficult one. The Boers resented nothing so much as any form of taxation, and in a primitive pastoral country, where money hardly circulated and the medium of exchange was chiefly cattle, it was difficult to arrange any system which could be satisfactorily applied. Into a country like this, where laws were lax and space was ample, there came from all parts of Africa the wildest spirits, those who found other countries too peaceful for them, and fugitives from justice. The Transvaal has with truth been called the Alsatia of Africa, and such settlers did much harm in debasing the tone of the whole colony. From this time onwards the influence

of foreigners on the politics and social life of the Boers has constantly been felt, and on the whole their influence has been anti-British.

Meanwhile the Orange Free State had settled down quietly, the leaven of British citizens, merchants and farmers, had worked well in the pacification of the country. They knew the benefits of good government and were not suspicious of every one in authority. A struggle with the Basutos, which nearly ended in their subjugation, led the chief Moshesh to ask for British protection, and the annexation of Basutoland in 1868 showed the dawn of a new policy on the part of Great Britain. The Free State was fortunate, during the stormy years that followed, in having at its head a man—President Brand—who steered them safely and wisely, adopted a policy of neutrality and kept on terms of friendly intercourse with Britain.

In 1868 and 1869 two events happened of startling import in the history of South Africa. Gold was found—the first—on the borders of the Transvaal, and diamonds were discovered in Griqualand.

The last was a somewhat debateable territory, as the possessions of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State both met in the region claimed by the Griqua chief Waterboer, where lay the diamond

mines. This region in an incredibly short time had become thronged with thousands of diggers, English and American, as well as colonists. A dispute as to the ownership of this treasure-trove at once arose. There can be little doubt that it really belonged to the Orange Free State, but Waterboer skilfully placed himself under British protection, while at the same time the Governor of Natal was asked to arbitrate as to the claims. By a not very reputable piece of juggling the British Government, having of course decided in favour of Waterboer, took over his claim, and erected the country into a Crown Colony under the name of Griqualand West. The Orange Free State had never consented to this arbitration, and appealed to a British court, which found that Waterboer had certainly no right to the territory; but, as the whole affair had been settled, and as it was obviously best for such a heterogeneous mass of miners to be under the control of a strong Power, the British retained the country and offered a sum in compensation to the Free State. This—perhaps on the principle that half a loaf is better than none—was accepted, but the impression created in the minds, not only of the Free Staters, but of the Transvaalers, was certainly not conducive to respect or confidence in Great Britain.

In 1871 the action of Pretorius in accepting a

boundary award made by the Governor of Natal—highly unpopular with the burghers—led to his downfall, and Burgers became the second President of the Republic. He was a Cape Dutchman, and in many ways considerably more advanced than the people who elected him. His ambitions for the country, his attempts to introduce education, to promote railways and to levy taxes, met with great disapproval. He was also unorthodox in his religion, a fact which in itself debarred him from the whole-hearted support of the people. Kruger, at the head of the Conservative party, opposed and thwarted his plans.

Gold continued to be found, and a small but constant stream of miners flowed into the land, where they met with little welcome from the Boers, who dreaded their disturbing influence, and were rigidly opposed to any change in the then existent state of affairs.

At this period a strong but ineffectual effort was made by Lord Carnarvon to arrange the confederation of the South African States. The time was not ripe, and race jealousy was too keen to allow the different sections in each State to act in concert.

The natives on the borders of the South African Republic took advantage of the disorganised condition of the Boers, and Cetewayo, chief of the Zulu tribe,

threatened them on the east, while Sekukuni, chief of the Bapedi, attacked them further north. They had formed an alliance with the Swazis, and these joined them in opposing Sekukuni, but the campaign ended disastrously, the Boers suffered a check and refused to continue to fight, saying that their defeat was due to the unorthodoxy of their President.

Affairs were in this state — natives threatening, bankruptcy imminent, a President who was quite unable to control the people, and a people divided among themselves — when in 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who had been sent as British Agent to Pretoria, declared the Transvaal to be under the protection of the British flag.

A discussion as to the merits and demerits of this action would be altogether outside the scope of this sketch, nor is it relevant to enquire as to the influence of which particular statesman it was due. There were many reasons which rendered such an act justifiable, although the chief one adduced—that the majority of burghers desired British annexation—is not by any means a fair statement.

The mazes of party politics at home, in which the question became involved, though interesting as elucidating the way in which our foreign policy is evolved, cannot be touched on here. The instruc-

tive part of the history of the annexation lies in the treatment of the country after that act, and here it may be remarked that a free white race cannot be treated in the high-handed manner often most successful with coloured races. Allowances must be made for their idiosyncrasies, more especially in the case of a race so tenacious of their rights and habits as the Dutch Afrikander.

No representative government was granted, although it had been expressly promised; taxes were strictly levied, and eventually a military governor appointed, who by his red tapeism and arrogance alienated where he should have conciliated, and confirmed the Boers in their opinion of the severity of British rule. Sir Bartle Frere landed at the Cape as Governor and High Commissioner just after the annexation had been made by Shepstone, and to him fell the task of settling affairs with the Zulus, under Cetewayo, who were far from friendly to Europeans, be they Dutch or English. The refusal of the truculent chief to consent to the terms laid down, led to the declaration of war and the campaign began in January, 1879. At the end of that month occurred the terrible disaster of Isandlwana, in which 800 white and 500 coloured soldiers were practically massacred. Reinforcements were sent, but it was August before

the war ended with the capture of Cetewayo and later of Sekukuni, the chief whose success against the Boers had hastened the downfall of the Republic.

The removal of the native dangers which had threatened them, encouraged the Boers to make another bid for freedom, but not until they had, by a delegation to London, petitioned the Government to restore their independence freely. They were assured of the impossibility of this, but there is little doubt that they received much encouragement from the sympathetic attitude adopted by Gladstone towards them. A second deputation having been equally unsuccessful, the Boers rose on December 15th, 1880, and proclaimed their independence under a triumvirate of leaders—Kruger, Pretorius and Joubert.

The war began with a disaster to British troops at Bronkers Spruit, continued with severe checks at Laing's Nek and Ingogo, and culminated in the terrible defeat at Majuba Hill, and the death of the unlucky General Colley. There is no doubt that this campaign owed its misfortunes to the attitude of the Government at home, as well as to the mistakes made on the spot. The war was unpopular, the authorities, judging rashly from the Boers' last encounter with Sekukuni, and forgetting their previous record,

believed that they would make little if any resistance to disciplined troops, while General Colley was handicapped not only by over confidence in his men and the stereotyped method of warfare in which he had been educated, but by the lack of support afforded him from Home. He was expected to bring the war to a brilliant conclusion *speedily, and at the same time cheaply.*

We have seen that the Boers, in their conflict with Sekukuni, had refused to continue the campaign because they did not believe that the divine blessing rested on their arms. A similar scruple seems at this juncture to have seized the British Government. A desire to put an end to a race conflict, to compensate for past injuries inflicted on the Boers, and to unite the Dutch and English elements by a bond of gratitude since all other means had failed, led them, at this unpropitious moment, to renounce their claims to the country of the Boers, and the convention of Pretoria, signed in March, 1881, gave back the independence of the Transvaal under the suzerainty of Great Britain.

The part played in this dénouement by the Dutch all over South Africa has to be taken into consideration. The race solidarity of the Dutch Afrikander is a remarkable characteristic, and both in the Cape,

in Natal, and in the Orange Free State much sympathy has always been felt by the Dutch for their kinsfolk in the Transvaal. But to allow that they forced the hand of the Government is to acknowledge a fatal weakness in two of our most important Crown Colonies, nor is it altogether warranted by facts. Throughout the history of South Africa too little attention has been paid to such elements as the sympathies and prejudices of the colonists, and too much to the prevailing sentiment, the spirit of the moment, or the party cry which influences the electorate of Great Britain. Such reasons, doubtless, had far more to do with the retrogression of the Transvaal than a too careful attention to the sentiments of the Dutch of Cape Colony and Natal.

The results might have been foreseen by anyone with an intimate knowledge of Boer character. What was meant for magnanimity was taken for weakness, and the ignorant and conservative farmers were not able to appreciate the subtleties which led a Government to begin a war, sacrifice many hundreds of lives, and then voluntarily renounce for the sake of humanity the objects for which that war had been undertaken. It was obvious to them that the disasters to British troops had made a great difference to the

point of view, and they considered the concession to have been won in free fight, so that the idea of gratitude never entered into their calculations. On the contrary, to their ancient prejudice against the British was added the contempt which a narrow-minded, ignorant man feels for one who seems physically his inferior. Of the real power of Great Britain they had no conception.

The indignation of British settlers, and the consequent discomfort of their position, is one of the most painful features of this period, and the native question assumed still more formidable proportions, since from the first the Boers have never been able to establish a footing for the natives which could be countenanced by other European nations.

Under President Kruger the government of the restored Transvaal was re-organised. He found the treasury empty, but his genius rose superior to such a detail, and he at once plunged into a policy of daring advance on the north, south and west. Before giving the later history of the Transvaal we must glance at the progress of the Cape and Natal during the last half century.

PART IV.

THE TWO COLONIES: NOTES AND IMPRESSIONS.

One of the most important features in the early history of Cape Colony was the introduction of a large number of emigrants, Scotch and English, into the Eastern districts—the most promising from an agricultural point of view. This was the country adjacent to that conquered by the Kaffirs, and a series of wars and treaties took place in the effort to settle the question of boundaries. The successful campaign and settlement of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and the subsequent retrocession by the Home Government and recall of the popular and able Governor have been mentioned as among the grievances which induced the Boers to begin their Great Trek. After their departure the same course of ineffectual compromise continued until, in 1847, the line formerly laid down by D'Urban was finally adopted, and the province of British Kaffraria was

created. The settlement gave, however, too much independence to the numerous tribes who occupied this territory. Once more the necessity for completeness—the absolute need for extensive white colonisation, in order to break up a country under native domination—was illustrated. A war began which lasted till 1853, when the country was incorporated with Cape Colony, Dutch and English settlers were introduced, and, to further increase the population, the Government sent out as military settlers a large number of the foreign mercenaries who had been in the employ of Britain during the Crimean war. The usefulness of this measure was largely discounted by the fact that most were unmarried, and schemes to provide them with wives fell to the ground, so that most of them never settled on the land. Still at different periods a number of Germans have been imported and have proved valuable settlers.

The British Government has more than once had to face the problem of how to induce permanent colonisation in her newly acquired territories. This, as will be shewn, is one of the great problems now facing her. The Boers owe a great portion of their character, and the Afrikander Dutch no inconsiderable portion of the race solidarity

for which they are remarkable, to the fact that their women have always gone with them wherever their fortunes led, have shared their hardships, and thrown themselves heart and soul into all questions affecting their race and country. This Amazonian spirit has manifested itself many times in their history, and instances of it are still fresh in the memory. The Englishwoman, on the contrary, does not come out till the country is settled or pacificated, and more often the English colonist waits till he has "made his pile" before he goes home and marries. Every Boer—up to recent years at all events—was a husband at twenty; his family went with him wherever he chose to go. Stress is laid on these conditions of life because they are important elements to be taken into consideration in the South African Settlement.

It was not until 1853 that representative government was granted to the Cape, when the two Houses, known as the Legislative Council and the House of Assembly, were established to supersede the Executive and first Legislative Councils. These had hitherto been constituted partly of officials and partly of the nominees of the Governor. The new Legislative Council was an elective body, the franchise being extended on the basis of a property

qualification of £25. This representative House had not, however, the power to control or veto the actions of the Governor or the other House, and it was not till 1872 that the colony acquired a responsible government. It may be useful to state briefly the constitution of Cape Colony as it now stands. A Governor is elected by the Home Government, and is at the same time High Commissioner for all South Africa. He is advised by an Executive Council of four or five ministers selected from the two Houses. The Upper House —or Legislative Council—consists of 23 members elected for seven years, and the House of Assembly of 39 members elected for five years. The franchise is extended to all who are British by nationality or naturalisation, who can write their name, address and occupation, and have a property qualification of £75 or wages at the rate of £50, and twelve months' residence is necessary before registration. The course of constitutional history has by no means run smoothly in Cape Colony, for the antagonism of Dutch and English divided the country into East and West, according to the preponderance of either race in these districts. Cape Town itself has very different interests to those of the interior settlements. On the whole, however, the system

now in use generally known as the cabinet system, which gives equal rights to Dutch and English, has worked well.

An attempt was made in 1848-9 to make a convict settlement of the Cape, and a ship was actually sent with ticket-of-leave men. This had the unforeseen effect of uniting all the heterogeneous elements of the Cape population in one effort. They stoutly resisted the mandate of the Government, boycotted the ship, which was obliged to remain in harbour, and by their unanimous refusal to give any countenance to the landing of the convicts gained their point. The ship was sent on to Van Diemans Land and the order which authorised transportation to the Cape revoked. The Afrikander nation had successfully demonstrated its right to be heard in a question which affected the welfare of South Africa.

The commerce of the Cape, which had been practically nil at the time it was in Dutch hands and merely a depôt for passing ships, was rapidly developed under the domination of the "nation of shopkeepers." The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 did away with the ancient *raison d'être* of the Cape as a half-way house to India, and by throwing it on its own resources gave an impetus

to private enterprise. The trade increased rapidly from this date, wool being one of the most important exports. The discovery of diamonds in Griqualand brought a stream of emigrant diggers through Cape Colony, and introduced an element of modernity into the primitive pastoral regions.

Railways, so important in a country like South Africa, were not taken over by the Government till 1872. An account of them will be found elsewhere.

The progress of the colony has been largely hindered by the many Kaffir wars. The Kaffirs, it will be remembered, were not the actual natives of the countries adjoining Cape Colony, but came from the north, and were first encountered by the Dutch in 1779. Between that time and 1834, when Sir Benjamin D'Urban made his determined attempt to solve the difficulty, and was thwarted by the Government, there were no less than four distinct wars with these turbulent neighbours. The seventh Kaffir war, in 1847, ended in an ineffectual compromise—the creation of a Kaffir province under British tutelage—which, as has already been mentioned, led to the eighth Kaffir war, only terminated in 1853. The record of these wars by no means exhausts the story of Britain's difficulties with the native races. The Zulu war, the frequent collisions with Basutos, and many

other minor campaigns have played a great part in the history of the country, and for a lengthened period they largely contributed to the disinclination of various governments to assume any further responsibilities in a country inhabited by such a variety of hostile races.

Natal, the younger sister of the Cape, whose genesis in 1843 has already been noticed, attained responsible government only in 1893, the form differing slightly from that of Cape Colony. Although one of the most favoured parts of South Africa in climate and fertility, it has not hitherto become an agricultural country. Sugar is grown with the aid of East Indian Coolies, who were largely imported to supplement the somewhat spasmodic Kaffir labour, but the discovery of the Kimberley Diamond Mines and the Randt Gold fields drew off a large number of European Colonists. The native question looms very large in Natal, and the overwhelming coloured majority has led to the practical exclusion of Indians and Kaffirs from the franchise. This solution of the question does not seem to have the elements of permanency, and the rapid increase of the coloured races who are already in ratio of ten to one to the Europeans raises difficulties which demand careful consideration.

As it is impossible in a work of this nature to follow

closely the history of the two British colonies, it must suffice for the present to indicate a few of the impressions conveyed by them.

One of the most brilliant observers who visited South Africa before the war, notices, among its striking characteristics a certain leisured peacefulness, a lack of hurry or strain. That this is largely owing to the Dutch element is evident, and it is more noticeable the farther one gets from the towns. There, where there is commerce to be attended to, mechanical work to be done and money to be made, a large leaven of English, Germans and cosmopolitan Semites are found, who give an air of business activity. But in the country districts, where the population is almost wholly Dutch and native, the traditions of Sleepy Hollow prevail. Education is spreading slowly, and will modify all this, but the average Cape Dutch farmer is still first cousin to the Transvaal Boer, a fact it is well to remember. A strong distrust of new methods, and a steady disapproval of taxation are two *idées fixes* in the Dutch mind; another point in which he has preserved a stubborn conservatism is his language. The Taal, or debased Dutch, is said to be the tongue generally spoken by one-third of the inhabitants of Cape Colony and of three-fourths of the Orange Free State, and, as has been frequently pointed out, it is

an illiterate tongue, capable only of expressing the commonest ideas, so differing from its parent that a modern Dutch book or even newspaper would not be understood by the ordinary Cape Dutch farmer or Transvaal Boer. This makes the survival of the language a still more remarkable fact, and illustrates again the feature which, above all others, marks out the Dutch Afrikander from other white men—his colossal conservatism. Needless to say, a school of young Afrikanders is growing up who will change the traditions of the past, and over whom grey heads are shaken and beards wagged, but the characteristics of a race capable of such force and tenacity are not lightly eradicated, and require the most careful handling if they are to be turned into a channel which will convert them into a loyal and united people.

The history of South Africa, which has been roughly and imperfectly sketched in the preceding pages, down to 1884, when the region of contemporary politics is reached and a more detailed account is necessary, is full of instruction for those who desire to see the establishment of an adequate policy in the settlement.

Unhappily, the chief lesson to be learnt from the history of the dealings of the British Government with South Africa is "How *not* to do it." It is with the

desire to emphasise the warnings of history, and not that of belittling his own countrymen, that the writer has laid stress on certain points, and also with the conviction that it is still possible for Britain to "rise on stepping stones of *her dead self*, to higher things."

PART V.

NEIGHBOURS: GREAT BRITAIN AND THE TRANSVAAL.

TOWARDS the west the Boers began to interfere in Southern Bechuanaland, and, following the tactics adopted in Zululand and elsewhere, obtained or forcibly occupied lands, the result being the establishment of two petty republics, the one called Stellaland and the other Goshen. Filibusters (not all Transvaal Boers) and lawless spirits from various parts of South Africa gathered there, the natives were unable to resist the seizure of their cattle, and farms were lavishly given away to attract settlers. There is no time to tell here the story of the events which led to the expedition of Sir Charles Warren to Bechuanaland in 1884; it is sufficient to note that Cecil Rhodes came into conflict with Sir Charles Warren over this question, and came into prominence as a politician. It was at this time, when Imperial prestige had fallen

to its very lowest limit, for the surrender after Majuba had led English colonists, hoping for no support from England, to come to terms with the Boers, that the Afrikander Bond became a power in South Africa. The cry of "Africa for the Afrikander" began to be heard and the doctrine of "Eliminate the Imperial factor," a phrase invented by Mr. Rhodes, was adopted as a cardinal cry with Cape politicians. This, perhaps, was not unnatural, for the colonists had come to the conclusion that if the Imperial Government could, or would not, govern the country, they themselves must take the matter in hand. To obtain control it was evidently necessary to secure the support of the Afrikander Bond and thus to manage the Dutch element which was in a majority. Hofmeyr, a man of marked ability and a devoted Afrikander, was the commanding personage among the Dutch. The loyalty of this remarkable man has in recent times been frequently questioned in England and even by British colonists in South Africa, but there is nothing to show that he ever contemplated removing Cape Colony from the system of the British Empire. Contrary to usual expectations, Warren's expedition was entirely successful; the filibusters receiving no support from the Transvaal Government made no stand, and the districts occupied were created a Crown

Colony under the name of British Bechuanaland. At the same time a British Protectorate was proclaimed as far north as the southern border of Matabililand, and several years later, in 1888, Lo Bengula, the King of Matabililand, agreed not to cede territory to, or make a treaty with, any foreign power without the consent of the High Commissioner.

In connection with this whole incident—the Boer incursion into Bechuanaland and the expedition of Warren—it is necessary to bear certain points in mind. Although the Boers unjustifiably raided Bechuanaland, a neighbouring territory, it must be remembered that the incursion was into a district which had no settled government, and that the Cape politicians, restive at the incapacity of the Imperial Government, had attempted to persuade Stellaland and Goshen to ask for annexation to the Cape Colony, which alarmed the Transvaal. It is important, in view of later events, to recollect that Cape politicians of this period were anxious to eliminate the Imperial factor.

The avenue to the Zambesi river and Central Africa —to the great Far Interior—was thus opened. The expedition is almost unique in the history of South Africa, wherever the British had come into collision with either Boers or natives. Its success was no doubt

largely due to the fact that the expedition, composed either of colonials or men conversant with the general conditions of South Africa, was under the command of a leader of character well acquainted with the situation. But the circumstance that, by the London Treaty recently concluded, the Transvaal Government had just gained advantages, while at the same time they were almost bankrupt, undoubtedly were important factors in the matter. While these successes were accomplished on the western border of the Transvaal two events of the first magnitude occurred. A change had begun within that State which was destined shortly to transform the Boer Republic, and to alter the whole course of events throughout South Africa. The Government of a miserably poor pastoral State found itself at one bound placed in command of vast and rapidly increasing wealth. At the same time another European Power had made its appearance in South Africa on the south-west coast. The whole situation was at once transformed.

Meanwhile Zululand, where events that had recently occurred resulted in grave disorder throughout the country, was not provided by the British Government with anything in the shape of an administration —was practically left to stew in its own juice. A small part of the country was taken over under the

title of "the Reserve," and, the German aspirations in South Africa creating a scare, St. Lucia Bay was occupied. A tract of country named the "New Republic," naturally completely under the influence of the Transvaal, was recognised by the British Government, which took no steps in this region of South Africa until, in 1887, they annexed Eastern Zululand. The "New Republic" was then incorporated with the Transvaal, and this large accession of territory gave the South African Republic a considerable strategic advantage with regard to their neighbour Natal.

At the time of the discovery of gold in the Randt the Transvaal was in a very bad way. The burghers were lax in paying their taxes, there were no industries, and the Government was finding it increasingly difficult to carry on its functions. Here was a country inhabited by a half-nomad race, with their flocks, herds, and farms scattered over an immense territory, moving yearly with their waggons from the high to the low veldt.

Although the assets of the Government were practically nil, the individual farmers, especially those of the higher class, lived in a sort of patriarchal plenty, surrounded by children, servants, sheep and cattle. Enormous flocks and herds of Biblical proportions

were no uncommon possession for one man, whose farm probably included something like six thousand acres. His house was simple, his fare coarse but plentiful, his dress and that of his wife and children home-made, as was indeed almost everything he possessed. A travelling trader visited the farm once a year and brought the rough materials and any hardware or cutlery which the family might desire. Very little, if any, coin was in use, payment being almost entirely in kind. Education was carried on by a few men whose qualification, so far from extending to a "little Latin and less Greek," was often bounded by a little reading and less writing. The Bible constituted the whole literature, and was read aloud daily by the head of the family, and its precepts sternly and literally applied. The Kaffir and Hottentot servants were treated much like slaves. To the Boers, as already said, they were the children of Ham, for ever doomed to be hewers of wood and drawers of water, and hardly credited with the possession of souls. One of the precepts most forcibly instilled into youthful minds by the elder Boers was an intense distrust of anything new, more especially of British ways or customs. These they considered would destroy their race, and it must be urged in their defence that they certainly came into

contact with many Englishmen who were not a credit to their nation. The chief virtues of the Boer were hospitality—too often abused by Europeans, and therefore dwindling—and sobriety. Drunkenness and profanity were almost unknown among them up to the time of the European immigration, and crime was equally rare. A large proportion of their life was spent in the open air, largely on horseback. Their religion, which was at once their scourge and solace, was that of the Dutch and Huguenot Calvinism of the seventeenth century, and their pastors, among whom were several Scotchmen, were treated with great deference and consideration. The Transvaal Boer was not, collectively or individually, a very good neighbour. Disliking the Kaffirs, he detested the British Government, though not, be it understood, the British people individually. Britain to him was the adversary that had never left him at peace, that drove him into the wilderness in 1836, that annexed his Republic in 1877, and that closed to him possible fields of expansion west and north. It is impossible to conceive a greater contrast than existed in 1886, and continues even to this very day, between the two communities brought into contact by the gold discovery. They were entirely antipathetic and incapable of understanding each

other. Centuries of pastoral life, solitary and shut off from contact with the outer world, have made the Boers altogether incapable of engaging in commercial or industrial pursuits, and more especially incapable of working the mines, an industry which at one time was entirely forbidden. They stood aloof altogether from the mining industry when it was started, and were content with disposing for merely nominal sums of the lands where gold was supposed to exist. They did not understand the value of these gold bearing areas, and, after all, one piece of land was as good as another from the pastoral point of view. It is unfair to regard the Boers as merely an uncouth, ignorant race. Besides the virtues already mentioned, they are brave, faithful to each other, good in their domestic life, little given to avarice or ambition, but the leaders among them, to whom money was of so much importance, were unable to resist the influences arising from the advent of gold seekers, most of them of Anglo-Jewish extraction, who were not too nice in their methods to secure their ends. The Transvaal Government soon showed signs of coming under the new influences. While the leading officials were becoming more corrupt, but not wiser, the mass of the people remained what they were, phlegmatic, devout and ignorant; suspicious and wily

in their intercourse with foreigners. Such was the land and such were the people that in 1886 were suddenly invaded by a horde of gold-seekers.

The newcomers were as far removed from the Boers as possible; they were town dwellers, bent on commerce, finance and mining, full of enterprise, and irreligious. In the eyes of the Boers these Uitlanders were not English, and did not belong to any one nationality, for though the English from England and South Africa were in the majority, there were also Americans, Australians, Germans, with a sprinkling of other nationalities—French, Italians, Russians, and others. A large number of these, from various parts of the world, were of Jewish race, and had all their characteristics. This cosmopolitan society, unlike in so many things, had one point in common, whatever their avocations might be. All were bent on the rapid accumulation of wealth, and all intended to get out of the country as soon as they had made their pile. The State at Pretoria received its revenue and milked the cow at Johannesburg to the utmost; and a few farmers sold provisions to the miners. Beyond this there can hardly be said to have been any contact between the two. There was no communication, and, of course, not even the beginning of sympathy. The Boers soon began to

realise the danger that was threatening them, and to suspect that these newcomers, supported by the British Government, would end by swamping them. The newcomers, on their side, resented in an increasing degree the control of a small number of ignorant and out-of-date louts, as they considered the Boers.

With a view to safeguard their position against the Uitlanders the Boers, in 1887, raised the period of residence necessary to obtain burgher-rights from five to fifteen years. The Uitlanders were at this time too much occupied in making money, and as yet did not feel the squeeze of the Transvaal Government, as they did soon after when the gold-mining industry had developed. It rapidly became evident that the existing authorities were quite incompetent to deal with the new problems, and in 1890 the constitutional agitation of the Uitlanders for increased privileges led to the creation of a new chamber, called the Second Volksraad. The newcomer who took the oath of allegiance might acquire a vote for this chamber after two years' residence, and become eligible for election after two more years. The new concession was, however, practically valueless, for care had been taken to deprive the new chamber of all real power, it had no control over taxation, and its proceedings could be

over-ruled by the First Volksraad. There is no need here to traverse the ground so frequently covered of the contest from 1890 onwards between the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government. Sufficient to say that the general effect has been that until an immigrant was over forty years of age, and had been a resident for at least twelve years in the country after taking the oath and being entered on the Government lists, he had no right to vote for the First Volksraad. The corner stone of these and similar exclusive measures was Kruger, who, fearing the newcomers and averse to everything foreign, foresaw the approaching ruin of Boer customs and eventually the overthrow of the Republic.

The part played by this man in the history of South Africa, and the remarkable nature of his personality make him one of the most interesting figures in modern history. In the early days of his Presidency he was known to the outside world chiefly as the ignorant peasant who aped supreme power at Pretoria. His red bandanna handkerchief, his loose, uncouth figure, plain features and homely habits were held up to ridicule. This was before he had proved a match in diplomacy for some of the cleverest statesmen of our times. Since then he has been exalted as a Machiavelli, or a Bismarck, and in both conceptions of him the true character of the man has escaped notice.

The impression made by him on the writer during interviews* in which the services of an interpreter were called in—for Kruger does not speak English, although he can certainly read *Englishmen*—was that of a strong man. His strength lies in his one-sidedness, a feature only possible to a man who knows nothing of books or theories. Paul Kruger has learnt his statecraft from men, and not from books, and is at the same time simple and cunning. All his similes, be it noticed—witness the famous "tortoise"—are drawn from nature. He has the physical courage of his race, was a good sportsman in his youth, and served with distinction in many of the Kaffir wars. His hold over the Boers lies chiefly in the fact that he is the incarnation of their race. Himself one of the original Voor-trekkers, he embodies the traditions of those "irreconcilables." He, like they, has in full force the defects of his qualities, but he is more bigoted, more cunning, more ambitious than were the most forward of them. He is, if one may be permitted the expression, concentrated essence of Boer.

While the discontent of the Uitlanders was growing, the mal-administration of the Transvaal, subject to influences already indicated, was rapidly increasing, and it became a question of gaining political power in order to influence the Adminis-

tration and thus secure reforms; in the words of the association called the National Union, "to obtain, by all constitutional means, equal rights for all citizens of the Republic, and the redress of all grievances." Contrary to a general impression its aim was not to bring the country under British control, but "the maintenance of the independence of the Republic."

While such was the general state of affairs in the Transvaal, the position of its foreign policy may here be briefly noticed. After the restoration of the Transvaal, which had been generally approved by the Afrikanders, there were cordial relations between the Bond and the South African Republic, and in 1887 a general meeting of the Bond was held at Potchefstroom, within the Transvaal. This friendly feeling between the Cape Dutch and the Transvaal Boers did not last long, however, for the Government at Pretoria, instead of admitting the Cape wine and brandy freely into the Transvaal, imposed heavy duties upon produce from the Cape; while, instead of filling official vacancies, for which efficient men could not be obtained locally, from the Cape, officials were imported from Holland, among them Doctor Leyds, a man of considerable talent and strength of character, well acquainted with the general conditions of European

politics, and animated by hatred of everything British. The Transvaal Government, which in effect was Kruger, under the influence of Leyds gradually drifted in the direction of an aspiration to hegemony in a great Afrikander Confederation, and at one time Germany was approached with a view to attaining this object. Meanwhile, Mr. Rhodes was becoming an increasingly important factor in South Africa, and the battle between him and Kruger, representing two entirely different systems, was already at work. It was not merely the difference between English and Dutch, it was the difference between the new and the old, the difference, one may almost say, between the future and the past. Rhodes was much identified in his earlier days with the Dutch. An intimate ally of Hofmeyr he was at one time as profoundly distrusted by the English colonists inside Cape Colony as he was trusted by the Afrikander Bond; as he has been since trusted by the English nation, to be again (since the Raid) as greatly distrusted by a large section of his countrymen, both in England and South Africa. The reference elsewhere made to Stellaland will show how far he was prepared to go to oblige the Dutch; and later his internal policy included the adoption of a protective tariff system, and opposition to any coddling

of the natives. Till 1896 Rhodes was in opposition to the principals of the very party in the Cape, the Progressive Party, of which now, by a turn of the wheel, he is the acknowledged leader. But it must be remembered that if he met the Dutch in these matters, he at the same time succeeded in conciliating them and obtaining their support in other and more important directions. When Rhodes is denounced for his action in working with the Dutch it must be remembered that the idea of a Confederated South Africa could never have borne the slightest chance of being realized except by means of Dutch support. The language used by Rhodes in the early days regarding the Imperial factor need not be taken too literally, for there was great discontent and impatience with the Imperial Government at the time, and politicians locally used expressions which later they were hardly likely to stand by.

PART VI.

EMPIRE MAKING.

THE year 1884 saw the declaration of a German Protectorate in South West Africa, whose inland boundaries were later defined by the Anglo-German agreement of 1890, which gave Germany access to the Zambesi river by a strip of territory "at no point less than 20 miles wide." The intervention of Germany in South Africa, in the South West certainly, and possibly also in the region north of the Zambesi, might have been avoided by the exercise of a little foresight, which would have enabled the entire South African coast line to have been kept in British hands. German intervention, however undesirable and awkward as it may prove in the future, had the effect of stimulating into action—not the British Government which was indifferent and lethargic here, as it has been and is still in Asia—but one man, a man of

character, energy and enterprise, with many of the qualities of statesmanship, and the master of resources which enabled him to put them into execution—Cecil Rhodes.

The career of this remarkable man is too well known to need a detailed account. Coming to South Africa first in search of health, he drifted to the diamond mines, and after years of patient effort succeeded in amalgamating the varying interests there into one company. From that time until the Jameson Raid he went from success to success.

The more interesting side of the question lies, however, in his electric personality which has had so vast an influence on South African history in the past, and must inevitably largely affect that history in the future.

The magic which cannot be described in any other word than "personality," and which places a man head and shoulders above his fellows without anyone knowing exactly why; the magic which surrounded Mr. Gladstone and enabled such men as de Lesseps and Eades (of the Mississippi) to sway others of far greater mental ability—this magic belongs to Cecil Rhodes. Despite his power over them, indeed doubtless largely because of it, he has no particular admiration for or belief in his fellow men. It is one of his pet theories

that every man has his price, and it is to be feared that a large experience of the world has not cured him of this cynicism. At the same time he is quick to discern qualities in those with whom he is brought in contact which may be useful to him. Courage and pertinacity—particularly pertinacity—will never fail to bring his approbation, and the writer recollects a characteristic incident of a raw Yorkshire lad, who without introductions or qualifications, and by literally forcing himself on Rhodes despite rebuffs, won what he desired—a post in the employ of the Chartered Company, which has since led to success and promotion.

A knowledge of men is of course above all things necessary to one who aspires to lead them, and this knowledge is not to be got from books. Nevertheless there are sides to human nature and phases of life which can only be understood through reading, and this is where Rhodes had the advantage of his frequent adversary Kruger. Kruger knows men only, Rhodes knows men, but knows books too, for he is a rapid and omnivorous reader, sucks the heart out of a book and throws it aside for another. His literary studies do not take him into the region of intellectual subtleties, but are all connected with living facts. History, ancient and modern, is particularly congenial to him, and he devours anything which tells him of new

countries or peoples. Though so prolific of ideas, Rhodes has not the faculty of fluent expression. His speeches, pithy and full of matter, are not flights of oratory, and his ordinary conversation is more remarkable for brevity than for brilliance. As for writing, it is almost a physical impossibility to him, he hardly ever writes even the shortest letter. Originality is stamped on all his thoughts and actions, and red tape is his pet abomination; he is so impatient of it that he shirks even the routine of letter reading. His independence of thought and action are exemplified in the facts mentioned elsewhere, which show that he was able to conceive and initiate a policy at which successive Governments had jibbed for years.

The two popular opposing pictures of Rhodes are as unlike as those which represent Kruger at opposite ends of the poles of civilisation. The famous Englishman is represented alternately as a great statesman of Elizabethan pattern, or as an unscrupulous financier.

As regards the latter charge, no one who has known him at all intimately can be unaware of the very great importance he attaches to the possession of the Almighty Dollar. Without it his schemes, as he himself declares, would be so much waste paper. It is unfair, however, to say that these are schemes of personal aggrandisement, although at the same time one

cannot imagine Rhodes taking the lowest seat in a kingdom of his own (or any other man's) creation. When a man is born to rule, and realises his power, he cannot be expected to serve. The acquisition of money and consequently of power are not with him an end but merely the means to an end, and that end no ignoble one in *his* eyes. In the scheme of life the warp and woof of good and evil are far more tangled than in Transpontine drama, where the good heroine and the bad villain have absolutely no half tones in the dazzling whiteness or Cimmerian blackness of their characters, and so it is more or less idle to try to judge a man according to the probable purity of his motives. Motives are always mixed. The important thing is how far the actions which result from those motives make for the common weal, and in studying the character and gauging the possibilities of a man like Rhodes we may form some idea as to his probable influence in the future.

It is impossible, however, to gauge this accurately. Originality and imagination are strong features of his character, and it is difficult to say where they will take him.

To return to his personality, it may interest those who view with approbation the present system of public school education in England, in which sports

are elevated to the first place in the formation of character, to know that Rhodes is in no sense of the word a sportsman, nor is he fond of physical exertion. A curious parallel is found in another man who looms large on the horizon of to-day—Chamberlain—who is perforce even less of an athlete or sportsman than Rhodes. When the biographies of these two as "Representative Englishmen" are written, it will be interesting to hear how they succeeded in developing so much force of character without the aid of a whole-hearted devotion to football. The restless energy of Rhodes is well known, and is another reason which makes it impossible to discount him altogether in the South African programme.

It has been said already that Cecil Rhodes does not respect his fellow-men, and it may be added that he has still less respect for them when they attempt, and fail, in the business of government. What he has needed, and what would have kept him from falling into irretrievable blunders was a check, in the shape of a strong Government, capable of at once appreciating and directing his ambitions. As a Free Lance he is dangerous, for he can originate policies which would divide the most united of governments. The question is, can he be induced to run in harness?

Whatever may happen it must be set down to the credit of Rhodes that he was the first Englishman of mark who realised the important character of the Dutch element in South Africa, and the absolute necessity of dealing with that factor, and he also is one of the few Englishmen who have understood the native question. In early days his relations with the other race placed him in a position of mistrust at the hands of his own countrymen, but he steadily kept in view the object of pulling with the Dutch. If in later years he departed from this rule of policy, namely, on the occasion of the Jameson raid, it must be remembered that meanwhile he had risen to a pinnacle of power through his achievements in the occupation of Mashonaland and Manicaland in 1890, and later on the conquest of Matabililand in 1893, and that, intoxicated perhaps by the universal homage paid to his power on the one hand, and yielding to the pressure of the Johannesburg Uitlanders on the other, he allowed his earlier and better judgment to be derailed and overthrown, and ended by finding himself in a predicament which from the Statesman's point of view was worse than failure, for it was a ludicrous fiasco. The famous movement into the Transvaal, to use his own expression, "upset his applecart." Although since that time his influence

and popularity have been on the wane—for he has alienated both sides, first by his anti-Imperialism in early days, and then by this attack on his quondam friends—Cecil Rhodes has still a future, and his ambitions, dashed for the time, are as lofty as ever.

The Transvaal at the end of 1887 was beginning to undergo a great change. A self-governing Republic, restricted in its foreign relations by the London Convention, its conditions in many respects, and these vital, were being modified. It was no longer an isolated farming country, peopled by a small number of Dutch, in the midst of a large native population, with whom alone they had relations. Its position was being altered by two chief forces. The springing up of a rapidly-increasing mining community within the Transvaal, and mainly on the Randt (the miners being European, but chiefly English and Australian); and, secondly, the British extension northwards, through Bechuanaland on the western border, Zululand on the eastern coast, and even Amatongaland. The Transvaal, which had been so poor as to be on the verge of bankruptcy, was rapidly becoming wealthy and had acquired additional territory in Swaziland. To the north of the Transvaal lay the country of Matabililand and Mashonaland, a

region which had already attracted the attention of the Boers. The fresh advance of the British northward in Bechuanaland naturally aroused at Pretoria an increasing share of interest, for Kruger had a shrewd suspicion of the aspirations of the Englishman, who at that time represented in his own person whatever there was of English Colonial statesmanship, not merely in South Africa but in Great Britain.

The story of the occupation of the northern land of Matabililand and Mashonaland, of how it was opened to British colonisation, has frequently been told, but the main issue has to a large extent been lost sight of. The question, it seems to the writer, who had intimate personal knowledge of the events prior to the carrying out of the scheme of the occupation of Mashonaland, has been from the first who should first secure the northern land—Boer or British? And these two were represented in the persons of Kruger and Rhodes. It was a duel to the death, the prize being the northern territory, which, with the Transvaal, it was clearly foreseen, would yet dominate South Africa.

In 1887 the territories of Matabililand and Mashonaland were subject to Lobengula, the King of the Matabili, the son of Moselekatze, the Zulu

Chief whom the Boer trekkers had driven northwards. His country extended from the Bechuana country on the west to the watershed of the plateau on the east, and from the Zambesi on the north to the Limpopo. The Mashona and other tribes were by conquest his subjects. He was a ruler of the despotic Zulu type, his subjects being armed and disciplined, although but degenerate Zulus. The country was rich in minerals, and a tradition had grown up in South Africa which credited Matabililand, even more than Mashonaland, with fabulous riches. Wonderful accounts had been brought back by the few hunters and traders who had crossed the country. On the Tati river, in the extreme south-west, gold fields had been worked in a fugitive way. The gold finds in the Transvaal in 1885 and 1886 inflamed the imagination, and attention became more and more centred on the north as another Eldorado. In 1888 an important step was taken, namely the despatch of Mr. Moffat, Assistant Commissioner in Bechuanaland, to conclude an agreement with the King, a measure which, undertaken by the Imperial Government, was largely due to the initiative of Rhodes. Lobengula undertook not to make any treaty with a foreign power, nor to sell or cede to foreign nations any part of his territory, without the sanction of

the British High Commissioner. Matabililand and Mashonaland were thus brought under British protection. Agreements with Germany and the Transvaal in 1890, and with Portugal in 1891, defined the limits of the respective spheres, the Transvaal withdrawing all claim to extend its territory northwards. The road to the north was now open to British enterprise.

It was under these circumstances that the British South Africa Company was born. There were at the time already in existence three other British chartered companies, namely, the Borneo Company, the Niger Company, and the British East Africa Company. The last of the companies, unlike the others, had the immense advantage of dealing with a country eminently suitable for British colonisation, and also an extension of existing British territory.

No need to tell here the story of the obtaining of the Charter, one not without its interesting and picturesque side. It may be noted, however, that the engineering of the Charter, and the amalgamation of the various interests in South Africa which were then in rivalry, afforded Rhodes the amplest opportunity for the exercise of talents with which he is richly endowed. Enough to say here that there were various rival concessionaires advancing claims which

were conflicting and difficult to decide, but the two main groups of rival interests after protracted negotiation came to an arrangement, the whole coming under the control of Rhodes, and in 1839 a charter was granted by the Imperial Government.

In 1890 Rhodes became Premier, and he had from that time to carry on the extremely difficult task of placating the Dutch element, and keeping them in hand, while the northern expansion was being carried out, and at the same time soothing the susceptibilities of Cape colonists, who dimly saw that this northern expansion might some day leave the Cape almost isolated in South Africa, in other words that the centre of gravity was being moved northwards.

The principal field of the Chartered Company's operations, it was laid down, was to be the "region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese dominions."

No northern limit to the sphere was fixed. The construction of railways and telegraphs, with promotion of trade and colonisation, the development of mineral and other concessions, were the objects which the Charter empowered them to carry out. A monopoly of trade was definitely negatived, and over the

political and administrative work of the Company the Imperial Government reserved control.

In 1890, by midsummer, Rhodes had perfected his plans for the occupation of Mashonaland, and a party of British voertrekkers, known as the Pioneer Expedition, entered Mashonaland and took possession of the country, building forts and establishing the rule and administration of the Company. The Company had very serious difficulties to contend with at the time—on the west the savage Impis of Lobengula; on the south the restless Boers; on the east and north-east the suspicious Portuguese. The position of affairs on several occasions was undoubtedly critical, and it was with difficulty that Lobengula was induced to hold his people in check from attacking the expedition while on its way, and, after the occupation, the scattered white communities.

Here it is unnecessary to relate at any length the story of this expedition, which attracted much attention at the time, but its main features may be recounted. A march of 450 miles, taking ten weeks to accomplish, by a track cut through bush and forest, with difficult rivers to traverse, was carried out without a collision occurring with the Matabili, without one shot being fired or a single life lost. The writer accompanied this expedition, in order to first visit

Manicaland, and, if possible, execute a treaty with the Chief of that country, and then rejoining the expedition to assume the duties of Administrator. The treaty was duly executed. Meanwhile the successful occupation of Mashonaland by the Pioneers was viewed with great resentment by Portugal. An agreement, however, was concluded in August, 1890 (while the Pioneer Expedition was on its way to Mashonaland) between England and Portugal, by which the eastern limits of the Company's territory were determined and the course of the Sabi river, from north to south, taken as a boundary. Never ratified, this treaty was taken as the basis of a *modus vivendi*, pending further negotiations. Under these circumstances the Portuguese attempted, late in the day as it was, to push forward expeditions into the interior, and thus to show something in the shape of "effective occupation." On two occasions there was collision between the Pioneers and the Portuguese in which the Portuguese were repulsed, and were pushed into the low country, with the result that they rapidly found their way back to the sea coast. A treaty between Britain and Portugal resulted, in 1891, clearly defining the British sphere of influence and the boundary between it and the Portuguese territory, the Company being guaranteed free access from

the east coast through Beira. This agreement, together with the one concluded with Germany in the previous year, and that determining the limits of the Congo State, brought about a general arrangement of Central and Southern Africa between the Powers interested in that region.

The claim to the country had, however, to be made good by effective occupation. The treaty with Lobengula, which enabled the Pioneers to occupy the country of Mashonaland, merely gave rights to the surface and mining, and not to the land itself. By the treaty Lobengula undertook not to league himself with any other Power. Always anxious in the past to exclude the white man from his territories, it is evident that the situation then existing in Mashonaland could not last. The Pioneers were not only overrunning the country, building forts, and giving other signs that they meant to remain, but they were in a country which had always been raided with impunity by the Matabili, and were evincing signs of a growing disposition to protect the Mashonas as against their oppressors. The inevitable collision could not be long delayed, and a raid by the Matabili on the Mashonas near Fort Victoria brought about hostilities in 1893. The Matabili Impis, who were rash enough to attempt to attack the British forces in the open, when they

were defended by strong laagers with machine guns, were completely defeated. The King fled towards the Zambesi, where he is said to have died, broken down, worn out and deserted by all but a few. The Matabili people surrendered and Matibililand was annexed.

This conquest of Matabililand, following as it did close upon the occupation of Mashonaland, and that again soon after the acquisition of Bechuanaland, gave rise to grave suspicions among the Boers, and dealt a deadly blow to their ambitions. Except to the east the Boers were now enclosed on all sides, and all thought of further expansion northwards, or of trekking bodily when pressed by unwelcome new-comers, had now to be abandoned. Nor could an exit be found at Delagoa Bay, for even there Britain had secured (by the Arbitration Treaty of 1872) the right of pre-emption. Meanwhile new forces were at work in the Transvaal, and strangers, mainly of Anglo-Jewish race, were flocking into the country in increasing numbers. Within a year, however, of the occupation of Mashonaland an expedition was arranged in the Transvaal for entering that country, with the view of occupying a portion of it. Notwithstanding a warning conveyed to Kruger that no countenance should be given to a proceeding which amounted to an

intended invasion of British territory, and notwithstanding his personal endeavours to prevent the expedition, a party of Boers actually reached the Limpopo, on its way northward, where, however, they were met by the Company's forces and turned back. No longer threatened by the chance of invasion from the Transvaal, and now on good terms with the Portuguese, the Company was in undisturbed possession of its territories.

With the extension of railways meanwhile throughout South Africa, it became increasingly important to bring about some sort of confederation. The scheme proposed by President Burgers for a railway from Delagoa Bay was carried out, not by the Government, but by the Netherlands South Africa Railway Company, a corporation which, necessarily, completely under the control of Pretoria, enabled the Transvaal to do many things contrary to the Convention. The railway system extended from Natal across the Transvaal, while the Cape Government united its lines from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London, and pushed forward the main line through the Orange Free State to the Transvaal.

There seemed to be little chance that the Transvaal could be induced to join a confederation with the Cape. It therefore was no longer politic to give the

Boers access to the sea. The system then at work in Swaziland had not been a success, and that territory, by reason of its geographical position, was necessarily bound to come under the influence of the Transvaal. In 1895, under the terms of a new convention, the administration of Swaziland was transferred to the Transvaal, with the provision, however, that it was not to be incorporated with the Republic, and that European residents in the country were to have full burgher rights. Monopolies were forbidden, the Dutch and English languages were to be on an equal footing, and the duties to be imposed were not to be higher than those imposed either in the Transvaal or by the Customs Union. The Uitlanders in Swaziland were therefore to be in a better position than those of the Transvaal. At the same time Amatongaland was annexed by Britain, and from that time the Boers could only hope to reach the sea at Delagoa Bay, and all chance of acquiring that great and dominating position had been secured by the British Government.

The position in the Transvaal at this time, as has been indicated before, was a peculiar one, and had no precedent in history. Other countries in the past have had their Uitlanders, but never before have sudden finds of gold drawn to one limited area of a country, and in such a short time, so large a number

of in-comers. The Boers were naturally alarmed at seeing this inrush of foreigners, mostly English or English-speaking. The revenues brought to the State by the activity of the newcomers was increasing by bounds, but at the same time the danger that the control might pass from the hands of its founders into those of the cosmopolitan community on the Randt, was becoming increasingly evident. The Boer Government not only showed themselves opposed to all schemes for extending the franchise, but they sought safety in the restriction of the existing franchise. It is unnecessary here to enter at length upon the question of the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government. Sufficient to say that discontent grew rapidly, the Uitlanders complaining that they were excluded from political rights and that they suffered from various grievances, grievances which it became increasingly evident would have to be reformed, or at any rate dealt with, before very long. In 1892 was founded the Reform Association. Two years later, on the occasion of a visit by the High Commissioner, who had come to negotiate with President Kruger on the Swaziland and other questions, there was a great anti-Boer demonstration at Johannesburg, and from that time the tension between British and Boers became more and more acute.

Meanwhile Johannesburg had been connected with the Cape and Natal railway systems, but there was a marked discrimination in favour of the Netherlands Railway Company. Heavy charges on merchandise entering the Transvaal from the Cape were levied, and these charges were evaded by unloading at the frontier and taking the freights across the Vaal in waggons. The Transvaal declared the drifts (fords) on the Vaal to be closed, a step which contravened the Convention. What was practically an ultimatum was despatched by the Imperial Government to the Transvaal, and the Transvaal yielded. The Reform Committee soon discovered that "constitutional agitation" (which in the Transvaal meant the not infrequent employment of the silver key) was hopeless. The strain grew day by day, a National Union was formed, definite statements of grievances and the probability of an armed rising became a matter of common talk, and a subject for discussion by the press. While such was the situation in Johannesburg there occurred the entry into the Transvaal from Bechuanaland of a force of the British South Africa Company, personally led by the Company's Administrator, with whom as well as with Mr. Rhodes, the Managing Director, an arrangement had already been made by the Reform leaders that, in the event of need and if summoned, assistance should be

forthcoming to support the Uitlanders. At the last second arose a difference of opinion on the question of the flag, which involved a postponement of the day fixed for the movement, but the force commanded by Dr. Jameson, believing that the Transvaal Government had got wind of their intentions, started on the night of Sunday, December 29th, 1895. But the unexpected arrived. They did not get through without fighting, as the programme had been, and they were recalled by the High Commissioner. Special messengers were despatched to stop the expedition, proclamations issued repudiating the movement, and, after being repulsed at Krugersdorp, the force was compelled to surrender on January 1st, 1896, at the village of Doornkop. A few days later the Uitlanders, who, though not expecting the movement, had taken up arms on hearing of the advance, tendered their submission. The members of this expedition were handed over to the British Government and the Reform leaders were imprisoned.

The Raid was followed by a native rising in Matabililand. In various parts of the country the isolated settlers were murdered, and for some time it seemed as if the pioneers in this remote territory might be wiped out, but they were able to hold their own and the disturbance was eventually put down without much difficulty.

The effect of the Raid, into the merits and demerits of which it is not necessary here to enter, was disastrous. Till 1896 Dutch South Africa had largely sympathised with the Uitlanders. Throughout the Cape Colony and the Free State the Dutch element strongly disapproved of the exclusive system in the Transvaal, where there was a growing progressive party. The Raid not only outraged the sense of the world at large, but it drew together the Dutch throughout South Africa. They saw that the Raid had been carried out by the Company's Administrator, a British official, the expedition being led by British officers; the Cape Premier, regarded in South Africa as the Chartered Company, the friend of the Dutch, was regarded as the originator of the whole business. Few held him responsible for the supremely absurd manner in which the movement had been carried out, but this did not relieve him from the odium attaching to the plot. Later on the action of the South Africa Committee still further outraged the Afrikanders, and not only that, it belittled England in the eyes of the world. The manner in which the Committee was conducted, and the closing of the enquiry at the critical moment, gave an impression that the whole affair was pre-arranged, and cast doubts on the integrity of English statesmen. Whatever were the interests in

whose favour the enquiry was burked, it is much to be regretted that they were allowed to operate in such a manner that Great Britain lost her reputation for openness and fair dealing. The whitewashing of Rhodes by Chamberlain added another blot to this discreditable page of our history. Kruger, who had hitherto become less and less the necessary man in the Transvaal, now became the essential man; and the Orange Free State became frightened, having before been without fear. The Dutch throughout Cape Colony were placed in a most embarrassing position, divided between respect for the Queen, a sense of duty to the Government that protected them, and sympathy for their kinsmen the Boers, who had been treacherously attacked by servants of the paramount Power. The Raid also confirmed the Boers in a rooted estimate of their fighting superiority and lowered the British prestige throughout South Africa with whites and blacks alike.

The events since 1896 may be passed over in a few words, for they are within the memory of all. The collapse of the revolution in 1896 was followed by repressive methods. The Transvaal sent in an estimate for compensation on account of the Raid, but the bill was altogether of fantastic proportions. The general attitude of the Colonial Office seemed to give

colour to the fears for their independence felt by the Boers, and certain steps which had been proposed before the Raid, namely, the creation of forts round Pretoria, the expenditure of large sums on armaments and the employment of foreign officers, were rapidly carried into effect. Reactionary legislation followed, a stringent pass law and an Alien Expulsion Act were passed and not modified until representations had been made by the British Government. The right of free speech was curtailed, and an abortive pass law was set afoot, which would have compelled Uitlanders to carry a distinctive badge. The grievances of the Uitlanders continued to grow. Besides those connected with the mining and the general incompetence of the police there was a rather vindictive spirit afoot against them, which in its active form began in 1896. The British Uitlanders, therefore, drew up a petition to the Queen setting forth their grievances, which was rejected on account of informalities, but a second was forwarded to the Home Authorities. The position between the British Government and the Transvaal at this time was one of extreme difficulty. The Raid had put England in the wrong, yet the complaints of the Uitlanders were generally just and pressing. The British Government were on the horns of a dilemma. The Transvaal

on its part increasingly feared the Uitlanders, and believed the British Government were determined to do away with its independence. The Raid drew close the ties between the two Republics, and the republican spirit was extending throughout Cape Colony, fostered by the "Dopper" ministers, who, in many cases, had been open preachers of sedition. Meanwhile, Steyn succeeded Reitz in the Orange Free State, and a defensive alliance was concluded. Reitz became State Secretary in the Transvaal, and Leyds returned to Europe to urge the Boer cause. Soon after this, at Bloemfontein, the High Commissioner urged on President Kruger a reform of the franchise laws, whereby Uitlanders might, after five years' residence in the Republic, become naturalised and receive the franchise. The concession was declined and the conference broke up. Milner concentrated his attention upon the franchise, for it was apparent that with a broad electional system the old misgovernment would soon become impossible. It is difficult to see, however, how by any device it would have been possible to prevent the Boers from being swamped by the Uitlanders. The position in fact was irreconcilable.

The Boer claim to a monopoly of a large and valuable tract of South Africa was untenable—a handful of ill-educated peasantry, pastoral and averse

to contact with the outer world, suddenly feeling the shock arising from the impact of an intelligent, enterprising, and aggressive wedge of Uitlanders. When the Transvaal was made over by the Convention of 1881 that country was sparsely populated, and the small number of Dutch farmers then in the country cannot be considered to be owners of the soil, for instance as the Japanese possess Japan or the British Britain. The immediate events leading up to the war are of such recent occurrence and so much a subject of controversy that they need not here be given at length. Faults were committed on both sides, and it is difficult, perhaps at the present time impossible, to allocate the blame on either side. On his return from Bloemfontein Kruger granted a seven years franchise, which however contained restrictions which completely nullified its practical value. The claims of the Uitlanders were bandied about between the British Colonial Secretary and the President of the Transvaal. A conditional offer was at one time made of a five years' franchise, but the conditions were impossible, involving as they did the practical recognition of the Transvaal as an independent Sovereign State. The Transvaal and the Free State called out their Burghers, and British reinforcements began to arrive in Africa, with more to follow. The Free State

considered its own independence threatened. In the end, which came rapidly, on the 9th October 1899 the Transvaal issued an ultimatum forbidding the landing in South Africa of more British troops. The Orange Free State joined the Transvaal outright, and a couple of days later a technical state of war had begun.

CHAPTER IV.

THE NEW LANDS—OF PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT.

CHAPTER IV.

THE NEW LANDS—OF PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT.

PART I.

MATABILILAND AND MASHONALAND.

THE territory known as Rhodesia is divided into two parts, lying respectively north and south of the Zambesi river. The first region, within what is known as British Central Africa, is briefly described later, and reasons are given for the belief that its value is not very considerable. The immense area situated west of Matabililand and south of the Upper Zambesi is a poor and uninviting country, considerably lower than the plateau of Matabililand and Mashonaland, mostly arid but in some parts marshy and intensely malarious. The land supports a very small population, has no minerals so far as is known, and,

remote in situation from either the East or West coasts, and with no natural egress—the Zambesi for practical purposes is useless for navigation—this cut off region seems to have no future before it. The only possible chance of its ever coming to anything is the discovery of minerals on a great scale, and there seems little likelihood that these exist. The most important section, however, of Rhodesia is the territory comprised in Matabililand, Mashonaland and its eastern section Manica.

This magnificent territory, an extension, as has been indicated before, of the Transvaal, is the last stage on the South African tableland before it sinks down into the Zambesi basin, and is the last section of white man's country in South Africa. Comprising an area of over 190,000 square miles, three-fourths have an elevation of over 3,000 feet above the sea, while one-fourth is more than 4,000 feet high. The country generally, favoured by the constant fresh easterly breeze and dry weather during two-thirds of the year, enjoys on the whole a healthy and bracing climate, and is eminently suited for colonisation. It is possible here for the European to work in the fields and for children to be brought up in the country, as they are in the Transvaal and Cape Colony further south, in every way as physically and mentally fit as the average European.

The boundaries of Southern Rhodesia are Ngami Land on the west, on the north the Zambesi, on the east the Portuguese territory next the Indian Ocean, and on the south the Limpopo, the northern boundary of the Transvaal.

Elsewhere enough has been said concerning Matabililand and Mashonaland to show that they have, notwithstanding certain defects, considerable pastoral and agricultural capabilities. The chief difficulties in the way of developing the agricultural resources, which have hitherto been want of transport, locusts, rinderpest and deficiency of rainfall, will in time be partly overcome. Railways are being carried into the country (the railway now open to Buluwayo is being constructed to Salisbury, which again is connected with Umtali on the edge of the plateau, whence there is railway connection with Beira). Irrigation, too, and drainage, for which there are facilities, can do much for the country.

The immediate future of the country, however, depends upon the mineral wealth. Gold was the magnet that drew the British to this region, and it is that which has induced the investment of large sums of capital, and kept a considerable white population employed in the search for and the exploitation of gold. When Mashonaland was occupied in 1890 by the

Pioneer Expedition despatched by Rhodes, acting for the British South Africa Company, the country was found to be covered with traces of old workings scattered over the face of the land, and these workings made it clear that in past times the country had been very fully exploited for the precious metal. Later on Matabililand was found to be similarly covered by old workings. The whole country from the extreme south-west to the extreme north-east (north of Umtali in Manica), and towards the south-east near Victoria, abounds in gold reefs. The chief gold bearing districts are found in Matabililand in the neighbourhood of Buluwayo and Gwelo, and in Mashonaland in the districts of Lo Magundi, Manica, Mazoe, Salisbury, Umfuli and Victoria. Several years ago there were more than a couple of hundred companies for the purpose of development, chiefly gold mining. Reefs had been prospected all over the country and a vast number of claims registered. The amount of work done, in the way of testing and opening the gold fields, has been comparatively small, considering the legion of companies at work. When Mashonaland was first occupied the hope was entertained that in some section of the country alluvial would be found, and thus draw a rush of miners, "individual diggers" as they are called, to the country. Nothing,

Rhodes saw clearly, would boom the country more than the finding of alluvial, which in other regions, notably in Australia and California, has accomplished so much. There was, however, little or no alluvial. It is a quartz reef country, and so far there is no sign of the existence of "banket," the conglomerate found in the Transvaal, which has made the fortune of the Randt. It is the persistency and consistency of the banket formation on the Randt that has made it so rich and its results so absolutely certain, but the uncertainty of quartz reef mining is proverbial. Varying in thickness and breadth, it remains to be seen how deep down these reefs go, and the percentage of gold obtained in a reef varies considerably.

The want of communication and the remoteness of the mining centres, involving either the absence or prohibitive cost of proper machinery, has hitherto prevented the full development of the gold reefs, and not until some time after communications have been more developed can the value of Matabililand and Mashonaland as a gold mining country be ascertained. It is now ten years since Mashonaland was occupied and four since Matabililand was taken over, and still, to this very day, in the absence of practical proof, the question is discussed as to whether the country will ever pay. In the past the reefs must have been very

rich and large amounts of gold taken out of the country, and in view of the circumstances under which these workings were carried on—the want of proper tools, the ignorance of the most primitive methods of mining—is it not clear, many argue, not only that this country must have been immensely rich, but that all the gold could not have been taken away? It is hoped that, with the introduction of modern methods and efficient machinery, made possible by cheap railway transport, the reefs may prove remunerative, where the old workings—open pits, which had to be stopped at a small depth below the surface on account of water—could not be made to pay. Against this argument, however, is the fact that the labour employed on these old workings must have cost extremely little; indeed, if slaves were employed, as is very probably the case, the cost must have been almost nil, and it is evident that rich surface mining may prove remunerative when slave labour is employed, where modern methods could not possibly do so. There has always been considerable difference of opinion on this question, as well as regarding the value of the reefs. A certain number from the early days of the occupation have been inclined to believe that the payable gold in the country has been almost entirely abstracted by means of these old workings—the ancients, these men say, had cleared the

country. "We have come several centuries too late," said an old Californian—an opinion not shared by others, however, especially those who are interested in the success of the country as a gold field. The results obtained in certain cases has been satisfactory, but, as already indicated, it remains to be seen how the country as a whole will turn out, which cannot be done until the communications are perfected and large quantities of quartz have been properly tested. In 1899, after nine years, gold to the value only of about £200,000 had been produced in Matabililand and Mashonaland during the preceding ten months.

The question of coal is one of great importance for this region, which is possessed of little timber. At certain points on the Zambesi valley south of the Victoria falls and north of Gwelo, coal is found, and railways have been proposed to bring these coal districts into use.

As regards the immediate future of Matabililand and Mashonaland, that depends largely, almost entirely, upon whether the country turns out to be rich in gold or not. For many years to come the growth of population and the prosperity of agriculture will depend upon the gold mining. Should that prosper, markets will be created on the spot, as has been the case at Johannesburg. But should the reefs not turn out satisfactory

settlement and prosperity as a whole will grow at a very slow pace. Gold is a great stimulus in a new territory, it brings settlers and capital (of which both remain to a great extent in the country) and gives it that impetus which is so valuable in starting a new colony. But the gold wealth cannot be expected to last very long, even if the country turn out to be rich, and ultimately it will have to depend chiefly on its own resources. Still, even if there be no gold in large quantities, the conditions of the country assure to it a white population and a reasonable degree of prosperity. The question of gold or no gold will merely decide the rate of progress.

The native population of Matabililand and Mashonaland is difficult to estimate, but it is probably now not more than several hundred thousand. The population of Matabililand before the war of 1893 was under two hundred thousand, and it was greatly reduced by the losses in that campaign. The native population of Mashonaland, at one time very considerable (before the Matabili established themselves in Matabililand) some sixty years ago, after ravaging the whole of Mashonaland), has been further lessened by the raids of the Matabili, and still later by the outbreak against the British South Africa Company, when their numbers were again thinned. Beside

the Mashonas there are other races, of Bantu stock, all being now known under the generic title of Mashona. The Mashonas are not a strong people physically or morally, and belong to the races that are bound to "go under" rapidly. They have some talent in native handicrafts and a little knowledge of agriculture, but they are indolent and cannot be relied on to work. They have a great dislike to underground labour, a fact which has proved a difficulty in the exploitation of mines, and it is doubtful whether the Mashona labour will ever be much use for mining purposes, in which case labour will have to be imported from other parts of Africa. Not merely the Mashonas, however, but the Matabili, physically their superiors, are decadent and will rapidly disappear. The white population of Matabili and Mashonaland is not exactly known, but is estimated at about 6,000, the town and district of Buluwayo containing more than half this entire population. Of the towns Buluwayo has close on 2,000 residents and Salisbury about 500.

Matabililand and Mashonaland are governed by the British South Africa Company on the Crown Colony system. The supreme authority of the Company is nominally vested in the Court of Directors in London, but the real power, the real authority, until the time

of the Jameson Raid, existed in the person of Rhodes, the Managing Director of the Company, and its presiding genius. Since the Raid the authority of the Company has been partly curtailed, and the power of Rhodes has to a certain extent diminished, but he still remains a most powerful influence in South Africa. The Company has an Administrator, assisted by a Council of four members, whose appointments have to be approved by the Secretary of State. There is a High Court and a number of magisterial districts, the law being founded on that of the Cape Colony. The police and the armed forces of the Company are now under the direct control of the Imperial Government.

Buluwayo, which has risen mushroom-like, is a town with no natural advantages, the neighbouring country being bare and suffering from dust and wind storms. But it has a fresh and exhilarating air with constant breezes and is free from malaria. All the concomitants of a new township in America were to be found here, soon after its foundation—the rapid running up of buildings, the sale of town lots or "stands" at phenomenal prices, the stores, the hotels, the drink shops and other paraphernalia of English life, including club houses, a racecourse and a ground for sports.

The question of the development of Southern Rhodesia must depend, however, very largely upon communications. One has only to glance in the most casual manner at any map of South Africa to see that this immense territory and interior tableland, with no water communication to the ocean, must depend upon railways for its development. Situated as it is over 1,000 miles, as the crow flies, from the Atlantic Coast, across the desert land of Northern Bechuanaland and German Damaraland; and some 1,400 miles to Cape Town; while it is only about 400 miles to the East Coast at Beira, in Portuguese territory (the river Limpopo which on the map seems to give access to the south of Rhodesia being useless); it is evident that the railway route for opening this country, the natural and only line of approach, is that from Beira. Before the settlement of Mashonaland in 1890 and in the early days of the occupation, this point was pressed by the writer, then Administrator of the British South Africa Company's territories, as being the key to the situation. Rhodes was fully alive to the vital importance of the question, and indeed it is one of his strong points that he has always recognised that the future of South Africa depends upon the great interior, which can only be opened by railway communication. In the absence of water ways, and with

the chief physical features of South Africa kept clearly in mind (those that have been already distinctly explained) it would seem almost superfluous to insist upon this point, but none the less it is one that, unrecognised ten years ago, seems hardly yet to be appreciated. It was natural of course, indeed inevitable, that the advance to Matabililand and Mashonaland should have been by the long overland route from Cape Town, through Kimberley, Mafeking and Tuli, for at that time it was essential to avoid Matabililand itself in the movement northwards, while the route through the Transvaal and through Portuguese territory to its eastern border were of course not available. Even to this day visitors to Matabililand and Mashonaland usually travel by the overland route, Cape Town being generally the terminus for visitors to South Africa. But the Beira route, notwithstanding the disadvantage of unhealthiness in the portion passing through Portuguese territory, as compared with the longer overland route, is without doubt the one along which the bulk of traffic in the future is certain to pass.

The difference made by railways in covering long distances in the interior is difficult for the reader to realise who has never been to South Africa. All the many difficulties and the wearisome delay inevitable

in pre-railway days, with the ox-waggon or even the coach, when replaced by a seat in the railway train, mark a complete transformation scene which can hardly be described. To illustrate by an example: the 300 miles distance from Buluwayo to Salisbury, which takes close on three weeks' hard travelling by waggon or four days by coach—a fatiguing journey from which there is no respite night or day—will shortly be accomplished in half a day.

The roads in the interior are so called by courtesy, being mere tracks, frequently changing, right across the Veldt, over stony hills and thick shrubs, and crossing the streams with banks roughly cut down to a slope. In some parts the roughness of this mode of travel, over boulders and rocks, is comparable to nothing met with elsewhere, unless it be the bumping along in a Chinese cart without springs over some old road which has not been repaired for centuries and which resembles the boulder-strewn bed of a hill stream.

The order maintained in the mining centres of South Africa generally is a marked feature also of Matabililand and Mashonaland, and is in strong contrast with the conditions obtaining in many Australian and American mining centres. At Johannesburg itself there are a considerable number

of drinking bars, but elsewhere, where there is a large consumption of alcohol and other drinks, there are none of the saloons common in the western American mining districts, where gambling and drinking occupy such a large share of the life, with all its accompaniments of violence, crime and rowdiness. It has often been remarked, and especially by Americans and Australians, how free the country of South Africa is from highwaymen, the gentlemen who stop trains and "stick up" coaches. In the whole history of South Africa there has been no such thing as a Kelly Gang. The reason of this extreme prevalence of order is not easy to understand, though many explanations are given. One reason would appear to be found in the fact of the immense distances that have to be travelled, and the slowness and costliness, which would make it difficult for the highwaymen to escape. Another reason is the fact that the white element is small and situated amongst a large native population, which tends to hold the whites together, and to make law-breaking of this sort exceptional. But the people of South Africa in the past—first, the Boers, orderly, stolid people, and later the Scotch and English settlers, with their law-respecting traditions—have established in South Africa a system wherein

order reigns. With the advent of many other nationalities in recent times—Italians, French, and British colonials from different parts of the world—the conditions hitherto obtaining, especially in view of the inevitable upheaval of the established order of things, must necessarily be greatly changed.

On the northern plateau of Matabililand and Mashonaland the nights are often bitterly cold, so much so indeed that with a strong wind and a slight rain the cold is intense. Nothing can keep it out. Plenty of warm clothing is a necessity in this region. This advice, however, is one that may wisely be given in going to many countries, even some of the southern sun-lands, where those who have not provided themselves with ulsters and wraps may find themselves covered with plaids sitting over a charcoal fire.

People who have not been to South Africa, the class of people especially who have never known what "roughing it" is, find it very difficult to understand the charm, the fatal fascination with many, of life on the African veldt. Those, and they are not few, who do not care for travelling sufficiently to visit a country like Southern Spain for instance, because the hotels are so bad and the cookery so execrable, are not likely to find any

peculiar charm in the veldt life. But to those who have really the taste for travel and open-air life there can be no more exquisite sensation than life on the veldt. The dry and exhilarating air, the sense of movement on horseback, the camping out alongside the waggon, or on the open veldt if there is no waggon; the making of the fire, for which wood has to be collected—wood of the proper kind—the rough preparation of a steak of venison, if game has been plentiful, usually broiled in the embers of the fire; the boiling of the "billy," to which everyone seated round the fire is looking forward, while coffee and tea are brewing (such coffee and such tea!) and then—delight of delights—the pipe of Transvaal tobacco which, on the veldt, is so delicious, but elsewhere would be pronounced unbearable. The brilliance of the stars is indescribable, the glories of the South African nights have a wonderful fascination of their own, even when one has to sleep in the open, lying on the bare ground with a blanket and waterproof to keep off the dew. The fare was poor in the early days of occupation, and still more so in the pre-occupation days when the country knew no foreigners save a few hunters like Selous. It consisted of the game shot, eked out with a few eggs, rough bread and

some coffee. The venison is now replaced by tinned meats, biscuits and such provisions, less picturesque but more certain.

The locusts are a great pest. They pass across the country in dense clouds, blotting out the sun, covering the ground and filling the air in all directions. These locust swarms have done immense damage in Southern Matabililand and Mashonaland.

Mashonaland is, take it all round, the best country in South Africa, especially the eastern portion. It has the advantage over Matabililand of a plentiful supply of rivers, frequently with rocky banks and deep beds, just as Matabililand has the advantage over Bechuanaland, which for three-fourths of the year has no streams at all. Coming straight from Bechuanaland, a miserably arid country (except in the east), to Mashonaland, that country appears a perfect paradise, for, well supplied with water and with beautiful scenery, the soil is fertile and the climate generally good. Fresh breezes sweep this high land and bring health, and fever need only be feared in the lower valleys after the rains. Manica is one of the most beautiful and fertile spots in Mashonaland, well watered, and for South Africa well timbered, with valleys and hills which make up

scenery of exceptional beauty. No wonder that the Portuguese were unwilling to let it fall into the hands of Britain.

To sum up. On the whole it is a White Man's country, though certain sections will remain malarious. Where the tableland falls, to the Zambesi river on the north and the Portuguese territory on the east, it is unfit for the white man. Numerically the blacks will for a long time outnumber the whites, and most of the manual labour here, as elsewhere in South Africa, will be done by them, and they alone can develop the less healthy portions of the country.

The immediate future of Matibililand and Mashonaland is bound up with the results obtained from gold mining. The increase of white population and the general progress of the country is dependent on this question of gold, but the soil and climate provide the chief element of durable success, and were there no gold the country would be well worth having, far more so than many Central Africas. With the change which is certain to take place in the Transvaal will arise a greater influx of white settlers, and self-government will eventually have to be given in some form. Its distance from Cape Town alone precludes the idea of its being incorporated with Cape Colony.

The present form of government is quite provisional, and in any case questions must soon have arisen regarding the future of this country.

There is nothing in common between Southern and Northern Rhodesia, the territories south and north of the Zambesi river. Central Africa, the territory north of the Zambesi, belongs to the class of countries such as East Africa—rich, fertile but unhealthy, where the white man can never hope to establish himself, and where at best he can merely act as a supervisor over hordes of blacks, and this with great detriment to his own health.

Apart from the question of gold in Matibililand and Mashonaland, their resources in climate and soil make them superior to most parts of South Africa. Generally, they are superior to even the Transvaal. East Africa is mostly barren and usually malarious; German South-West Africa is mainly a desert, the greater portion of it dry and waterless, though usually healthy. Portuguese East Africa, the lowland fringe next the Indian Ocean, is so fever-stricken as to make it, except for purposes of transit from the ocean to the inland, perfectly useless.

The acquisition, therefore, of this territory of Mashonaland and Matabililand—the last stage on the interior plateau reaching north, before the fever-

stricken Zambesi is reached—has been of great service to Britain. Whatever the view taken of Rhodes may be, he at least added a slice of White Man's country to the Empire.

PART II.

BRITISH CENTRAL AND EAST AFRICA.

THE whole of British Central Africa is an inland territory far removed from the sea, and lies north of the Zambesi (where that river runs from west to east), south of Lake Tanganyika, and between Lake Nyassa on the east and the Zambesi (running from north to south) on the west. The history of this part of Africa is intimately associated with the name of Dr. Livingstone, whose travels in the Zambesi and other regions did so much to awaken the interest of Europe in Central Africa. The campaign started by this eminent explorer-missionary against the slave trade has been carried on by many who, following in his footsteps, have endeavoured to glean a spiritual harvest from the somewhat barren ground of Central Africa. The explorations of Stanley at a later date roused an interest in "Darkest Africa" which led ultimately to political intervention and the partition of the country.

Neither the soil nor the climate of the Zambesi valley is favourable to colonisation or agriculture. Malaria and the tsetse fly are the great scourges, and the lower parts are most unhealthy for white men. Barotseland, which is under the protection of the Chartered Company, has an enlightened though autocratic chief who lives at peace with the missionaries, but does not encourage the presence of other Europeans in his dominions, even were they desirous of settling in such a fever-stricken country.

In 1891 the territory under British influence north of the Zambesi, with the exception of Nyassaland, was handed over to the British South Africa Company. Nyassaland was given a protectorate, and later on became known as the British Central African Protectorate. British Central Africa is therefore divided into two sections; the one, including Barotseland, under the influence of the Chartered Company; the eastern district, directly under the control of the Imperial Government. The size of this territory (over 300,000 square miles) will be best realised when we remember that it is nearly three times the size of the United Kingdom and about that of New South Wales. The population of this enormous country is estimated at from two to three millions, and is entirely made up of natives of mixed races. The Barotse are a strong

people of Bechuana origin, and notwithstanding the frequent raids of the Zulus they never established their dominion in this territory. Many traces of them, however, remain among the numerous native tribes, mostly of Bantu stock, some peaceful in character, others still retaining the raiding propensities which they inherited from an admixture of Zulu blood and Arab influence.

Besides the Zambesi—the great river of Southern Central Africa—there is the Shiré river, which connects it with Lake Nyassa. The Shiré is not favourable for navigation, its course being interrupted by frequent rapids. The Zambesi itself is only navigable for a very short distance from the Chinde mouth of its delta—as far as its confluence with the Shiré. Its higher course is interrupted by falls and rapids, among them the celebrated Victoria Falls, nor are its tributaries open to navigation. The Upper Congo has its source in Lake Bangweolo in this district, and is said to be navigable during the whole of its course by light vessels, though broken by a number of falls. The Lakes are a distinguishing feature of Central Africa. On the north lies Lake Tanganyika, on the west the lakes Mweeru and Bangweolo, and on the east Lake Nyassa, a pure fresh water lake of great extent, some 350 miles in length, and from

fifteen to forty-five miles broad. There is valuable timber in the neighbourhood of Lake Nyassa, a variety of palms, the ebony, bamboo and india-rubber trees. European and tropical fruit trees grow here, while cereals of most kinds, wheat, maize, oats and barley, are produced as well as rice. Coffee is the most valuable product, and will probably become the staple article of commerce of Central Africa. This is grown in the Shiré highlands, which are more suitable for European occupation. The tsetse fly is a great drawback, attacking cattle and horses in all the lower parts of the country, and rendering pastoral pursuits almost impossible. Of the mineral resources little is known, except that coal and iron exist in several places, while copper and gold have been found, though nothing has been done hitherto to exploit them.

The white population, consisting of missionaries, officials and a few planters, is a mere handful, and increases but slowly. The introduction of Indian natives as police and agriculturists under British supervision has been successful so far, and suggests a possible outlet for certain of the over-populated districts of India.

Practically the only town of any size or importance is Blantyre, the seat of administration being at

Zomba. Both places are now connected by wire with Southern Rhodesia, and therefore with the whole of South Africa, through the Portuguese town of Tette on the Zambesi, which is also connected with Chinde at the mouth of the Zambesi. The bar of sand which crosses the mouth of this river prevents the entrance of large vessels, and goods have to be transhipped.

Although roads and railways are projected in this part of Africa, little has yet been done in opening up the country, and if anything is ever to be accomplished, railways must be constructed from the littoral to the highland country, not only for purposes of commerce, but to enable incoming settlers to cross speedily the low-lying malarial and tsetse-infected districts, and to reach the more healthy and fertile highlands. A parallel is to be found in Mashonaland and its communications, where similar conditions have been overcome by the provision of a railway from Beira to the inland plateau.

Under the circumstances already detailed—disadvantages of climate, remoteness of position, and comparative smallness of the districts at all suitable for European occupation—the future of this vast territory seems exceedingly doubtful. The dominant feature, the great Zambesi river, which might be a

source of fertility and strength, is instead merely a fever trough. Health and strength are left behind in the air of its valleys, which literally reek with malaria. "The country," writes one who himself is fixed for life in Barotseland, "offers no inducement to colonisation, and has no future before it." The same is more or less true of the Zambesi in the whole of its course. The only prospect is that of a country worked by coloured labour with European overseers, and it is doubtful whether the result will be worth the lives wasted in establishing such a dominion.

Whether a sufficiently large number of Indians or natives can ever be organised in its cultivation or not, British Central Africa can never be regarded as suitable for European colonisation. When Mashonaland and Matabililand had been annexed, Britain had taken the last slice of "white man's Africa."

The exact position of British East Africa in the British Colonial system is difficult to exactly define. Not a colony, either in the popular acceptation of the word or as "a portion of the British Dominions exclusive of the Mother Country and of India,"* it is an aggregate of tribes and countries, some under British Protectorate, and others constituting merely a sphere of influence. The whole territory, though containing within its area the sources of several

streams running to the Indian Ocean and the upper branches of the Nile, has been till quite recently entirely cut off from the outer world by an inhospitable and unhealthy strip of land along the coast, and the immense distance to Egypt, and is even yet little known. With the completion of the railway to Uganda, however, the region will at last be opened to the world.

On the coast here, as elsewhere on the Eastern littoral, the Arabs have till recently been all-powerful, but since the coming of the English and Germans their power has been almost entirely broken. In the interior is a great variety of African races, Bantus, negroes and others; but the Arabs, on their slave-raiding expeditions, have carried the Mahommedan religion inland, radiating from Zanzibar as a centre of influence on the coast. Zanzibar lies about 1,000 miles north of the Zambesi, and this great emporium is situated at a point on the East African coast which stands in an important position with regard to the outside world, at a distance of 1,600 miles from Delagoa Bay and about the same from Mauritius, 2,000 from Aden, and some 3,000 miles from Bombay. Zanzibar and Delagoa Bay are about equidistant from the centre of Madagascar. The mainland directly opposite Zanzibar is German territory, and the British

possession begins a little north of Pemba, itself a British Protectorate. Situated on the Equator, British East Africa has within its limits a great variety of conditions. There are here, as in South Africa, three chief divisions, namely, the coast, low and unhealthy; the slope, largely desert, but in places undulating grassy plains, sometimes wooded but generally barren and poorly populated; and, lastly, the central plateau, on which are situated the great lakes, the Victoria, the Albert Edward, Albert, and Lake Rudolph. Though containing so many large pieces of water, much of the territory, specially towards the great Lake Rudolph, is extremely dry.

Till about the middle of the present century the great interior of Central Africa was a *terra incognita*.

The history of the country, which is the history of the coast, may be divided into four distinct periods. First, there was the time of the Arab and Greek traders; then the era of the Portuguese, when Europe first began to move in Eastern Africa; again, a period of Arab rule when Mahommedan influence, interrupted for a couple of hundred years, once more reasserted itself; then came the palmy days of Zanzibar, when East Africa broke away from its direct Arab mastership. Finally, came the scramble for Africa, the period when the whole of the continent was being divided

up and apportioned by various European powers, Portugal losing instead of gaining ground. It is this feverish rush for African territory that has brought the interior of the country into close contact with modern civilization. The movement of British expansion in the territory south of the Zambesi, and the gradual assertion of British authority on the Nile, have given it a great importance, for through this country lies the line of future communication, telegraphic and rail, between white man's South Africa and the British Protectorate of Egypt—the Cape-to-Cairo route.

From very early times there were trading relations between Arabia and the Western as well as the Eastern African seaboard, the trade winds facilitating the ocean passage at certain times of the year. The Mahommedan connection with East Africa was rather commercial than political. Among the Arab writers notices are given of various towns on the coast and of Mahommedan settlements. The well-known traveller Ibn Batuta in 1331 visited some of these, and among them Mombasa, the seaport and terminus of the railway giving access to Uganda, commonly known as the Uganda Railway.

In the last years of the fifteenth century, in 1497, the Portuguese Vasco Da Gama was the first Euro-

pean to sail up the East coast of Africa, on his famous voyage to India round the Cape. On his second voyage, in 1502, he visited Delagoa Bay, and also Sofala, then the great port for trading with the interior for gold and ivory. Arabs were established at the main trading points as far north as Mombasa. Commercially prosperous during a long period of occupation, they had deteriorated through intermarriage with natives, and they were unequal to resist the Portuguese, who found the acquisition of points on the coast of great value as a stepping-stone to India. Within a few years, from 1505, all the important places on the coast had passed from the sway of the Arabs. A fort was built at Sofala, and from this and minor posts along the shore the Portuguese carried on a successful trade with the interior, chiefly through the intermediary of the conquered Arabs. The power of Portugal was established on the coast of India, the King of Portugal being styled the "Lord of the navigation, conquest, and commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India." For nearly a century, supreme in the Eastern seas and the sole masters of the South-East African coast, here, as indeed elsewhere, their dominion did not extend to the interior. In 1580 Portugal became incorporated with the Spanish crown. The whole aim of the Por-

tuguese was to acquire a rich trade, especially in ivory and gold, and therefore they were content merely to occupy points on the coast. Such a thing as colonisation was altogether out of the question, for there was no surplus population in Portugal. Towards the South she made no attempt to establish herself, for there was no gold or trade. With the exception of various expeditions into the interior, specially to the mythical country called Monomotopa, believed to have been the present Matabililand, they appear to have done very little. Some expeditions were despatched against the native tribes on the Zambesi, but they were unable to achieve much in this direction. Portuguese missionaries, however, were active and had large numbers of native converts, while a few trading parties pushed their way from time to time into the interior. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the Portuguese power in the East was already on the decline, and other European nations appeared in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese are often blamed for not having effected more, for not having made better use of their opportunities in Eastern Africa, but it must not be forgotten that they had to contend with two grave difficulties. The terrible unhealthiness of the coast country and of the only portion of the interior they knew, the

Zambesi valley, was serious enough, and the inability to maintain and reinforce their settlements from home, a difficulty which was aggravated by the Portuguese habit of intermingling with the natives of the country, made the difficulty still worse. The terrible climate not only killed off the garrisons and expeditions, but rapidly sapped the energy and enterprise of the survivors. Under these circumstances, a mixed and very inferior race sprang up. Intermarriage with native races has been in Africa, as in Brazil and India, a weak spot in the Portuguese expansion, and perhaps even more than the Spanish, when in contact with inferior races, the Portuguese have been unable to resist a process of deterioration. Early in the seventeenth century the Dutch, who were at war with Spain (with which Portugal was incorporated), attacked certain posts, among them Mozambique, but without success. The Dutch, however, like the English, found no time to spare from the profitable field which they were exploiting in India and the Far East; the Portuguese remained on the coast on sufferance, and this state of affairs has continued in an increasing degree to the present day. The story of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, an episode of the present century, need not be told at any length. One Seyid Said, who had usurped the

power in Muscat, established himself at Zanzibar, and, realising the importance of the position, set about the work of subjugating the neighbouring Sheikhs. Under the masterly rule of this man the importance of Zanzibar increased greatly, but on his death the connection with Muscat ceased.

In the first half of the nineteenth century the Portuguese were frequently in conflict with the natives, and in 1834-36 were actually driven from their forts at Inhambane and Sofala. Soon after the first steps towards the active intervention of Europe began, in the usual sequence, first the geographical explorer and then the missionary, resulting at last, mostly within the last decade or so, in the arrival of English, French, Germans, and even Italians. If the interior of the Dark Continent was to be opened up it clearly could not be done by the feeble Portuguese, who in all those centuries of occupation had been unable to reach inland a few miles from their settlements on the fever-stricken coast. It now remains to be seen what can be accomplished by the stronger Teuton races.

From 1858 a number of distinguished travellers—Burton, Speke, Grant, Baker, Stanley—did much to reveal the interior, and in later years Thomson,

Lugard and others have helped to fill in the minor details.

Under the ægis of the Government of India, Zanzibar continued to flourish as an emporium of trade, and Indian traders began to settle along the East Coast of Africa. Thirty years ago, while the slave trade in the interior was almost entirely in the hands of the Arabs, the East Indians already did all the banking and mercantile business. They advanced monies to the caravans and controlled the Customs of the Sultan. The influence of the Sultan on the interior was nil, except such as was actually exercised through the slave caravan. Zanzibar was until recent years a centre of the slave trade, which seems to have existed from the earliest times and flourished under the Portuguese, negroes being exported on a large scale to India. The trade reached its height in the present century, when piracy in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf had been put down. Notwithstanding various attempts made by the British Government to check the slave trade it continued to flourish until recent times. There was an essential difference between the West and East African slave trades which made the latter very difficult to suppress. From the West Coast to America was a special trade in the hands of Europeans better controlled and more easy to suppress, whereas

on the East the trade was mixed up with legitimate commerce, the traders being Arabs who saw nothing objectionable in slavery. The scandal became so great that, in 1886, at the Conference of Berlin, the slave trade was forbidden in the basin of the Congo, and in 1890 by the Brussels Conference, the principal Powers and the Sultan of Zanzibar agreed on certain measures —the establishment of a settled administration, the construction of roads and railways, and restrictions on the importation of firearms—to be the most effectual means of dealing with the trade. The engagement of the Powers seems to have been rather of an academic nature, but in the natural course of events, with the occupation of large slices of the interior, and the opening of the country by railways, the traffic is bound to disappear. In the Congo especially, from all accounts, there would appear to be ample room for reform in this matter.

The beginning of British East Africa is due largely to the action of a Scotchman, Mr. Mackinnon, the chairman of the British India Steam Navigation Company which, in 1872, had established regular communication between India, Zanzibar and Europe. To this gentleman the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1877 offered a concession of the whole of the Zanzibar coast, but the proposal did not meet with the approval of the

British Government, who, though not unwilling that he should take up the concession were not prepared to support him in any way, by a charter or otherwise. Shortly afterwards the Germans appeared on the scene, made treaties with certain chiefs, and a society for German colonisation was founded and actively supported by the German Government. An agreement, in 1886, was arrived at between England and Germany, settling the limits of the Sultanate, and defining on the coast the respective spheres of influence. Both Powers agreed not to make acquisitions of territory, accept Protectorates, or interfere with the sphere of the other power. The collection of Customs of the ports in the German sphere of influence was handed over by the Sultan to the German Company, and soon after a similar concession was granted to the British East African Association which, in 1888, under the name of the British East Africa Company, received a charter. The question of the interior still remained undetermined, and the next few years saw a fresh agreement concluded, in 1890. The limits of the German and English spheres, as well as the southern border of the Italian, were defined. In 1890 the Sultan accepted the Protectorate of Great Britain, and France recognised the British Protectorate over the island of Zanzibar and Pemba, Britain acknowledging,

in exchange, the French Protectorate over Madagascar. In 1894 followed an agreement between Britain and the Congo Free State, the latter obtaining access to the Albert Lake, but no political rights in the Nile basin, except those concluded by the terms of the treaty. As will have been gathered from the description elsewhere given of the country, the immense territory brought under the English influence was a cut off region, having little connection with the coast. The cost of carriage to the sea was actually about £300 a ton, and the transport of anything except ivory was prohibitive, a fact which, be it mentioned in passing, greatly encouraged the slave trade, for the ivory had to be carried by porters. The taking over of the huge area known as British East Africa was no voluntary act of the British Government; it was simply the fear of being forestalled. The Imperial East African Company had grave difficulties to encounter. There was a revolt against the establishment of German authority on the coast, the Arabs threatened to rise against the missionaries for harbouring slaves who had run away, and finally German explorers began to appear in the interior, whereupon the Company took steps to secure the region for Britain. Uganda was visited by expeditions in 1890, and Lugard concluded a treaty with Mwanga ceding authority over the

territory to the Company. There is no space here to do more in alluding to the missionary work in Uganda than to say that the somewhat gloomy history is lit up by the record of the Scotch missionary, Alexander Mackay, a man of courage and tenacity of purpose who, in addition to other fine qualities, commended himself to the natives by his knowledge acquired as a working engineer. Feuds broke out between the Protestants and Roman Catholics, with the saddest results, and when King Mtesa died in 1884 his successor Mwanga roused the people against the missions, culminating in the murder of Bishop Hannington. Mwanga was driven out, the Arabs electing a nominee of their own and expelling the missions. Mwanga however was supported by the Christians, and the Mahommedan rule was brought to an end. The Protestant and Catholic factions, which had a strong political tinge, being actually known as "the English and French," were on very bad terms, but they combined to repel the attacks of the exiled Mahommedan. Partial order was restored with great difficulty by Lugard.

The Company meanwhile, unable to bear the excessive strain on its resources, unsupported as they were by Government, resolved, in 1891, to abandon Uganda. This step, however, at the request of the Government,

was not taken till 1893, to allow time for the despatch of a commission of enquiry. A railway from Mombasa to Lake Victoria was proposed, but the Company failed to obtain the assistance of Government, which declined to do more than supply the sum of £20,000 for a survey. It was estimated that the work could be carried out at a cost of about £1,700,000. The Government finally undertook to build the railway, but the sum proposed has since proved to be altogether inadequate, for the expenditure already has amounted to £5,000,000, and even this is believed to be insufficient to complete the work.

In England public opinion was greatly opposed to the abandonment of Uganda; whatever might have been said against the first steps in the acquisition of the country it was felt to be impossible to recede. Sir Gerald Portal, then Consul General at Zanzibar, was despatched to Uganda. There he concluded a new treaty with King Mwanga. After his departure the Mahommedans rose, and there was fear of a mutiny among the Soudanese troops, but the outbreak was quelled. Portal was altogether against abandoning the country; missionary work would be checked and the position of Europeans in East and Central Africa would become impossible; administration by Zanzibar was not to be thought of, and a regular Colonial administration

would be too costly. He recommended the appointment of commissioners with a sufficient force to assure their safety, their political ascendancy, and the security of Europeans in the country; by these means British control was to be upheld. For the successful execution of such a scheme a railway was a necessity, and this railway would be sufficient to check the slave trade and attract the commerce of the lake countries. While giving considerable credit to the Company for the acquisition of a great potential market for British goods he held that they had failed, and recommended that their functions should be taken over by Government. In 1895 this was done, the British East Africa Company being bought out for the sum of £250,000—not a very magnificent reward for services of a pioneer character, if the country were worth acquisition at all.

Meanwhile a British Protectorate was proclaimed over Uganda, in 1894. Zanzibar and Pemba are still governed by the Sultan under similar conditions. Security has been established in the coast region, and an attempt is being made to provide proper communication between the lakes and the sea by the railway from Mombasa to the Victoria Lake. The present settlement, however, is only provisional, and must be replaced in the general reconstruction of British Africa.

On the whole, the coast of East Africa is more accessible than that of South Africa, on account of the small islands off the mainland, but there is the same want of open estuaries and river communication with the interior. For practical purposes the rivers are useless, though some of them have been ascended by light draught steamers.

The towns on the coast are of small importance. Mombasa is the chief port, and is situated on the eastern side of a small island, connected with the Continent by a causeway. As the terminus of the railway to the interior, the place is likely to grow. Some sixty-five miles north of Mombasa is Melinde, with a fair anchorage, and again seventy miles further north is the island and harbour of Lamu, the second port of British East Africa.

The great highland interior can boast not only of great inland seas, but of the highest mountains in Africa, Kilimanjaro, in German territory, reaching a height of about 20,000 feet. Mount Kenia, snow-clad in places, reaches to nearly 19,000 feet in height, and away in the west are the Ruwenzuri mountains, explored by Stanley, ranging from 16,000 to 18,000 feet high. Other peaks of lesser height need not here be mentioned.

In British East Africa there is a great variety of

races. Here are met Bantus, Negroes, and the Hamitic and Semitic stocks of Northern Africa, as well as dwarf tribes resembling the Bushmen of the South. Along the coast are the Arabs, much intermixed with native blood. The ruling races in East Africa are the pastoral peoples from the North-East, the Bantus and those of Negro blood whom they conquered being the more settled agriculturists. The power of the ruling class in Uganda has been much reduced by cattle plague. Like the natives of the country who were dispossessed by the Matabili, the people—Bantus—are tillers of the soil skilled in metal work, pottery and various handicrafts, and other signs are not wanting of some intellectual power and capacity for being raised in the scale of civilisation.

Under the arrangement arrived at in East Africa the English have gained or retained access to most of the great interior lakes. It is difficult to convey any idea of the vast size of these lakes. For instance, the Victoria Nyanza is nearly 800 miles in circumference, in area nearly the size of Scotland; next to Lake Superior it is the largest freshwater lake in the world. The lakes Albert Edward and Albert are both small when compared with the Victoria Nyanza, the open water of the Albert lake being about 100 miles in length, with a breadth of 25 miles. Lake Rudolph in

the North-East is about 60 miles long with an average breadth of 20 miles.

Uganda is a country of rounded hills separated by marshes and sluggish streams overgrown with vegetation, and stands about 4,000 feet above sea level, with an average rainfall of about 50 inches in the year. The country in the first half of the distance between Mombasa and the lakes has little rainfall and timber. The greater portion is, in fact, a waterless desert, except for a few isolated spots. On reaching the highlands of Kikuyu, a cooler and more productive country, covered in large part by a dense forest, is reached. It seems extremely doubtful whether this region is suitable for European colonization, as has been proposed, and the natives here have not the best of reputations. Beyond Kikuyu, the climate becomes cooler and the water more abundant, but the country is almost uninhabited. The eastern edge of the Central African Plateau rises here to nearly 9,000 feet, the ground from this point falling towards the North-Eastern corner of the Victoria Nyanza, the road passing round the lake into Uganda. The climate on the coast is one of the worst in Africa, while even inland, except on the higher tracts where swept by the sea-breeze, the climate is bad, and it does not appear likely that the "breezy uplands,"

of which one has heard so much, will ever be the home of any considerable white population. There are "breezy uplands" elsewhere, enough and to spare, without seeking for them in Eastern or Central Africa. The resources are very much the same as those described as characteristic of British Central Africa; low lying lands, fertile but extremely unhealthy on the southern section of the coast; river valleys, similar to those of the Zambesi region, though mere dwarfs in comparison, suitable for cocoanut and india rubber trees; and the lake regions on the high lands, fertile for plantation products, such as coffee, cotton, and rice. The higher plateaus occupied by the Masai are largely grassy plains and rolling hills, well watered and timbered, said to be suited for cattle ranching and sheep farming. The country in the neighbourhood of Lakes Rudolph and Stephanie is chiefly desert.

Under these circumstances the resources of the country do not seem to admit of any great development. The ivory trade, the one great product formerly brought from the interior to the coast, is doomed to extinction, and there are no precious minerals to attract a mining population. The chief justification for being there at all is the object of keeping open the right of way from south to north. Notwithstanding the prolonged negotiations between Great Britain

and the other Powers interested, this object has not been attained as yet, for, intervening between the British spheres, north and south, lies a gap nearly six hundred miles in length. Lake Tanganyika affords a route across a larger part of this, but on either side lie respectively German and Belgian territory, while a strip of German territory, of considerable extent, lies between the north end of Tanganyika and Uganda. It is obvious that this condition must add to the physical difficulties of the route another obstacle of a political character—no easy one to overcome. A rail and steamer connection which must be dependent for its existence on another Power such as Germany is by no means to be regarded as an assured and permanent route, and may in the future lead to serious complications. For this reason, if for no other, the present arrangement in Central Africa cannot be regarded as final.

CHAPTER V.

THE ECONOMIC FUTURE.

CHAPTER V.

THE ECONOMIC FUTURE.

What is the future of South Africa to be? To arrive at a solution of this question it is necessary first to recall the chief physical characteristics of the country. These are: a high plateau, extremely dry, hot and healthy, and a low coast fringe varying in width, healthy on the west and the extreme south, but terribly malarious as one approaches the Zambesi river and the country north of it.

The three great natural sources of wealth are those arising from agriculture, cattle and sheep farming, and mining. The forests of the country are hardly worth speaking of, and need not be taken into account.

In the popular mind South Africa is associated almost entirely with minerals, and of these particularly diamonds and gold; but though the mineral wealth is great, and is likely to exercise a most important influence on the immediate future of the country, it is not, and this must be emphatically

stated, a permanent source of wealth. Agriculture has been in the past and must be in the future the chief factor upon which the ultimate development of the country must depend. From what has been said it will be apparent that only a small proportion is at present capable of cultivation. One has only to look at a map, and to bear in mind what has been said, to realise how large a section of the area south of the Zambesi is naturally unfit for agriculture. It is better not to attempt here any calculation of the proportions, for the data necessary for the purpose are not to be had. The extreme dryness of climate characterising an immense section of the country has more than once been alluded to. From Cape Colony in its southern part across the Karroo region, and Bechuanaland to the Upper Zambesi—a distance of over 1,100 miles—is, broadly speaking, unfit for cultivation. The German territory on the West is almost worse. Large sections of the Orange State, the Transvaal and Western Matabililand are too dry to be of much value. In the area more favoured with rain, on the south and south-eastern coasts, a large proportion of the country is, by nature of the ground, broken by hills, unsuited for cultivation. The coast lands are, as one proceeds northward on the eastern coast, rich and fertile, but north of Natal, especially in the immense tract of

Portuguese territory, unsuited for settlement by the white man.

In South Africa the whites generally, following the example of the Boers, apply themselves almost exclusively to stock farming. Much might be done, however, with the introduction of improved methods, to make agriculture successful and profitable. Of the articles now raised, wheat, maize, oats, Kaffir corn, fruit and sugar, the first two are largely imported from abroad, it being cheaper to do this and pay the duties than raise them locally. Butter, milk, cheese and meat are also imported and pay heavy duties—this to a grass country. Fruit is exported in the early part of the year, almost entirely to England. On most of the coast lands sugar might be grown, in the Portuguese territory especially, as it is now in Natal, and rice could be raised on the low lying ground. There are portions of Mashonaland where tea might be planted, as it is on the hills of Natal further south. Cotton can be grown in many places, but could hardly be made profitable. No need to dwell further on this subject; speaking generally, owing to the varying conditions of country and climate, the products of both sub-tropical, tropical and temperate regions can be grown in parts not far removed from each other.

Much might be done in the present waterless highland tracts by means of irrigation, for instance, in the Karroo, Bechuanaland and parts of Rhodesia, for even the former when watered is of marvellous fertility. Something has already been done in Cape Colony in this direction, where over 300,000 acres are already cultivated by means of irrigation. Unless something is done to extend this system to the great interior, South Africa will never become a real agricultural country, and will merely continue divided into enormous stock farms—necessarily enormous, on account of the area required to support any number of cattle. There are still districts which are capable of cultivation without irrigation, but they are not enough. The inadequacy of the rainfall is not so great a drawback as the fact that it only continues for three months or so of the year. The foodstuffs at present imported, dear as they are, are cheaper than what can be raised locally under present conditions. Until this is altered, which cannot be done without irrigation on a large scale and improved communications, the energies of the whites will be devoted to the exploitation of the mines, and the keeping of cattle and sheep.

Most of the country that is not broken mountain or waterless desert, and much that to the new comer

seems the latter, is already in the hands of stock farmers, whose farms are of great extent—from 6,000 acres upwards. In South Africa there are some 4,500,000 cattle, which suffer from havoc worked by the murrain, while in Cape Colony alone there are 14,000,000 sheep and 5,000,000 Angora and other goats. The sheep have suffered greatly from diseases, for which measures of a stringent character have been adopted. The vast interior, in great part resembling a desert, as it does, formerly condemned as unfit for live stock, is now deemed capable of being used. The area required to each sheep is of course greater in proportion as the country is drier. On the Karroo, where the sheep thrive on small succulent shrubs, water being only obtained by means of wells or pools, as much as six acres is the average for one sheep. The rough ground, covered with patches of thick, scrubby bushes, is utilised for ostrich farming which furnishes for export to Europe and America about £500,000 worth of feathers. The Merino sheep produces a valuable wool, one of the chief products of South Africa. In the Orange State the Merino sheep and Angora goats thrive, and the pasture land of this State and Bechuanaland and portions of Rhodesia are suitable for ranching purposes. This immense area in the interior, more or less suitable for live stock, does not imply by

any means a large population, for to support a herd or flock, owing to the conditions of the country—the want of water, the thin pasturage, the frequent droughts, and the devastations of the locusts—the areas are much greater in South Africa than would be imagined. The fact of the farms being from 6,000 acres upwards is an indication of the inability of the land under existing conditions to support a great population; the number of persons on a farm looking after cattle or sheep is very small indeed. On a large grazing farm the proportion of whites to blacks is usually about three to twenty-five. The scattered mining communities do not create a very profitable market, as they obtain their supplies mainly from abroad. In such a country, consisting of farms of great area, where the distances are so immense, it is evident that for many years to come the extent of white population must necessarily be small, unless artificially stimulated.

As regards railways, few words will suffice to explain the general system now in existence in South Africa. Running from Cape Town northwards across the great interior plateau skirting the Orange State and Transvaal, through Bechuanaland and Matabililand, to Buluwayo, a great through line is to be connected with Salisbury the capital of Mashonaland, which is

already connected with the sea at Beira. From a point called De Aar junction, in the eastern part of the Colony, a branch runs to Port Elizabeth, and from this line, at Middleburg, a railway runs north-east through Bloemfontein as far as Pretoria, the line to the Limpopo from that place, which was in progress, having been suspended. From Cape Town to Pretoria is over a thousand miles, and from Cape Town to Buluwayo close on fourteen hundred miles. From East London there is a line inland joining the Cape Colonial system and the Orange State railways; from Durban there is a line connecting that place with Pretoria and Johannesburg; and from Delagoa Bay there is a railway to Pretoria, opened in 1894. Finally, from Beira there is a line connecting that port with Salisbury, the capital of Mashonaland. There are some minor lines of which no account need here be given. The main trunk line running northwards (excepting the portions in the Transvaal and Orange State), owned by the Cape Colonial Government, and the line from Durban to the frontier of the Transvaal, belonging to Natal, both pay fairly well. The lines from Delagoa Bay to Pretoria, and from Pretoria to the State border and the frontier of Natal are owned by a Dutch Company. The Beira railway practically belongs to the British South Africa

Company. All these railways, including that from Beira which has recently been altered, have a gauge of 3 ft. 6 inches. The railways are well managed, sleeping cars are provided on long journeys, and the accommodation, considering the circumstances of the country, is all that is necessary.

The transformation that has been effected in South Africa generally by railways has been already alluded to. The whole life of the country has been affected thereby. In pre-railway days the ox waggon was the sole means of conveyance, and fifteen miles a day was a good average of progress. These waggons have played a very important part in the opening of South Africa, providing not merely means of communication but being literally houses on wheels, and forming a base, when necessity arose, from which further travel could be made. The Boers on their treks have thus moved their families and households, and in waggons the chief explorations were made, whether by missionaries or hunters. Food and other necessities have to be taken with the traveller, and for this the waggon is indispensable. When expeditions have taken place on any scale among the hostile natives, the laager afforded protection, as it did for the cattle safely tethered in sight from the attacks of wild beasts. The general character of the country has made this uni-

versal use of the ox waggon possible. Over a large section of the interior no timber is found, and where there is forest the trees do not grow thick together, and the brushwood is dry, small, and easily cut. It is evident that had South Africa been thickly wooded this method of travelling would have been out of the question. Coaches, drawn by mules or horses, ply beyond the railway termini, at a rate night and day of six to eight miles an hour where the ground is good. The prevalence of horse sickness in the north of the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, Matabililand, and Mashonaland especially, makes the use of horses for driving or riding very limited.

So far the over-ocean communication with South Africa has been almost entirely by British lines, but Germany, here as elsewhere, is beginning to wedge her way in, and before many years are over may be expected to become a very serious competitor. So far these German boats run from Hamburg by the route of the Red Sea to Durban as a terminus. On the coast, from Cape Town northwards, there are the steamers of the Castle and Union lines between Cape Town and Durban, calling at intermediate ports, and there are also smaller steamers, indifferently adapted for passenger purposes. From Durban to Delagoa Bay there is a weekly boat, and thence to Beira and

northwards there are the steamers of the German East African Company and also local lines. Between Cape Town and Delagoa Bay there is no sheltered port, as already indicated; at Port Elizabeth and East London ocean steamers are compelled to lie outside, and landing is effected with difficulty by means of tenders. The bar at Durban, which has made it difficult for big steamers to enter the port, has recently been dredged, with a view to enabling large ocean steamers to cross it at high tide. There is only one harbour on the whole coast which can be called well sheltered, namely, Delagoa Bay. At Beira the harbour, available at all times, with expenditure (such as, however, can never be hoped for from the Portuguese), could be made of great value.

The wealth of the country at present consists of minerals, and it is this that for some years to come will furnish the main source of prosperity. It was only some thirty years ago, at a time when it was not known that anything but iron and copper existed in the country, that diamonds were first found, and this discovery was a turning point in the life of South Africa. From the day of the lucky find, the country was no longer exclusively a pastoral and easy-going, indeed sleepy land. The precious stones

drew at once to the country a great stream of men from every part of South Africa and all quarters of Europe and even America, and introduced a new spirit, speculative, adventurous, feverishly bent upon the rapid accumulation of wealth. The great De Beers Consolidated Mining Company, the result of the amalgamation of many claims and interests into one great corporation carried out by Rhodes in 1885, has now the command of the diamond market of the world, exporting more than £4,000,000 worth each year, chiefly to the United States, and maintaining the output exactly at a figure which will not depreciate the value of the stone by over-supply. Such an experiment is unique in the history of the world, and is a sample of the daring and financial genius of the originator. One of the results of the discovery of diamonds was the creation of a class of men, active, restless, and always seeking some new field of investment in connection with minerals. Ten years after the great amalgamation of the mines at Kimberley came the great gold finds in the Transvaal, which soon after altogether eclipsed the diamond industry, and made Johannesburg the great centre in the life of the interior towards which everything converged.

Something has been said elsewhere regarding the

gold fields of the Randt in the Transvaal. The chief feature of the field, as compared with the other known gold fields in South Africa was clearly shown, namely, the consistency and persistency of the yield obtained from the peculiar formation existing there, known as "banket." There is, so far as known, only one "banket" field in South Africa, or, indeed, in the whole world, namely that of the Randt. The rest is all quartz reef. Gold occurs in this quartz reef formation in many sections of the country south of the Zambesi. Matabililand and Mashonaland are in many parts covered with such reefs, and they occur further south at Tati, in Northern Bechuanaland, in the eastern and north-eastern districts of the Transvaal; also in Natal, Zululand and Swaziland; and even, though to an inconsiderable amount, in Cape Colony. It will thus be seen that the extent of gold-bearing quartz reef in South Africa is immense. The reefs are very similar to those found in North America and Australia. Those in the Northern Transvaal and on the Zambesi, in Matabililand and Mashonaland, which have already been alluded to, are great in extent, and from them considerable amounts of gold have, in times of which we now possess no record, been extracted. To test and develop this large region will for many years

to come absorb a large amount of capital, and provide employment for a considerable population, the growth of which must of course depend upon the value of the reefs. This introduction of capital and enterprise will be a great stimulus to the country, and already railways have been made, land has been to a certain extent cultivated, and trade has been created such as centres round a mining community. The development of the country will have to be dealt with by companies possessed of considerable resources, and before a very long period, probably in the next half century, the payable reefs will have been used up, and the population will then for a time decline. The country, however, will in the meantime have obtained an increase to its population altogether apart from the mining, and many of those who came to mine will remain to farm. The prosperity and progress of the country, then, will be largely affected by the action taken by the powers that be at the present juncture. If every effort is made now to promote and encourage settlement on those lands which are suitable for the white man, either as an agriculturist or stock farmer, then the inevitable "slump" in the mining interests of South Africa will find the country better able to bear such a shock, for it will no longer depend for its prosperity

on gold alone, but will have a large pastoral and agricultural population independent of such evanescent conditions.

We now pass to the consideration of the other gold formation found in South Africa, the "banket" fields of the Randt. It is necessary to emphasise the difference—the essential difference—there is between these mines of the Randt, the "banket" field, and those found elsewhere throughout South Africa which are all quartz. It is all the more necessary because the public in Europe and America, receiving their impressions in a vague way, in which cold logic finds no place, have been accustomed to appraise the value of the gold reefs generally by the value of the "banket," two things which, of course, have absolutely no relation. The fact that over £15,000,000 worth of gold is being yearly extracted; that a population of close on 200,000 white men has grown up in the last fifteen years, and that gold estimated at the value of £700,000,000 still remains to be extracted, so dazzles the imagination that the public are apt to think that all is gold in South Africa, which is by no means the case. But the Randt—this marvellous "banket" field—has secured for the Transvaal the first place among gold-producing countries, being considerably

ahead of the United States, Australasia coming third in the list and the Russian Empire fourth. It has been calculated on what seems a reasonable basis that these mines will increase their output for some years to come, and that the field will last for at least another half century. The position after the field has been exploited to a depth of 5,000 feet, the maximum at which mining is now possible, remains to be seen.

The discussion of what is likely to occur over half a century hence seems to many hardly to come within the realm of the practical. It is important to bear in mind that, unlike Matabililand and Mashonaland, the land here is generally unsuitable for agriculture, though capable of being used for pasture. The probability, therefore, is that in the long run this part of South Africa will relapse from its present prosperity and will be behind Matabililand and Mashonaland, and other districts which are of a more fertile nature.

While the discussion of a remote future may be highly speculative, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the gold will not last for ever, and that South Africa, as Bryce remarks, "is now living not on her income, but on her capital, and that in twenty-five years half or more of the capital

may be gone." Meanwhile such considerations do not worry those who are in any way connected with the gold industry, and indeed many who are altogether outside any direct interest in the question. "We are not working for posterity" is essentially a South African motto. "It will last our time" is the universal creed, and the aim of all is to make their pile, and, to use the colonial term, to "clear just as soon as possible." The question of coal and iron is one of very great importance, both for the development of the gold fields and for the working of railways. Coal of good quality, and well situated for exploitation, has been extensively found in the Transvaal and Natal, and exists elsewhere, while there is a coal field now being worked in the eastern part of Cape Colony, near the Orange State. Iron also is found in Mashonaland and in the Transvaal, as well as elsewhere, but there has been no development of it, goods of iron manufacture being procurable more cheaply from abroad. There are indeed at present in South Africa practically no manufactures, and such as exist, entirely in the hands of non-Dutch, are hardly worthy of notice. There seems no prospect under present conditions that manufactures on any large scale will spring up in South Africa, which is

wanting in all the requisites for producing them, namely, a large market, cheap sources of mechanical power, and inexpensive though efficient labour. Such demand as there is, or can be for many years to come, can be met much more cheaply by importation from the immense industrial establishments of the United States and Europe. There are no waterways from which power can be obtained, and the average quality of the coal is inferior to that obtained from many parts of the world, for instance England, Belgium and America. The most important question, however, is that of labour, which, when unskilled though plentiful, is bad and expensive, and when skilled is difficult to procure and costly. The white man, chiefly because there is a black man handy, does not do rough hard work, and the natives are changeable and unreliable, and cannot be counted upon either to apply themselves or to stick to their employment. Some of the natives, such as the Cape boys, are good at driving a team and are suited for various kinds of rough mechanical work, but the Kaffirs generally are no good at trades requiring skill, and it will be some time before they can be sufficiently trained to attempt any but the simplest. The Kaffir personally is not anxious to undertake

any labour except the tillage of his own ground or the looking after his own cattle. The wages of the white man in South Africa seem very high in comparison with German or English rates, but are discounted by the dearness of all the necessities of life. Under such conditions, it is clear that South Africa cannot for a long time, until changes not yet foreseen occur, become a manufacturing country. So little interest is taken locally in the question that there has never been any cry for a tariff on foreign manufactures, and the only protection hitherto given has been to the agriculturists in Cape Colony, in the matter of food stuffs.

Till lately in South Africa there were no specially rich people. The farmers were comfortable, though they had no luxuries and little money; the Kaffirs had all they wanted; the cattle ranches did not make fortunes as in Australia; nor till the diamond fields were opened were there any capitalists or financiers. Even after that very little of the capital invested in developing the gold mines came from South Africa, but chiefly from England, and to a considerable extent from France, Germany, Holland, and elsewhere in a lesser degree. Almost all the dividends go to shareholders abroad. The representatives of the companies and their skilled assistants,

and even the miners, do not remain in South Africa or spend their money there, and the capital drawn from the mineral resources of the country to a great extent goes to augment the comfort and splendour of Europe. South Africa is as yet, even considering the degree of population, a poor market. Except at the Cape, Johannesburg, and a few of the larger towns the whites are generally not in a position to purchase much, and the blacks, in the lowest grade of civilisation, buy merely the barest necessities. Their wants are few, being merely those of food and a few simple articles of clothing, and the purchasing power of the black population is likely to grow at a very slow pace. It is obvious therefore that if South Africa is to realise the hopes of the British nation she must receive some assistance from without. The question is in what form must this assistance come? It is usually conceded that the one thing needful is a large influx of British blood and energy, and many schemes are afoot for inducing settlers to come. As has been pointed out these settlers, if they are to accomplish the regeneration of South Africa, must be agriculturists or cattle farmers. Miners and the men who form the *entourage* of mines are not settlers or colonists in the true sense of the word. Hitherto South Africa, unlike Australia or Canada, has not

attracted British or other colonists. The stream of immigration has been constant, but has flowed out as fast almost as it flowed in. The permanent element has been Dutch. How can this be altered? Can we, at this critical juncture effect such a change in the natures of men, and in the conditions of life in South Africa, that we can people the wilderness and make the barren places to sing with fatness? Unless we can accomplish some such miracle (and the age of miracles is not past) another fifty years will find us masters of South Africa perhaps, but with the same shifting unstable hold and face to face with a solid body of Dutchmen, sons of the soil, and increasing in numbers yearly while we stand practically still.

A number of schemes are afoot to provide the necessary white agricultural element in South Africa, and one of the most favoured is that of soldier settlers, to be assisted by the State, and entirely supported for the first few years, while engaged in irrigation, building and so forth. This would provide—theoretically — both for the military defence and the agricultural development of the country. A somewhat similar scheme is that of offering grants of land, and a retaining fee to those of the forces now in South Africa who might desire to remain, under the condi-

tion that they should act as a sort of police. There are many objections to such plans, first and foremost being that of the difficulty of making farmers out of soldiers. It is not so easy as it sounds to beat a sword into a ploughshare, and too often the result is that both are spoilt. The difficulty is no new one, and as far back as eighty years ago an attempt was made at State-aided colonization in Albany, north of Cape Colony. Bands were sent out under leaders and established in various districts, but the result was not successful. Successive years of blight, floods and other misfortunes discouraged the colonists, and finally an elaborate system of relief had to be organised for them. Many gravitated to the towns, or found their way home, the only good result being that a certain leaven of British blood remained in that part among the Dutch. An experiment was tried on similar lines in Rhodesia, after the occupation, when the pioneers and mounted police of the Chartered Company were given farms and induced to settle. These men had been for some time making acquaintance with the land and conditions of life, so that they had an advantage not to be possessed by those to whom farms are to be granted under the present scheme, yet the experiment was an entire failure. None of the men really settled down, but after a

short time sold their farms to land speculators and drifted into the cities or to the mines. After the Warren expedition another attempt was made to induce settlement, under similar conditions, and with equally unsuccessful results. The chief reason for this is that no country in the world requires more knowledge and experience, under its present conditions, and that it is not a land where any casual man who possesses a few pounds and plenty of energy can be planted down and told to farm. It is suggested that the quasi-soldier-policeman-farmer should have instruction during the first year or so from some farmer of experience, but any such plan must be at once rejected as inadequate if not impracticable. Another difficulty is that of bringing out or providing wives for the soldier settlers. This was an obstacle which met Sir George Grey when, some fifty years ago after the Crimean war, he attempted to settle on the land part of the German legion who had been in the pay of Britain. This, however, was the most successful attempt ever made, for a certain number settled down, intermarried with the Dutch and became valuable colonists, but their nationality makes it impossible to argue from their case. They had many qualities lacking in the British colonist.

The question of selection is an insuperable difficulty.

Anyone who has any experience of emigration work can testify to the impossibility of guaranteeing that the right class of men are sent out. The only safe source would be from colonials, and even there a grave difficulty at once arises, for the right sort of colonist does not need—and probably would not wish—to leave his own colony. The result of an indiscriminate granting of land to all who might express the desire to stay in South Africa would draw together men of two classes. First, the inexperienced new chum, say an Army Reserve man, raw from home, probably with the traditions of army discipline still clinging to him, and making it difficult for him to strike out for himself; or else the even less experienced youth, anxious to carve a way for himself in the new world, but without the slightest conception of the difficulties he will meet. These will find that all they have learnt at home stands them in little stead as masters, while as workmen they have to compete against black labour. Secondly there will be a class of wastrels, many with plenty of experience, dearly bought in other colonies or at home. These will snatch eagerly at any offer or concession, and will as eagerly take the first opportunity of selling their land, and will gravitate to mines or towns where they will swell the population of "mean whites." I do not, of

course, expect that all the colonists recruited by such methods as I describe will fall into one or other of these categories, but the majority are likely to do so, and the money expended in schemes like these will be worse than wasted.

The expense of such experiments is another objection, and it is useless to urge that the soldier-settlers would save Great Britain part of the expense of garrisoning the country. The country will not, for some time, be sufficiently tranquil to dispense with a garrison, and scattered farmers could not supply its place, or be sufficiently organised. One or other of their functions would be neglected. Again, if it were possible to select the best colonials and settle them in farms they would still have to be subsidized and helped for several years, and it is difficult to see how Great Britain could be expected to pay the expenses of Australians, for instance, in South Africa.

All such attempts at artificially stimulating settlement on the land is doomed to failure, for it ignores the principle of *natural selection*, and substitutes for the proper position of colonists a quasi-dependence on the State. The true method is to induce men to colonise, not by bribes or subsidies, but by making it worth their while to come freely; by improving the conditions of life, opening communica-

tions, cutting down tariffs, and by the introduction of irrigation. One of the chief deterrents to colonists, hitherto, has been the isolation necessitated by settling on the land. The lonely farm, the vast stretch of empty country round it, the black population, cutting him off from his neighbours, the absence of all the amenities of life, have combined to discourage any but the stoutest, and have rendered a farmer's life an exile only to be borne until some better opportunity came along. This condition of affairs can be remedied first by irrigation, which will reduce the size of a farm necessary for a living (15 acres being sufficient instead of 6,000), and render the crops far more regular; and second by railways, which will link the farms together and to the townships, and make the transport of goods cheap and easy.

Irrigation should be done by the State, not by land companies, whose effect is always in the end to paralyse and squeeze the farmer. It is calculated that in the Cape alone 5,000,000 acres might be irrigated, with an increased value of £20 per acre, which would add over £100,000,000 to the value of the Colony.

These are not inexpensive methods, but they have the merit as speculations that they do not depend for their success on the *morale* of a certain number

of individuals, as would be the case with an army of subsidised settlers, but on the energy and enterprise of the whole British race, not usually slow to take advantage of such opportunities as would be offered by the Renascent South Africa. The lands, when they are ready, should be offered to colonists on easy terms, as in New Zealand and Canada, and should be freed from red-tape trammels. The initiation of public works and of many others, such as the building of school-houses, municipal buildings and so forth, should be the first task of the Government, and for this many of the irregular troops now engaged in South Africa might be retained, and work in detachments, on a quasi-military footing and under military officers as well as trained overseers. The Trans-Siberian Railway line was built under similar conditions. This suggestion is made to meet the demand made by a very large number of the irregular troops, who expected to find employment in South Africa after the war, but whether it be practicable or no, the writer feels convinced, not only from his personal knowledge of colonists and colonies but from the history of the past ventures, that any scheme, however liberal, which interferes with the natural course by which a man becomes a successful colonist, either a farmer or a ranchman, is foredoomed to failure.

As for the towns and mines, as soon as the war is over there will be a rush to these, and it is to be feared that much trouble will arise unless this hasty immigration is checked.

South Africa must not be pushed into abnormal growth if she is to be healthy. Her development may be speedy, but cannot be accomplished in one *coup*, nor by such crude measures as those suggested of simply bribing men to stay in the country and buying them spades. Once the country is made liveable the farmers will come fast enough of their own accord, and the artificers and mechanics will find plenty of work. Thus communities, properly organised, will grow up, striking root in the soil. We want a different class of men to those who have hitherto flocked to South Africa, more especially to the newer regions. These, as has been said elsewhere, came to make money and went away as soon as possible. We must get men who will regard South Africa as their home, and to do this we must make it possible for them to live and bring up their children with the advantages of education, and some, at all events, of the amenities of civilisation.

CHAPTER VI.

THE SETTLEMENT.

CHAPTER VI.

THE SETTLEMENT.

It is unnecessary to preface the general conclusions arrived at by more than a passing reference to history. Elsewhere it has been shown how South Africa was discovered by the Portuguese, used as little more than a place of call by the Dutch, taken over, as a consequence of international complications, by Britain, and how, from that date (1806) till now, matters have been maturing gradually towards a point at which the Dutch and British elements could no longer exist as separate nations on the same continent. The difficulty was not new, and ought to have settled itself long ago, but the circumstances were exceptional. The situation, as it stands, has been evolved out of the errors of a century, during which the whole history of the relations between Britain and South Africa is a story of blunders, enough to have ruined the chances of many nations, only redeemed by the genius of the British race.

Another feature which it has been the writer's endeavour to bring out is the character of the Boers—its force, gathered through a long period of stubborn and successful resistance, and its probable permanence. A proper appreciation of the calibre of the Boers is all-important in considering the question of the future of South Africa, and might have prevented many mistakes in the past.

In endeavouring to bring home to the average citizen of Britain or the United States the character of British South Africa, it is natural that comparison should be made with Canada and Australia. Smaller in area than these territories (being not one quarter the size of either of them), of this area a very large section is unfit for tillage, and great portions are unsuited even for cattle ranching, so that it is evident that a wide difference exists in the conditions of these countries for the purposes of colonisation. In the matter of situation, as regards the Old and New Worlds, South Africa is less accessible, and less easily opened up, owing to its want of harbours and absence of rivers—both conditions necessary for the rapid colonisation of a new country.

The advantages possessed by Canada, for instance, have already been noted. Admirable water communication, lakes, rivers and colonisable country reach-

ing from the Atlantic to the Rockies, while the impracticable portion lies on one side, towards the inhospitable north. Australia is, like South Africa, without great navigable rivers, and both have a considerable extent of desert country, situated in Australia in the centre, and in South Africa mainly in the west. This desert country in South Africa does not block the line of communication to the North, but there is no connection between East and West, while in Australia the desert area breaks the communication between East and West, North and South. The mountains of Australia are not serious obstacles, while the ranges of South Africa are natural barriers which can only be overcome by railway communication. These mountains, with the absence of waterways, account for the slow progress accomplished in colonising South Africa. It is difficult, indeed almost impossible, for the European or American to picture to himself what a riverless and in large sections rainless country like South Africa is. In climate the interior stretching from Cape Town northwards is on the whole suited to the white man. The great tableland, without the long Canadian winter, has generally a bracing atmosphere. Less favoured in soil than Canada or Australia, it suffers from droughts and the plague of locusts. Not a granary like Canada, or a producer of wool to the extent of Australia, it is

the greatest gold producing country in the world and the possessor of diamond fields that control the entire diamond market. Thus it is plain that little is to be learnt from attempting to institute a physical comparison between such widely differing regions.

The chief stages in the history of modern South Africa have been the discovery of diamonds in 1867, and the still greater discovery of gold on the Randt, to which may be added the appearance of Germany on the scene in 1884. The diamonds brought to life a speculative and go-a-head spirit in pastoral South Africa, which has never since been absent. This supplied the first great stimulus to the development of railways throughout the land, altering the conditions of transport at a rate which annihilated distance, and vastly stimulated the growth of the towns and town life. Then came the great gold discoveries, which added another and still greater stimulus to the rapid progress of certain centres in the great interior, communicated a feverish excitement to the whole life of South Africa, and were destined to have far reaching consequences.

The arrival of a foreign power, no decadent race like the Portuguese already established in Africa, but the sturdy Teutons, the great commercial rivals of Britain in all branches of industry and in all

quarters of the world, provided a fresh stimulus politically, for it became evident that the great interior was not to be had whenever it suited Britain to expand. A new competitor entered the field, one that was prepared to occupy large tracts of most unpromising country, evidently not for what was to be got there, but as a stage to the valuable interior, perhaps to effect connection with the Transvaal, with whom there was in a sense some distant kinship, and whose Government had been making certain preliminary overtures, though these did not go very far.

Lastly came the great expansion northwards brought about by Rhodes, by means of the British South Africa Company, which has added to the British Empire in South Africa the last slice of white man's country available south of the Zambesi, has kept open the overland route to the north, and, for good or for evil, has with the rapid development of the gold industry in the Transvaal largely contributed to the conflict which has arisen between Boers and British. The step was a momentous one. It would be easy to indicate errors in the carrying out of this extension, but for the present it is sufficient to note the great importance of the step. It was one which, having in view the general conditions of South Africa at the time, could not have been avoided. To have shirked the duty then

would have been to bring about still graver difficulties in the future.

The close of the military operations at once raises a variety of questions, not merely political, but personal and financial, which cannot possibly wait for settlement. Upon the decision arrived at will depend the future of South Africa, and, to a large extent, the fate of the British Empire.

The first race question which confronts us on the termination of the war is no new one. As pointed out in the little historical sketch of their relations from early times, the two races come of the same stock, and ought to fuse without any great difficulty, but the fact remains that, hitherto, they have not fused to any great extent, and the chief reason for this is probably found, not so much in natural antagonism, or national prejudice, as in the fact that the Boer or Dutchman lived on the land, was a farmer and cattle-breeder, while the Briton came to the towns or mines and left them as soon as he had enough money to do so. The bird of passage, breathing an alien air, clinging to habits, methods, vices, perhaps, of the world he had left, despised the home bird—old-fashioned, narrow, bigoted—and the gulf was made wider by political conditions. The Boer especially (for the Cape Dutch are not

altogether included in these generalisations) regarded himself as the son, and rightful owner, of the soil, and the newcomers as temporary and dangerous tenants. The settlement of English colonists of a good stamp, if it takes place gradually, naturally, and under the conditions already indicated, would alter all this, and greatly facilitate the fusion of the two races.

The question of the exact proportions of British and Dutch has been much debated, and made to prove, by the manipulation of figures, a number of different theories. It is, however, of little importance beside the fact that the Dutch have been, and are still, increasing far more rapidly than the British, who, unlike the Boers, have shown no disposition so far to settle on the land, to marry young and have large families. We have already shown the dangers to be avoided in stimulating settlement, and a wholesale electoral gerrymandering would accomplish no real reform in the conditions of the country. Any temporary British majority due to the coming rush upon mines and towns, and from a redistribution of the electorate, would not be lasting, and would leave the country worse off than before.

The question of representation presents several difficulties, but not immediately, since some time

must elapse before a representative Government can be established in the newly-conquered states. In the Orange State, where the British are in a minority, but the Dutch element is far less violently opposed, the difficulties will not be so great. The interests of Dutch and British are to a great extent identical, and centre in the land, for the mining population is comparatively small. The two races there have always got on well together in the past, and may continue to do so.

The Transvaal, however, presents two far less promising conditions. The British minority is considerably less in proportion to the Dutch, and entirely occupied in the mines and mining towns. There has been no community of interests, and, as all the world knows, a terrible degree of friction. Separate town representation, if granted, as suggested, on a scale hitherto unparalleled, would of course increase the British majority at the Cape, where, however, there is already a Progressive majority, which may be taken to show a predominance of British influence. But this would not meet the difficulty in the Orange State, where there are practically no towns, nor in the Transvaal, unless fresh goldfields are discovered and new towns founded, for no conceivable increase of numbers at Johannesburg would give a majority

over the country districts. In the Transvaal it is not the case of towns versus country, but of one town versus the entire land. In any case, such a discrimination would be extremely impolitic as widening the gulf between the two races.

This is a question which, like many others in South Africa, can only be settled by a permanent occupation of the land by British colonists.

A measure which, without meeting the whole difficulty, might facilitate its ultimate solution would be to effect certain territorial changes. This, however, is not a matter to be settled with the aid of a map and a few statistics, but must be largely developed by Afrikanders themselves. A proposal which, on the face of it, seems reasonable is the transference of the north-east corner of the Orange State and the south-east section of the Transvaal, with Swaziland, to Natal. The British electoral majority in that colony would not be swamped by this, while the Dutch would lose considerably in the two conquered states.

A measure, of whose wisdom and practicability the writer is far more strongly convinced, is that of offering Boer farmers, in small parties, inducements to "trek" to the wilder parts of Mashonaland (especially Manica) and other neighbouring territories. This

would be likely to meet with their approbation, for they can thus find opportunities for carving out their fortunes and leading their own lives—impossible henceforth in their own country. They would not dislike—indeed they would prefer—the isolation involved, and they would be broken up and distributed among the British communities. As those countries develop, and the communities increase, the Boers will mingle more and more in the social life, and *by degrees* that fusion will take place which is one of the most essential factors in the future prosperity of South Africa.

Although the question of Boer and British is the immediate and pressing one, there is another race problem, deeper and more enduring, on the solution of which depends even more largely the future of South Africa.

The ultimate problem, as has been already indicated, is that of black and white. Two things are certain. The black man will go on increasing rapidly, and he must dwell side by side with the white—is not to be pushed back. The conditions of life in the future will therefore in many respects resemble those of the Southern States of America, with the difference that there the blacks are in a minority, while in South Africa they largely outnumber the whites. It seems

inevitable, therefore, that a large section of the whites will be engaged, not in actual manual labour, but in the direction of field work and the carrying on of agriculture and cattle farming with native labour. The position will probably place some of those obstacles in the way of the development of the country which have presented themselves in the Southern States, foremost among which is the contempt for manual labour and the consequent deterioration of the ruling class. These possibilities and dangers must be faced, and they emphasize the necessity for two things —unity among the white races, and the necessity for supplying South Africa with a thoroughly good stamp of colonist. We cannot entrust such a delicate matter as the handling of these natives to an inferior class of men—South Africa, in short, cannot be colonised and developed by our cast-offs.

There are two aspects of the settlement which require to be looked at, the one temporary and the other permanent. In South Africa the colonists are, not unnaturally, perhaps more deeply concerned regarding the temporary question, which is immediate, than with the permanent, which looks to the future. The South African colonists have been hit very hard in this war. Not merely has the best of the colonial youth contributed its share to the death

roll—that has been done by the mother country and the other colonies of the Empire also—but in a hundred other ways, notably in the material losses and the confusion and miseries incidental to such a conflict, the strain has been great. What the colonists are bent on, therefore, is to gather together the remnants of their properties, and to see order evolved, so that the march of life may return to the even tenor of its way. But it is not merely the sentiment of the home country and of the colonists in South Africa that has to be considered, but of the people of Greater Britain—the Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, and even the British planters of India and Ceylon, for all these have rallied to the flag, and in different degrees have in no unstinted spirit come to the aid of the mother country. The settlement, whatever the peculiar form it takes may be, must be a settlement which, while just to the South Africans, shall be the most satisfactory one for the British Empire as a whole.

As regards the question of defraying the cost of the war, notwithstanding a very general belief in this country to the contrary, it may be taken for granted that the main burden will have to be contributed by the British people. There is a great

deal of loose talk about "making the Transvaal pay all costs," not only of the war, but actually of the garrisoning of the country afterwards. But it must be remembered that the Transvaal is, except for the Randt, a particularly poor country. Before gold was discovered it was on the verge of bankruptcy. To say therefore that the Transvaal must pay is to say that the mines must pay. The abolition of the republics, while it may possibly with judicious management clear the way for a general settlement of South Africa, at once opens the door to a variety of difficulties, and these of a grave character, which will be burdens to be borne by the mines or by the British public. The Transvaal Treasury will not merely be empty, but there will be a heavy debt to assume when the country is taken over.

The settlement of the question of the mines is an intricate and troublesome one, involving certain possible dangers, from the quarter of foreign Powers, which at first sight may not be apparent. The Transvaal Government since the beginning of the war has been carrying on work on some of the mines, while from others a tax of about one-third of the produce has been levied, and, needless to say, there has been a fine discrimination in dealing with the matter between those which appeared to be in

foreign hands and those which, in their opinion, were British. Among the awkward questions likely to be raised regarding the mines is that a large proportion of the shares, generally assumed to be a considerable majority, are held by foreigners. Under such circumstances it is urged that it would be highly impolitic to tax French and German subjects, especially at the present moment when anti-British sentiment is so strong. One half of the gold mine shares are said to be held by foreigners, and of that half two-thirds are probably French—that is, one-third of the whole. The tendency of France to protect its financial interests abroad is well known, and Mexico, Egypt and the Bondholders may be quoted as examples. It is, however, open to doubt whether the number of shares held by foreigners has not been considerably over-estimated, and indeed it is probable that, notwithstanding the degree to which these Transvaal goldmine shares were popularised on the Continent for self-evident political purposes—in order to alienate any inconvenient sympathy for the Transvaal Government—the British still hold the control of the greater number of shares. This subject is a big one, and cannot be dealt with here at greater length. The question is whether these alien interests will be taxed by the British Government, and, if so, to what

extent. In the Orange State the question of mines, as of other matters, is not nearly so difficult. There is only one mine of any consequence, the Jagersfontein Diamond Mine, and it is unlikely that there will be any interference with it.

There is great danger that the settlement may favour certain financial interests. The case of Egypt must be borne in mind, where the interests of the Bondholders have been so carefully looked after. But South Africa is no country inhabited by a spiritless race like the Felaheen of Egypt, but by strong, sturdy, resolute and daring men of the same blood as ourselves, who, as the war has shewn, are possessed of a dogged courage which knows no defeat. The danger which would arise from establishing a machinery in South Africa which would benefit the financiers, a rich and acute class, at the expense of the poor and ignorant countrymen—such a danger as already exists in our Asiatic Empire—requires no special argument. Should the British Government ever come to be regarded as a debt collecting agency, as a taxing machine, and out of touch with the sentiment of the colonials (Dutch and British), infinitely worse troubles than those we have lately had will certainly break out afresh. The impression is strong in South Africa that the British system supports the

financier and share dealer. The immunity of diamonds from taxation while bread is heavily taxed and there is no excise on alcohol ("dear bread and cheap brandy") does not reassure the Colonists, the Dutch especially, that power in South Africa, in the Transvaal and Orange State at least, may not be transferred from the corrupt government at Pretoria and the harmless government at Bloemfontein to the controllers of a great financial organisation.

The land in the Transvaal was divided into something like 12,245 farms, of which 1,612 were sold to outside owners and companies, 6,997 are in the hands of resident owners and companies, and the balance, 3,636, belonged to the Transvaal Government. It is more than likely that a number of these farms may have been disposed of to prevent their falling into the hands of Britain. The Government was also the owner of many undeveloped gold fields. From these two sources a certain revenue can be realised as a contribution towards the cost of the war and to defray the expenses of administration. But, as already said, the main source will have to be the mines and the British people. For a certain term of years import duties might be raised, especially if the rates on the Netherlands Railway Company are reduced to within anything like a reasonable limit. This opens the im-

portant question of the future of that Company, which has a monopoly of railway construction and working in the Transvaal. The Company is not a purely Hollander body, but has German interests connected with it. The Transvaal Government received 85 per cent. of the profits, 10 per cent. going to the shareholders (the Government being one) and 5 per cent. to the directors. The whole of the debenture issue were guaranteed by Government, who notwithstanding these pecuniary interests had no share in the administration, no legal right to reduce tariffs and not even a director on the board. It is obvious that Great Britain, while inheriting the interests, cannot accept the situation as it stands. Two courses are open. Either by adequate representation on the board and the provision of proper safeguards to ensure the working of the railway on lines compatible with the interests of colonists, or by expropriation to become sole owners of the railway. This can legally be done on a year's notice being given to the Company, the shareholders being entitled, to twenty times the average dividend for the last three years plus one per cent. of the nominal capital for each year up to the end of the concession. The expense would be large, something under £10,000,000, but the Government, holding the majority of shares, would receive a large

proportion of this, and there is little doubt that the line, even with greatly reduced tariffs, would be a paying concern. Something can be realised from the importation of dynamite, the present monopoly being done away with. By these and similar means a revenue can be realised without resorting to the imposition of direct taxation on land or incomes, which would press heavily on the Boer farming population, but all these sources of revenue are connected more or less directly with the mining interests.

The conditions of the Orange State are altogether different from those of the Transvaal. Here there are no mines, with the exception of the Jagersfontein diamond mine. The population is probably not much more than 200,000, of these 77,000 being whites, of whom 15,000 are British subjects. The revenue is a little over £400,000, the expenditure rather less, and the public debt about £40,000. The railways, valued at £2,500,000, are the property of the State, and Government has other assets in the telegraphs, undisposed land, etc. The burghers have to pay a small land tax, in this respect differing from the Transvaalers. Under these circumstances, it seems advisable to secure from the railway profits, which will be considerable from through traffic, the greater portion of the revenue needed from the Orange State.

Obviously, it would be most impolitic to exact revenue in any form that would be highly unpopular and would bear heavily on the people, such as an increase in the taxes on articles of consumption, or the addition of any new direct land or income tax, which moreover would be extremely difficult to realise from a scattered farming community.

A not unfair division of the expenses involved first by the war, and secondly by the settlement and development of the country, would be that Great Britain, to whose unpreparedness and neglect the length and costliness of the war is largely due, should bear the chief burden of that, and the conquered States should themselves be made to pay for the policing and settlement of the country and the compensation to colonists. For the two latter it may be necessary to raise a loan, for which the Imperial Government would be guarantee, which would provide working capital for the country, whose exchequer is practically empty, and whose people cannot bear a heavy taxation.

The development of South Africa generally, by means of irrigation, railways and so forth, may probably call for another loan, for which the Imperial Government must be guarantee. These are all productive works, and would be no burden on South Africa.

It would be unwise in the extreme to assume, as is not infrequently done, that the Boers, when once defeated, will abandon all idea of further resistance, and that they will at once appreciate the advantages of British rule. Their whole history seems to point the other way; their stubborn character and their love of extreme liberty seem rather to demonstrate the fact that they will not accept British rule as a boon and a blessing and settle down quietly, but that they will resent it, and all the more so because now they can no longer trek inland, but are closed in on all sides, as it were in a trap. It seems right, therefore, to urge that all reasonable precautions should be taken to preserve the authority of the supreme Government, and not less to avoid in every possible way oppression of the Boers, or even the wounding of their susceptibilities. The suggestion already made of moving bodies of them to the new frontier districts would partly accomplish both of these objects, as it would isolate them, and would not be objectionable, giving them an opportunity of carving out their fortunes away from what they regard as the corrupting influence of the Randt.

It must not be supposed that because the Boer was incapable of appreciating the "generosity" which gave him back his independence after Majuba that he is utterly unable to understand generous treatment.

Conciliation must be used, if the country is ever to be tranquil, but it must go hand in hand with justice and firmness. We have heard so much of the impossibility—illustrated by Lord Roberts' first attempts after his entrance into Pretoria—of conciliating the Boers, who reward such an attitude with treachery, that a few more words may be said on this subject.

There is obviously a great difference in the state of affairs before the armed resistance of a people is at an end, and afterwards—when their leaders are prisoners or fugitives and their forces entirely broken up. Although for the last few months it has been obvious to all outside the Transvaal that the Boers must have come almost to the end of their tether, this was by no means so plain to the ignorant and obstinate farmers themselves, who were constantly encouraged by their leaders with false reports. We know that when the crisis in China arose, Kruger, who had confidently expected some European complication, told his burghers that now the English must draw off their men. While a ray of hope remained, therefore (and it did so till the last commando was dispersed) the Boer, wherever he was, his wife and children, felt it a positive duty to deceive and hoodwink the British, if by so doing they could further the cause of their own people. It is impossible, therefore, to regard as serious

any oath of allegiance taken under such circumstances. Once the Transvaal army is entirely disbanded, their power entirely crushed, a new epoch arrives, and then is the critical time when conciliation coupled with discretion is the safest way. And here it cannot be too strongly urged that the men employed in the work of pacification should be men of Colonial experience, and who have some knowledge and understanding of the Dutch.

The new administration of the Transvaal and Orange State will have very serious difficulties to contend with, amongst other things in the organisation of the Civil Service. The Orange State service was fairly honest, but the Transvaal was notoriously corrupt, the *personnel* has been mainly built up of foreigners who are absolutely committed against everything British, and this Anglophobism has been considered sufficient excuse for a system of widespread corruption and incompetency. There are exceptions, of course—some Colonial Afrikanders for instance — whose services should of course be retained, and it is advisable to retain as many as possible, for otherwise a malcontent class is increased, whose ex-officialdom gives them a hold on the people. Altogether, this question of the reorganisation of the Civil Service—what is to be done with the mass of Hollander officials, not to

speak of the presidents and high officials—is no easy one.

For many years there must be a large military force in South Africa (experts must decide the number, but 30,000 would be the minimum), more especially in the Transvaal and Orange State. The possibility of the Boers settling down to guerilla warfare is not one to be lightly dismissed, and indeed is extremely probable unless they are handled with extreme tact, as well as resolution, by some soldier-administrator with intimate knowledge of the maze of difficulties to be overcome. The period of this military administration would be naturally provisional, and should be preparatory to the creation of a self-governing confederation under British control. The country of South Africa is not, as is usually supposed, composed of a number of States corresponding with the geographical conditions. It has to be borne in mind that, as has been remarked, South Africa is the great interior plateau, and the coast country a mere fringe, an adjunct to that plateau. The different sections of the country are alike in the respect that they are cattle-rearing and agricultural countries, except of course for the mining, which will not be permanent. The social life is much the same throughout, as is the aspect of towns and villages. The British control the trade of

the country, internal and external; but the ability to transport and export produce to local or foreign markets at the minimum cost, and to import foreign articles at the lowest possible duties, is to the evident interest of the whole people. It is to be hoped that the barriers which have hitherto prevented the successful carrying out of a Customs Union to provide complete freedom of internal trade—difficulties mainly created by the jealousies and rivalries between the various sections of the country (Cape and Natal, the Eastern and Western sections of Cape Colony)—will vanish now the opposition of the Transvaal has no longer to be considered. The moment seems propitious for the creation of such a Union, the first step towards political confederation. The fact that the chief question in South Africa, after all, is that of white and black makes greatly towards a confederation of some sort, for it is only by such a step that the problem of their relations can be solved. With all their differences the British and Dutch in South Africa are quite at one as to the dangers ahead from the black element, and are almost unanimously agreed that the blacks must not receive political equality with the whites, and should be induced (should this read "compelled"?) to support themselves and "contribute to the general good," in other words, be made to work. Rhodes'

view of the question, as given in the debate on the Glen Grey Act, represents the general colonial view, namely, that the Kaffirs are big children and must for the next hundred years be treated as such. It will take some time, however, for the antagonism between Boers and British to disappear, and a period must elapse before the bitterness and ill-feeling can die out. People who deny the existence or permanence of such feeling can never have seen, as has the writer, the soreness even amounting to resentment which still survives in the Southern States of America against their Northern conquerors.

It is now universally granted that confederation, to be real and lasting, must be voluntary, spontaneous, and that the demand must come from South Africa itself. Confederation must evolve itself in South Africa in the States which are to make up the Union, and must not come from Downing Street. In alluding to this question of confederation it is necessary to refer here to the wish expressed in certain quarters that Rhodes should not be allowed to have any say in the question of settlement, either immediate or future. It seems altogether absurd, whatever view may be taken of Rhodes, to suggest such a thing, for the idea of his being a negligeable quantity in South Africa is out of the question. Almost as well

try to settle the South African question without taking into account the Randt. But, apart from Rhodes, there are many men of ability and character in South Africa whose influence and assistance in the re-organisation of the administration may be counted on, whether in the Transvaal, the Orange State, or Cape Colony.

In the coming settlement it will be necessary to reconsider the question of the relations between South Africa and the Mother Country. That the whole machinery for dealing with foreign and colonial affairs is antiquated and out of date has long been apparent, and the vital necessity for a complete change is borne in upon one irresistibly by a consideration of the past history of South Africa—the vacillations, the in-acquaintance with facts, and the absence of any real and living touch with South African affairs, and especially the colonial aims and aspirations, prejudices and passions, during the past hundred years. It was this want of touch on the part of Holland that largely contributed to the failure of the Dutch Africa Company, that led Great Britain to antagonise the colonists on the occasion of the emancipation of the slaves, and to attempt later the importation of convicts. Their successful resistance to the last measure gave the colonists their first sense of independence

The reasons for so many blunders and so much trouble in the past are those which culminated in the present conflict between Dutch and British, conducted with the lack of knowledge and foresight always displayed by the latter in dealing with South Africa, which unless remedied will lead to further and more serious troubles in the future, and may even bring about the loss of South Africa to the British Empire. The Colonial Office, dealing as it does with forty separate and independent Governments and controlling no less than fifty-six Colonial Governors — apart from the various dependencies under British protection, but as yet without regular administration—is quite unequal as at present constituted to deal with this Herculean task. In addition to Cape Colony, Natal and Bechuanaland, there is the immense territory of Southern Rhodesia requiring close attention, and to these are now added the Transvaal and Orange State. The various problems demanding settlement at an early date, which have been briefly indicated, are such as to demand the very highest statesmanship in the mother country and South Africa. In view of the fact of the stupendous character of the work to be performed throughout a scattered empire; in view

of the condition of many British Colonies (for instance the West Indies group); in view especially of the incapacity of Governments generally to grasp the situation in South Africa prior to the present war, and of the incessant blundering in dealing with the Colony throughout the whole period of British intercourse, can there be any hope that, *as matters now stand*, South Africa will be wisely dealt with? It may seem hardly an opportune time to undertake a complete reorganisation of the whole control of the British Colonial and Foreign system. But crises demand exceptional treatment, and Britain stands to-day at a critical turning point in her history. With the Far East slipping away from the grasp of the great sea trading Power into the arms of the great military land Power—the Northern Colossus—with that power already at Herat (the key to Afghanistan, and therefore to India), and coming down to the Persian Gulf, closing in, no longer slowly and steadily as in the past, but with giant strides, upon India, who can doubt that the coming struggle for Asia is close at hand? And at a time when the fate of Asia seems to be hanging in the balance, and when there is an almost universal anti-British Bond at work throughout the world, comes this question of the settlement of Africa.

One step that can be reasonably taken, one deserving immediate adoption, is the creation of special Departments of the State to deal with African and Asiatic affairs. It is a fact quite unrealised by the general public that Colonial affairs are managed far less by Secretaries of State, universally credited with being the controlling factor, than by the permanent officials who, to a degree unconceived by the man in the street, have the real power, while the semblance rests with the chief. Secretaries of State may come and go—there has been during the last hundred years an average term of occupancy of less than two and a half years for each—but the permanent officials remain. Now and then there may be a strong Secretary, an able departmental Administrator, a man of masterful character, such as there is to-day, but such men are not frequent, and the majority of the holders of this office have been men who by education, training and temperament were nearly always ignorant of Colonial affairs, and not infrequently also indifferent. The great object was to keep clear of political slips generally and to avoid all worry. This became a tradition with the Colonial Office, and it was only natural that the servants should fall in with the humour of their

masters. The permanent officials, men who have risen in the public service in one department, may, indeed in the very nature of things must, have known theoretically a good deal about Africa, as about Asia or Australia. But in no department is the staff either adequate or sufficiently organised. Here, as in the case of the whole Colonial Office, much depends on the head. With a man of strength and ability things may go fairly right, but this cannot always be counted on, and in any case (whether the head be able or not) the knowledge of the permanent officials, no matter how wide, how all-embracing it may be, is after all purely academic. The man who has spent a few months on the Veldt, who has seen something of Asia, who has lived up country in Australia, and who has kept his eyes open, knows more that is practically useful than the oldest of permanent officials (and many of them *are* old) can possibly have learned from poring over records or by the perusal of official correspondence. The permanent official, however, is bound to be a man full of information of a sort, full of details that are necessary to his chief, and it is inevitable that the head must be largely dependent upon his subordinates, and frequently greatly influenced by them in a thousand different ways that

need not be specified. The Colonial policy of Great Britain has been conducted in the past, is carried on to-day—almost incredible though it may seem—under such circumstances. The present so-called African Department of the Colonial Office is fortunate in being superior to its predecessors and in having a capable head, and from it can be created the new Department of State. It would need, however, to be quite re-organised, and though the suggestion may seem superfluous to anyone not acquainted with the present system, it would be advisable to secure the services of some men, at all events, who have actually been in Africa. The India Office is officered on these lines, and if India requires such a council it may be fairly assumed that Africa cannot afford to dispense with one.

One step that seems to be necessary in the general settlement is the placing of Uganda, British East Africa and Zanzibar under the Colonial Office, with a sufficient administration, and thus avoiding the ludicrous attempt to run these territories by the Foreign Office, with resulting blunders like that of the Uganda Railway, of which the cost from £1,800,000 has already risen to £5,000,000 with little prospect of finality. It requires no special argument to demonstrate that, if the Colonial Office has proved

itself unequal to the management of its charge, the Foreign Office is not likely to be an improvement.

Without attempting to deal in detail with the question of the political re-arrangement of South Africa, it is necessary here to indicate the outlines of a system which seems to the writer to be best suited to existing circumstances. A confederated South Africa has long been the aspiration of many—the goal towards which they have pressed—ever since the time when Sir George Grey first expressed the desire to see it, and was recalled in consequence as a "dangerous man." The time is not yet, but is already in sight, and towards this all true well wishers of South Africa must work.

As has been said already, this confederation must evolve itself. It is no good to bring it ready framed and with the ink scarcely dry to the Afrikander. The Afrikander must frame it and decide the best moment for its adoption, and then approach the Government at home. Meanwhile, for some time to come the newly conquered territories must be administered as Crown Colonies by governors and executive councils with legislative powers, and Rhodesia must be treated on the same lines, this being a good opportunity of placing it on the same footing. Responsible government will follow in due course, in ratio with the

steadiness and ability of the colonists themselves. When this stage is reached there will very soon arrive the auspicious moment when the States of South Africa can combine under one motto—"Union is strength"—and the Afrikander nation will begin its true career as an offshoot of the great British race. One of the immediate steps to be taken is either the abolition of the office of High Commissioner or the separation of that office from the Governorship of Cape Colony. This is a change long needed, and emphasized by recent events. With the diverse interests and varied problems of the different colonies it is impossible for the Governor of any one section to administer the affairs of all with just attention to the interests of each. The Governors of Crown colonies and of colonies with representative government should be placed under a Governor-General or High Commissioner. This, without interfering with the internal arrangements of the responsible colonies, would bring the general interests of all under one Head, and harmonise the conflicting elements by a policy wide enough to embrace the welfare of all.

The question of language is one which, despite its apparent simplicity, presents difficulties. The recognition of Dutch in Cape Colony has given it a standing there which it would have lost naturally, for the lan-

guage actually spoken by the Dutch differs and is debased from that used in law courts in the Cape Colony, and throughout the civil service of the Transvaal.

The actual spoken language of the present Dutch is illiterate, and no violent measures are needed for its repression, but as far as official recognition is concerned English must be firmly proclaimed and held throughout South Africa as the language of the country. Plenty of facilities must be afforded to the Boers for learning it, and to avoid all opportunity for grievance an interpreter, or an official with a working knowledge of the "taal," must be available at every public office.

Among the conclusions arising from the foregoing considerations is one that must suggest itself to anyone who studies, however casually, the map of the country whose future we have been discussing. It is not only the desire to paint the map red that forces us to this conclusion, but the desire to make the country we have already acquired truly successful and prosperous, in which condition, as we have frequently shown, she will afford an open market and field of enterprise not only to ourselves but to the whole world. Large sections of the inland territory, of whose development and exploitation we have said so much, depend greatly on the

access to them by harbours on the neighbouring coasts, which are in the hands of Portugal on the east and Germany on the west. The unhealthy nature of these coasts, and the lack of enterprise on the part of Portugal, who held her strips of territory long before Britain appeared on the scene, have prevented either of these coasts from being really valuable to their owners, while the occupation of the hinterland by a strong power still further limits their possibilities.

It should be the object of friendly diplomacy to see that the Portuguese territory is opened and safeguarded for us, and it is understood that the Anglo-German agreement of October, 1898 (the text of which has never been published), is an important step in this direction, providing for the right of pre-emption of all Portuguese Colonies in Africa by the two Great contracting Powers. Portugal, however, is not believed to be a party to this transaction, and she refuses to admit the self-evident fact that her dominion in South Africa is drawing to a close. The recent arbitration with regard to the Delagoa Bay railway clears the ground for further developments, and once we realise how important the question is to the future of South Africa we cannot doubt that ways and means of obtaining control of Delagoa Bay will be found without alienating the Portuguese.

To sum up briefly. Gold—hitherto the chief factor in the development of South Africa—is not a permanent one. Settlement of British colonists on the soil can alone solve the problem of the future, and accomplish the fusion of Boer and British. The settlement must come as the natural sequence of improved conditions of life and agriculture, and the two most important factors in these are railways and irrigation. The Native question can only be dealt with by a united white race, and the Blacks should everywhere in South Africa be placed on one footing, and given the benefit of training which may fit them one day to take a higher position. No attempts should be made at hasty or premature legislation, but the ideal of a Confederated South Africa should be kept steadily in view.

With the adoption of these or similar principles and the pursuance of a steady and persistent policy we may expect to see wonderful developments in South Africa. The territory incorporated under the British Flag is the last bit of white man's country in the entire universe to be had by ambitious Powers.

We must not forget, however, that in assuming the control of this vast territory we are taking equally vast responsibilities, and we cannot hope to reap unless we are prepared to sow. South Africa is rich, but gold is

not to be picked up there, nor are the streets paved with that metal. She has just gone through a great upheaval, and many elements of discord still rend her, —not yet is she capable of realising our dreams,—but if we bear our responsibilities in a manner befitting our race and country we shall be repaid an hundredfold, for, on the ashes of her dead self South Africa will arise, Phœnix-like, and in her glorious Renascence we shall get back with usury what we have spent on her,—our money, our time, and the blood of our bravest.

APPENDIX I.

CHIEF EVENTS IN SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY.

Cape of Good Hope discovered by Bartholomew Diaz	1486
The East Coast explored by Vasco da Gama	1497-8
First appearance of Dutch in South Africa	1595
First Dutch Settlement at Table Bay	1652
Arrival of First French Huguenots	1689
First Kaffir War	1779
British occupy the Cape	1795-1803
British occupy the Cape (second time]	1806
Cape Colony ceded to Britain by William of Orange	1814
Wars of the Zulu Chaka	1812-1828
First British Settlers arrive	1820
First British Settlement in Natal	1824
English Language enforced in Cape Colony	1825-1828
Emancipation of Slaves	1834
The Great Trek	1836-7
Matabililand Conquered by Umziligazi	1838
Emigrant Boers occupy Natal	1838
British annex Natal	1843
Orange River Sovereignty	1848
Independence of Transvaal recognised (Sand River Convention)	1852

Independence of Orange River Boers recognised (Bloemfontein Convention)	1854
Representative Government established in Cape Colony	1854
Diamonds discovered on Lower Vaal River	1869
Griqualand West annexed	1871
Responsible Government established in Cape Colony	1872
Delagoa Bay Arbitration	1872-75
British annex Transvaal	1877
British War with Zulus, Zululand conquered	1879
Retrocession of Transvaal	1881
Acquisition of Bechuanaland	1884-85
Germans occupy Damaraland	1884
Convention of London with Transvaal	1884
The Rand. Gold Field discovered	1885
British South African Company founded	1889
Pioneer Expedition occupies Mashonaland and Manicaland	1890
Matabililand conquered by Chartered Company	1893
Responsible Government established in Natal	1893
Protectorate over Amatongaland	1894
The Jameson Expedition	1895
War commenced between Britain and the Transvaal and Orange Free State	1899
Annexation of Orange State and Transvaal	1900

APPENDIX II.

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS OF CAPE COLONY.

[*From "Cape Statistical Register."*]

—	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Copper ore	323,385	326,757	254,184	253,681	202,316	284,800	246,597	218,422	300,772	262,830
*Corn, grain and meal	15,012	17,934	14,094	8,671	7,712	6,523	7,051	22,896	16,063	27,239
Feathers—ostrich	365,884	563,948	468,221	517,009	461,552	477,414	527,742	519,539	605,058	748,565
Fish—salted or cured	19,735	18,279	17,086	16,722	10,474	9,835	10,650	6,379	12,966	7,800
Fruit—dried:										
Currants and raisins	698	240	414	247	319	137	148	303	201	124
Other sorts	277	97	133	73	147	107	103	99	110	81
	975	337	547	320	466	244	251	402	311	205

In 1886 the value of exported dried fruit was £3,135; 1887, £748.

—	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898
Hair—Angora	351,544	337,239	355,426	373,810	527,619	421,248	710,867	572,230	676,644	647,548
Hides—ox and cow	68,575	69,085	72,354	73,973	79,283	78,264	111,[illegible]	76,808	217,754	199,543
Horns "	6,131	6,028	5,345	6,196	7,927	8,579	7,641	6,864	8,523	11,523
Horses	965	2,487	1,230	6,390	630	1,714	1,730	4,492	681	3,550
Ivory	2,495	2,742	3,495	2,408	829	1,914	2,022	368	992	1,086
Precious stones—diamonds	4,325,137	4,162,010	4,174,208	3,906,992	3,821,443	3,013,578	4,775,016	4,646,487	4,454,376	4,566,897

* In these figures the produce of South Africa is included.

Skins—goat	123,784	*142,425	130,454	132,717	131,843	111,825	116,422	89,782	87,423	104,524
" sheep	241,939	231,593	287,121	271,689	285,983	229,122	246,986	229,626	208,990	244,411
Wool:										
Fleece washed	198,253	149,812	153,342	142,356	139,849	129,435	95,826	86,752	62,813	53,677
Scoured	764,135	841,383	752,965	750,124	503,561	625,693	616,256	526,228	408,977	281,115
Grease	1,288,987	1,204,845	1,358,191	1,136,613	1,211,666	844,504	983,838	1,261,575	1,024,989	1,431,948
	2,251,375	2,196,040	2,264,498	2,029,093	1,855,076	1,599,632	1,695,920	1,874,555	1,496,779	1,766,740
Spirits—brandy	4,062	2,557	2,237	2,157	2,455	2,863	3,985	4,602	4,567	5,628
Wine	23,120	19,537	20,183	18,645	18,964	18,908	20,289	21,412	17,715	15,043
The *Grand Totals* (Colonial product-) Exports for the respective years are as follows	9,083,718	9,653,982	10,934,974	11,774,556	12,765,770	13,503,044	16,577,157	16,700,102	19,176,061	24,112,483
If *Gold* (including produce of South Africa) is deducted as follows	911,791	1,497,455	2,781,576	4,095,512	5,259,120	7,147,308	7,975,637	8,252,543	10,991,926	15,394,442
	8,171,927	8,156,527	8,153,398	7,679,044	7,506,650	6,355,736	8,601,520	8,447,559	8,184,135	8,718,041
If *Diamonds* deducted (the figures given including produce of South Africa) as follows	4,325,137	4,162,010	4,174,208	3,906,992	3,821,413	3,013,578	4,775,016	4,646,487	4,454,376	4,566,897
	3,846,790	3,994,517	3,979,190	3,772,052	3,685,207	3,342,158	3,826,504	3,801,072	3,729,759	4,151,144

* Classed in *Cape Statistical Register* as "Produce of Grain Farming," and includes barley, beans and peas, bran, wheaten flour, maize, oats, wheat, and "unenumerated"—this last an insignificant amount.

GENERAL INDEX.